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sanctioned the use of the Heimlich maneuver to remove suspected contraband after the defendant swallowed it. In Beck v. State, [216 Ga.App. 532, 534–536(1), 455 S.E.2d 110 (1995),] the police officer sprayed a chemical irritant into the suspect's eyes when he refused to spit a bag out of his mouth. This Court did not find unreasonable the use of the spray or the subsequent order, after Beck swallowed the bag, that he provide a urine sample and have his stomach pumped.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Sanders, 247 Ga.App. at 172, 543 S.E.2d 452.” Christy v. State, 315 Ga.App. 647, 727 S.E.2d 269 (April 18, 2012). DUI and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; contrary to defendant’s argument, traffic stop with guns drawn didn’t amount to arrest. “[I]nstead of stopping his vehicle when the officer activated his own vehicle's blue lights, Christy sped up and did not stop until he had pulled into the driveway of his residence. Faced with a suspect who appeared to be fleeing from him in a vehicle into which he could not see, the officer drew his weapon, ordered Christy to show his hands, and then briefly handcuffed him. In addition, the officer informed Christy at the time that he was detaining him until the officer could ‘figure out what [was] going on.’ Given these circumstances, the initial encounter between the officer and Christy was a second-tier traffic stop ‘rather than a full-scale arrest, as the forcible nature of the stop arose from the officer's primary concern at that point for his safety, and as the nature of the detention did not unambiguously convey a prolonged custodial arrest.’ [ Lewis v. State, 294 Ga.App. 607, 609(1)(a) (669 S.E.2d 558) (2008)].” Buford v. State, 312 Ga.App. 411, 718 S.E.2d 605 (November 4, 2011). DUI conviction; trial court properly denied motion to suppress State blood test, finding that defendant was under arrest when implied consent was read. “It is undisputed that at the time of his encounter with the trooper, Buford was secured to a board in a hospital room with tubes attached to his body. Even assuming that Buford was alert rather than coming in and out of consciousness at the time, a reasonable person in his situation could not have thought that he was free to leave when the trooper announced that he was charging him with DUI. ‘“[A] defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force.”’ Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 716 (620 S.E.2d 380) (2005), quoting Clement v. State, 226 Ga. 66, 67(2) (172 S.E.2d 600) (1970).” State v. Padidham, 310 Ga.App. 839, 714 S.E.2d 657 (July 13, 2011), affirmed on other grounds, 291 Ga. 99, 728 S.E.2d 175 (May 7, 2012). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by suppressing alco-sensor test and Intoxilyzer results. “The trial court's determination that Padidham was in custody prior to taking the alco-sensor test was clearly erroneous. Padidham was permitted to wait in his own car rather than a police car; he was not handcuffed; and he was told by the officer that he had been stopped for speeding and was going to been given a ticket. The officer told Padidham that he thought he was too intoxicated to drive, but that he was going to verify this suspicion. He did not tell Padidham that he would be arrested. Padidham may not have been free to leave during the eight to ten minutes that elapsed before the alco-sensor test was administered, but not every detention is an arrest. [Cit.]” DiMauro v. State, 310 Ga.App. 526, 714 S.E.2d 105 (July 6, 2011). In DUI prosecution, evidence supported finding that defendant wasn’t in custody when asked to take HGN evaluation. “DiMauro was allowed to walk around and was not put into handcuffs or a patrol car while he and the first officer awaited the arrival of the second officer. DiMauro had been informed that he was suspected of driving under the influence and that the second officer had been called to further investigate this suspicion. And the delay occasioned by the need to summon a second officer was only about twenty minutes.” Reggler v. State, 307 Ga.App. 721, 706 S.E.2d 111 (February 4, 2011). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Defendant’s temporary detention in handcuffs and in back of patrol car didn’t amount to arrest, citing “ White v. State, 208 Ga.App. 885, 888(2), 432 S.E.2d 562 (1993). In White, an officer waiting for backup handcuffed a suspect and placed him in the back of a police car while he further investigated a check forgery case. Id. at 887-888(2), 432 S.E.2d 562. This court held that, given that the officer was alone in the dark with the suspect whose actions were suspicious at best, and the location being investigated was close by, the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 888(2), 432 S.E.2d 562. This court reasoned than an ‘officer remains particularly vulnerable during such a stop precisely because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, [and] the officer must make quick decisions as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. The circumstances in this case are quite similar. The officer responding to an audible alarm call was alone, Reggler acted suspiciously, and the townhouse being investigated was close by.” Distinguishing Scretchen v. State, 192 Ga.App. 436, 385 S.E.2d 115 (1989): “Here, Reggler was not taken anywhere, but was seated in the patrol car parked at the townhouse where he lived while the officer awaited backup and then investigated the residence with the alarm. Under the circumstances in this case, the officer acted reasonably by detaining Reggler while she investigated the alarm. See