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public road. The day after running the tag, the officer saw the vehicle operated on a public road, and arrested defendant without re-checking the information. “Although the investigator did not confirm the information immediately before arresting Swicord, the information was just 24-hours old, and the investigator had no reason to believe the car would be or could be properly tagged, insured, and registered within that period. This evidence was sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that Swicord had committed or was committing an offense. See Stewart v. State, 220 Ga.App. 295(1) (469 S.E.2d 424) (1996) (a police officer who previously encountered a defendant in court and knew the defendant's license had been revoked had knowledge of specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal conduct).” Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga.App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (May 16, 2008). “‘[A] determination of probable cause need not rest on the knowledge of the arresting officer alone, but can rest upon the collective knowledge of the police when there is some degree of communication between them. (Punctuation omitted.) Murphy v. State, 286 Ga.App. 447, 449 (649 S.E.2d 565) (2007). … In this case, at the time of Daugherty’s arrest, the officers knew that within minutes of the carjacking three men matching an eyewitness’s description were seen in the vicinity of the crime driving vehicles also matching the eyewitness’s description. These men were followed by police until they abandoned their vehicles and fled across a highway and through a muddy, overgrown area. Almost immediately, the officers found Daugherty on the other side of the highway, at a closed business, with muddy shoes and debris on his clothes, sweating profusely. He generally matched the description given of one of the fleeing suspects, and he could not give a logical explanation for his presence at that location. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Daugherty. See Dixon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 740, 742(2) (615 S.E.2d 838) (2005) (probable cause existed to arrest defendant stopped soon after theft of trailer and near where it was abandoned, when suspects and vehicle matched description given by eyewitnesses); Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105(3)(a) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996) (probable cause existed to arrest defendant when vehicle and its occupants, including defendant, matched description in police lookout, and occupants fled from police); Gray v. State, 207 Ga.App. 648, 649-650(2) (428 S.E.2d 663) (1993) (probable cause existed to arrest defendant who fit description of suspect, who was breathing heavily and sweating, whose shoes and socks were wet and covered in grass clippings and those conditions existed at scene of crime, and who gave conflicting explanations of his presence near scene of crime).” Burgess v. State, 290 Ga.App. 24, 658 S.E.2d 809 (March 4, 2008). Officers had probable cause to arrest two men found on property where owner had complained of trespassers who might be growing marijuana; the two were found with tools used to grow and harvest marijuana – hoes and stakes. The men then failed to stop when instructed to do so; one ran away, the other continued riding his four wheeler. “‘Flight can be a significant factor in determining probable cause.’ Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105(3)(a) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996) (citations omitted); see also Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 803(7) (514 S.E.2d 1) (1999) (noting that flight in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search).” Boyd v. State, 290 Ga.App. 34, 658 S.E.2d 782 (March 4, 2008). Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for loitering. “Under Georgia law, ‘[a] person commits the offense of loitering or prowling when he is in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.’ [fn: We note that the concern for safety of persons addressed by this statute encompasses threats to individuals and to ‘peace and order’ arising from the sale of illegal drugs. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Griffin v. State, 223 Ga.App. 796, 797(1) (479 S.E.2d 21) (1996). ] OCGA § 16-11-36(a). Among the factors that an officer may consider in determining whether an alarm is warranted is whether the person takes flight when police arrive, refuses to identify himself, or tries to conceal himself or any object. Id. In addition, if circumstances allow, the officer should allow the person the opportunity to dispel any such alarm by asking that ‘the person identify himself and explain his presence and conduct.’Id. We find that under the totality of the circumstances here, Spata was justified in believing that Boyd had committed the offense of loitering. Boyd was leaning against a car talking to a man in a housing project where complaints of drug activity had initiated police patrols of the area. Boyd’s companion attempted to conceal a package when he saw police and then attempted to flee the scene. Although Boyd did not flee, he moved away from the car across the street. He was not able to offer a credible explanation for his presence in the housing project, and did not provide a clear answer when the officer asked him about the ownership of the car. Boyd’s explanation that he was waiting for a ride raised questions in the officer’s mind when compared with Boyd’s prior behavior of leaning on the car across the street. The officer felt it would be unusual for someone to lean on someone else’s car in that manner. Accordingly, we find that probable cause existed for Boyd’s arrest and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. See In re: R.F., 279 Ga.App. 708, 711(2) (632 S.E.2d 452) (2006); Castellon v. State, 200 Ga.App. 478, 480(3) (408 S.E.2d 493) (1991); Hansen v. State, 168 Ga.App. 304, 306(2) (308 S.E.2d 643)