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support of an arrest warrant supply the probable cause. See Smith v. Stynchcombe, 234 Ga. 780, 781, 218 S.E.2d 63 (1975) (rejecting defendant’s effort ‘to have the probable cause requirements of an affidavit on which a search warrant is issued [cit.], made applicable to arrest warrants’ and concluding that Georgia imposes no such requirements on its arrest warrants.). See OCGA § 17–4–40(a) (magistrate judge may issue arrest warrant for the arrest of any offender against the penal laws based on probable cause either on the magistrate judge’s own knowledge or on the information of others given to him or her under oath). That some of the information reflected in the affidavits may have been based on hearsay statements given to officers during their investigation does not render the affidavits invalid. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (fact that affidavit submitted in support of search warrant relied on hearsay was not alone sufficient to render affidavit invalid), overruled on other grounds, United States, v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 864–865, 165 S.E.2d 302 (1968) (finding it well-settled that probable cause to arrest may be established by hearsay evidence); see also Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 773(7), 700 S.E.2d 350 (2010) (rejecting claim that arrest warrant was illegal because supporting affidavit contained inaccurate and incomplete information where evidence did ‘not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause.’).” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (March 16, 2015). Affirming 325 Ga.App. 429 (750 S.E.2d 789) (2013); in DUI prosecution, Court of Appeals correctly found that trial court erred by granting motion to suppress. 1. Trial court erroneously held that officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI, and thus suppressed implied consent testing results. Trial court found that defendant was one of two drivers involved in an early-morning accident that killed the other driver; that “officers observed that Hughes appeared to be sleepy, had ‘glassy eyes with some redness,’ and ‘may have been unsteady on his feet’;” that “officers arrested Hughes at the scene for running a red light and vehicular homicide in the second degree;” and that “[u]pon arresting Hughes for those offenses, the officers searched his person and found ‘some tightly packaged pills, which they could not immediately identify.’” Defendant also concedes that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for running a red light and second-degree vehicular homicide. As a matter of law, these findings of fact and undisputed facts require a finding that the DUI arrest was supported by probable cause. “[W]hen a court considers whether an officer had probable cause to arrest a suspect, the court must focus on the facts and circumstances then known to the officer, and it must inquire whether those facts and circumstances could lead a prudent person—that is, a reasonable officer—to conclude that the suspect probably has committed an offense. The facts and circumstances known to the officer must be examined altogether, for it is the totality of those facts and circumstances that matters , Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769) (2003), not any one fact or circumstance standing alone. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740) (2002) (rejecting a ‘divide-and-conquer analysis’ that gives no weight to any observation by an officer that was ‘by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation’).[fn] Because the standard for probable cause depends on what a reasonable officer could have concluded from those facts and circumstances, the standard of probable cause is an objective one, and the subjective thinking of the actual officers in a particular case is not important.[fn] See Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 371(2)(b), n. 13 (761 S.E.2d 19) (2014) (‘As the United States Supreme Court has explained, subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis, and the constitutional reasonableness of [searches and seizures] do not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813(II)(A) (116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89) (1996). And where the totality of the facts and circumstances known to an officer would permit reasonable officers to draw differing conclusions about whether the suspect probably has committed a crime, probable cause exists, and it is for the officer—not judges, trial or appellate—to decide which of the several reasonable conclusions to draw. See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F3d 25, 32–33(II)(C) (1 st Cir., 2004) (‘[T]he availability of alternative inferences does not prevent a finding of probable cause so long as the inference upon which the officer relies is reasonable.... Consequently, when conflicting inferences are available to resolve the issue of probable cause and both of them are plausible, it does not matter which inference is correct.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted)).” “[T]o the extent that the training and experience of the actual officer would have permitted a reasonable officer with the same training and experience to understand the facts and circumstances known to the officer in a unique way, the training and experience of the officer should be considered. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911) (1996) (‘[O]ur cases have recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.’ (Citation omitted)). Such training and experience are among the ‘facts and circumstances’ known to the actual officer, and the question is whether the same training and experience would have led a reasonable officer—in connection with all of the other facts and circumstances known to the actual officer—to conclude that the suspect probably had committed a crime. See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253(3) (497 S.E.2d 367) (1998).” 2. While appellate courts “owe substantial deference to the way in which the trial court resolved disputed questions of material fact, we owe no deference at all to the trial court with respect to questions of law, and instead,