☢ test - Í

Minor's detention for approximately two hours while the deputies waited for the search warrant cannot be characterized as a brief, investigatory stop. See Jackson [ v. State, 191 Ga.App. 439, 441(2) (382 S.E.2d 177) (1989)] (defendant's detention for nearly two hours cannot be justified as a second-tier encounter); Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga.App. 85, 87 (372 S.E.2d 440) (1988) (physical precedent only) (defendant's 30 minute detention while officers waited for drug dog constituted an arrest); Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 238-239(3) (244 S.E.2d 346) (1978) (physical precedent only) (‘where detention exceeded 40 minutes, it tortures the English language to say it was a “brief” stop or “momentary detention”’).” 2. Probable cause. “Deputy Cooley smelled the odor of raw marijuana on Minor when she initially spoke to him, and she also found marijuana seeds and stems in his friend's vehicle, which Minor had exited only moments before. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Cooley had probable cause at that time to arrest Minor for possession of marijuana. [Cits.]” Johnson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 254, 676 S.E.2d 884 (April 1, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; defendant’s arrest for driving on suspended license was supported by probable cause, although “dispatch advised [Officer] Payne that Johnson had not been served with notice of the suspension of his license.” Search incident to that arrest resulted in defendant’ conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. “Here, after observing Johnson driving and pulling him over for a headlight violation, Payne ascertained that Johnson's license was suspended for failure to respond to a traffic citation. … Under such circumstances, Payne had probable cause to arrest Johnson. Cox v. State, 250 Ga.App. 69, 70 (550 S.E.2d 127) (2001) (‘[O]nce the officer, after observing Cox operate a vehicle, determined that Cox's license was suspended, probable cause for arrest was established.’) (footnote omitted); McCullough v. State, 211 Ga.App. 16, 18 (438 S.E.2d 369) (1993) (computer printout verifying that defendant had been driving under suspended Tennessee license provided probable cause for arrest). The fact that central dispatch informed Payne that Johnson had not been served with a notice of suspension does not alter our conclusion.” “Contrary to Johnson's argument, dispatch's report that Johnson had not been served with notice of suspension did not affirmatively establish that Johnson had no actual or legal notice of the suspension and that the license suspension therefore was not effective. Service of written notice is not the only means by which a driver may obtain actual knowledge of a suspension. For example, a driver has actual knowledge if, on a prior occasion, a police officer has verbally notified him or her of the suspension. See Arnold v. State, 89 Ga.App. 900, 901(2) (377 S.E.2d 918) (1989). Even in the absence of actual knowledge, a driver may be convicted if he or she has legal notice of suspension. ‘The term legal notice has been referred to as the same as constructive notice. Constructive notice is information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law because the fact could have been discovered by proper diligence and the situation was such as to cast upon a person the duty to inquire into it.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hale v. State, 188 Ga.App. 524, 525(1) (373 S.E.2d 250) (1988). Notwithstanding the information he received from central dispatch, Payne had no way of knowing if Johnson had actual knowledge that his license was suspended by means other than formal service of notice or whether facts or circumstances existed that would have placed Johnson on constructive notice. We do not believe that this uncertainty rendered Payne powerless to arrest Johnson. [fn: We note that, previously, OCGA § 40-5-121 provided that ‘[t]he charge of driving with a suspended or disqualified license shall not be made where the suspension is a result of a failure to respond under Code Section 40-5-56... unless the arresting officer has verified a service date and such date is placed on the uniform citation.’ OCGA § 40-5-121(b)(1) (2005). A 2006 amendment deleted this subsection, and no such requirement was in place at the time of Johnson's arrest. See Ga. L.2006, p. 449, § 12. ] ” Notes that, effective January 1, 2010, OCGA § 40-5-56, is amended to provided that a traffic citation form putting defendant on notice of suspension for failure to appear “shall be sufficient notice of said suspension.” Accord, Agnew v. State , 298 Ga.App. 290, 680 S.E.2d 141 (June 10, 2009). Smith v. State, 294 Ga.App. 761, 669 S.E.2d 735 (November 20, 2008). Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant based on false information provided during traffic stop. “Even in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that Smith himself had committed a crime, police were engaged in the lawful discharge of their duties when, having lawfully removed Latasha Smith from the car she was driving, they attempted to determine whether her brother could drive the car home by asking his name and whether he was licensed to drive, and when they checked the veracity of the information he gave them. See State v. Menezes, 286 Ga.App. 280, 282-283 (648 S.E.2d 741) (2007) (noting the absence of evidence that the arresting officer unreasonably detained the defendant passenger in the course of issuing the driver a citation). When Smith gave false identifying information to officers thus engaged in the lawful discharge of their duties, he provided them with probable cause for his arrest .” Swicord v. State, 293 Ga.App. 545, 667 S.E.2d 401 (September 15, 2008). Arrest was supported by probable cause: officer had run the tag on defendant’s vehicle the day before and ascertained that the tag registration was suspended and vehicle had no insurance, but the officer didn’t stop or arrest at that time because he didn’t see the vehicle operated on a