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punctuation omitted) Buchanan v. State, 259 Ga.App. 272, 274-275 (576 S.E.2d 556) (2002). ‘The material inquiry is whether the facts within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest constituted reasonably trustworthy information which was sufficient to authorize a prudent person to believe that [the suspect] had committed an offense. [Cit.]’ Harvey v. State, supra, 266 Ga. [671, 673, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996)]. Here, the officer recognized Howard and, based on his belief that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for him, he called radio dispatch to confirm his suspicion. The evidence supports a finding that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer were sufficient to justify Howard’s arrest. ‘Even if such information is subsequently proven to be wrong, the Supreme Court has held that in hindsight, it will not declare an arrest to be invalid when the arresting officer reasonably relied upon information which he had no reason to think was incorrect.[Cit.]’ Fuller v. Troup County, 253 Ga.App. 228, 230(1) (558 S.E.2d 777) (2002). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Howard’s motion to suppress.” Combs v. State, 271 Ga.App. 276, 609 S.E.2d 198 (January 12, 2005). “Here, the officer found Combs unconscious in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle in possession of syringes and vials admittedly containing injectable drugs. Combs claimed that the vials contained drugs similar to steroids. The officer testified that, in his professional experience, steroids are not lawfully administered through injection except in a doctor’s office. That knowledge by the officer, combined with Combs’s inability to provide any documentation showing that he was in lawful possession of the drugs, established probable cause for his arrest. [Cit.]” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (December 15, 2003). Defendant occupied front passenger seat of car stopped and searched by police. Police found large amount of cash in glove compartment, and five baggies of cocaine in back seat. Held, this evidence gave officers probable cause to arrest defendant, as well as the other two occupants of the vehicle. “We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” “In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), we noted that ‘a car passenger … will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.’ Id., at 304-305, 119 S.Ct. 1297. Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him.” State court erred in dismissing the money “as a factor in the probable-cause determination, stating that ‘[m]oney, without more, is innocuous.’ [Cit.] The court’s consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light of our precedents. [Cits.]” Willis v. State, 263 Ga.App. 740, 589 S.E.2d 282 (October 22, 2003). Acting on information from a detective that defendant was engaged in the drug trade out of a described vehicle in a certain area, and had a suspended driver’s license, officer confirmed via dispatch that defendant’s license was suspended. He then saw a vehicle and driver matching the description given, pulled it over, and in fact found defendant. “When Officer Stone informed Willis that his license was suspended, Willis stated that he had been issued a work permit and was on the way to his grandmother’s house. Officer Stone placed Willis under arrest for violation of his work permit, based on the conclusion that his grandmother's home was not a permissible destination. When Officer Stone checked Willis's license a second time, he confirmed that Willis had a probationary license to drive to and from work and medical appointments. After placing Willis under arrest, Officer Stone searched his vehicle and discovered crack cocaine and marijuana in plastic bags, as well as a set of scales.” Defendant moved to suppress evidence, contending the stop lacked articulable suspicion of criminal activity and was merely pretextual; and that there was no probable cause for arrest because defendant was driving within the limits of his permit. Held, officer had articulable suspicion that defendant was driving on a suspended license at the time of the stop, as he had verified that license was suspended; fact that officer had ulterior motives for stop is irrelevant: “‘[w]hen a police officer sees a traffic offense occur, a resulting traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the officer has ulterior motives in initiating the stop.’” Notwithstanding defendant’s later testimony that he lived at his grandmother’s house, “[t]he facts known by Officer Stone were sufficient to authorize him to believe that Willis was driving with a suspended license and was violating the terms of his work permit. Accordingly, the search was incident to a valid arrest, and the trial court did not err in denying Willis's motion to suppress.” Accord, Thomas v. State , 289 Ga.App. 161, 657 S.E.2d 247 (January 9, 2008) (ulterior motive did not affect validity of traffic stop). Adams v. State, 263 Ga.App. 694, 589 S.E.2d 269 (October 21, 2003). “The dispatcher notified Officer Owens that he would be responding to a domestic violence call, and [witness] pointed out the fleeing offender. Then Adams refused to comply with Officer Owen’s order to stop…. [B]ased on the totality of the circumstances, including Adams’s attempted