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we must apply the law ourselves to the material facts.” (Exception: “[w]e have held that less deference to the trial court is owed to the extent that material facts definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility. See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178(1) (657 S.E.2d 863) (2008) (to the extent that material facts could be discerned by appellate court from video recording, no deference to findings of trial court was required).”) Trial court here “appears as well to have made the mistake of employing a ‘divide- and-conquer’ approach, considering each of the several facts and circumstances known to the officers in isolation, rather than altogether.” Disapproving appellate decisions likewise applying a “divide-and-conquer” approach to the facts, Gray v. State, 267 Ga.App. 753, 756(2) (600 S.E.2d 626) (2004), State v. Goode, 298 Ga.App. 749, 750 (681 S.E.2d 199) (2009), and State v. Encinas, 302 Ga.App. 334, 336 (691 S.E.2d 257) (2010).” Horne v. State, 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. “When the officer learned that Horne did not have a valid driver's license, the officer had probable cause to arrest Horne for driving without a license. [fn] See Edge v. State, 269 Ga.App. 88, 89 (603 S.E.2d 502) (2004).” White v. State, 310 Ga.App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for cocaine possession and obstruction affirmed. Fact that defendant was acquitted of the offense for which he was first arrested (here, pedestrian under the influence) didn’t mean that his arrest lacked probable cause. “See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga.App. 417, 419(1) (650 S.E.2d 268) (2007).” State v. Crumpton, 302 Ga.App. 602, 692 S.E.2d 39 (March 3, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress; officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and conduct body cavity search of defendant suspected of possessing drugs in his anal cavity. “In this case, the arresting officer testified that he arrested Crumpton based on the information he had received prior to this arrest [defendant’s criminal history], what he witnessed that night prior to the stop [driving to avoid police, slumping in seat, leaning back in seat with legs fully extended, shaking nervously], the fact that Crumpton fully exposed his genital area but would not let him view his anal cavity, and the fact that the drug dog alerted on the seam of the door of the vehicle where Crumpton was seated. In our view, the trial court correctly determined that these circumstances did not ‘combine to show probable cause,’” quoting Lawrence v. State, 300 Ga.App. 731, 733 (686 S.E.2d 352) (2009)]. “Although the arresting officer knew of Crumpton's prior criminal history, that information apparently included only one incident in which Crumpton was suspected of illegal activity involving drugs and no arrest or charges arose out of the incident. And even if Crumpton consented to a search of his person and even allowed the officers to view his genital area, consent to search does not normally encompass a body cavity search, Walker v. State, 299 Ga.App. 788, 791(2) (683 S.E.2d 867) (2009), and refusal to allow a more invasive search did not give the officer probable cause to arrest Crumpton. As to the drug dog's alert, the video of the stop shows the dog also alerted on the rear panel of the vehicle as well as the driver's side door and contraband was not found in either location.” Lawrence v. State, 300 Ga.App. 731, 686 S.E.2d 352 (November 3, 2009). Officer had no probable cause for arrest, and thus no grounds for search incident to arrest, where he saw defendant’s wife pick defendant up from a club “known to the officer for drug activity.” Officer initiated a traffic stop when wife swerved off the road and stopped. “The officer was familiar with Lawrence and was aware that he had a history of drug offenses. Lawrence's wife at first denied picking up anyone in front of the club, but then admitted that she had picked up Lawrence.” Officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, whereupon wife said defendant “put something in his pocket.” “The officer did not know what was in Lawrence's pocket. But he instructed Lawrence to get out of the car and empty his pocket, and Lawrence pulled from his pocket a bag of cocaine.” “The circumstances of this case … do not combine to show probable cause. [fn] The officer did not testify to observing any illegal or furtive behavior or any anxiety on the part of Lawrence. There was no evidence that the officer had received information from a reliable source that Lawrence was in possession of drugs that night. Any suspicion that Lawrence had put drugs in his pocket arose not from the officer's observation of Lawrence but from an ambiguous comment made by Lawrence's wife, and the officer admitted that he did not know from that comment what Lawrence had placed in his pocket.” Minor v. State, 298 Ga.App. 391, 680 S.E.2d 459 (June 16, 2009). Defendant’s detention for two hours while officers obtained a warrant to search his residence was an arrest (but supported by probable cause). 1. Detention was an arrest. “[I]t is clear from the evidence that once the deputies secured the premises and required that Minor wait outside of his home while they obtained a search warrant, Minor was not free to come and go as he pleased. In fact, both Deputy Cooley and the deputy who assisted her in securing the premises testified that Minor was not allowed to leave at that point. Additionally, both deputies pursued Minor and subdued him when he attempted to go back inside his home. Furthermore,