☢ test - Í

(1983).” Vega v. State, 285 Ga.App. 405, 646 S.E.2d 501 (May 16, 2007). “Flight from the scene of a crime may constitute sufficient probable cause for an arrest under certain circumstances. … Here, Vega’s presence at the scene of an ongoing robbery, coupled with his flight from police, justified his arrest.” State v. Morehead, 285 Ga.App. 320, 646 S.E.2d 308 (May 9, 2007). Trial court properly granted motion to suppress based on illegality of arrest. Arrest was based on criminal trespass, but evidence supported finding that the criminal trespass notice given to defendant “did not explicitly apprise Morehead that he could not return to the train station” where he was arrested; warning telling Morehead not to return to “the property” could have been construed to refer only to the area where he was previously loitering, and not to prohibit him from catching a train at the MARTA station. Fleming v. State, 282 Ga.App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769 (October 17, 2006). Defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, as police had evidence other than the statements of the informant whose reliability was unknown. “Regardless of the reliability of an informant, where police hear an individual state that he will be at a certain place at a certain time to sell cocaine to the informant, the police’s subsequent observation of an individual at that place at the designated time gives them probable cause to arrest that individual, particularly where that individual converses with the informant at the site as if he had been waiting for him. See Parker v. State , 218 Ga.App. 770, 771(1), 463 S.E.2d 70 (1995); State v. Hancock , 203 Ga.App. 577, 578, 417 S.E.2d 381 (1992). The information received from the untested informant may be helpful and corroborating, but the personal observations and perceptions of the police alone more than suffice to supply the probable cause needed for a warrantless arrest.” Simmons v. State, 281 Ga.App. 654, 637 S.E.2d 70 (September 22, 2006). Officer responded to a report of a suspicious person entering an automobile at 2:00 a.m., and found defendant asleep in a lawn chair in the carport. Arresting defendant for public drunkenness, the officer patted defendant down and discovered drugs on his person. Held, officer had sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant for public drunkenness even though there was insufficient evidence to convict for that offense. “After ascertaining that he was intoxicated and so confused that he did not know where he was, the officer had a reasonable basis for placing him under arrest even though, under the facts, a conviction against Simmons for public intoxication would not be sustainable. [footnote: To be guilty of public intoxication, one must manifest his intoxicated condition ‘by boisterousness, by indecent condition or act, or by vulgar, profane, loud, or unbecoming language. ’ OCGA § 16-11-41(a); see Welch v. State, 251 Ga. 197, 198-199(4) (304 S.E.2d 391) (1983).] If the officer acting in good faith believes that an unlawful act has been committed, his actions are not rendered improper by a later legal determination that the defendant’s actions were not a crime according to a technical legal definition or distinction determined to exist in the penal statute. It is not the officer’s function to determine on the spot such matters as the legal niceties in the definition of a certain crime, for these are matters for the courts. The question to be decided is whether the officer’s motives and actions at the time and under all the circumstances, including the nature of the officer’s mistake, if any, were reasonable and not arbitrary or harassing. Dixon v. State, 271 Ga.App. 199, 201-202 (609 S.E.2d 148) (2005) (footnote and punctuation omitted); but see United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003) (police officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot provide objectively reasonable grounds for reasonable suspicion). Here, the officer’s actions and motives were reasonable and neither arbitrary nor harassing. The seizure of the cocaine was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest.” Compare to Stephens (April 7, 2006), below. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga.App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (April 7, 2006). “[U]nlike reasonable suspicion of general criminal activity (which justifies an investigative stop), probable cause for arrest requires that the particular crime be specified and that therefore some circumstances reflecting the elements of that crime must be present. See Bothwell v. State , 250 Ga. 573, 576(2) (300 S.E.2d 126) (1983) ( Terry stop ‘can be based on a showing of “reasonable suspicion” to believe that criminal activity is afoot rather than the more rigorous standard of “probable cause” to believe that a particular crime has been committed’); Aguero v. State , 169 Ga.App. 462, 464-465(2) (313 S.E.2d 735) (1984) (same).” Howard v. State, 273 Ga.App. 667, 615 S.E.2d 806 (June 15, 2005). Officer’s arrest of defendant was justified even if underlying warrant was not. Here, defendant had already been arrested on the warrant and posted bond, but dispatch advised officer that warrant was still outstanding. “‘A radio transmission that confirms an outstanding warrant establishes the necessary probable cause to arrest. Although insufficient to authorize conviction, National Crime Information Center printouts have been held reliable enough to support a reasonable belief which is needed to establish probable cause for arrest. Probable cause to arrest [Howard] existed once the officer learned of the warrant. [Howard’s] arrest was therefore lawful. Whether or not the information about the warrant later proved incorrect or invalid is immaterial.’ (Citations and