☢ test - Í

Campbell v. State, 255 Ga.App. 502, 505-506(1)(b), 565 S.E.2d 834 (2002) (briefly placing a detainee in the back of a patrol car to further a legitimate investigation does not constitute an arrest).” In re: R.M., 305 Ga.App. 483, 699 S.E.2d 811 (August 2, 2010). In juvenile’s delinquency petition, trial court properly ruled that juvenile’s detention for DUI by trooper constituted an arrest notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-45(b): “[t]he taking of a child into custody is not an arrest, except for the purpose of determining its validity under the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” “As our Supreme Court explained in Hough [ v. State, 279 Ga. 711 (620 S.E.2d 380) (2005)] ‘an arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of another to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 716(2)(a). Specifically, the Court continued, ‘The defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force. Thus, implied consent is triggered at the point that the suspect is not free to leave and a reasonable person in his position would not believe that the detention is temporary, regardless of whether a ‘formal arrest’ has occurred. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. We conclude that R. M.'s detention by [Trooper] Shirah, following Shirah's statement that R.M. was under arrest, was an ‘arrest’ sufficient to trigger the implied consent law, notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-45(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying R. M.'s motion to suppress on this ground. Id.” Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 695 S.E.2d 604 (June 7, 2010). Interim review of death penalty prosecution. 1. Fact that defendant was taken from his home in the early morning hours, “handcuffed, placed in a patrol car, and taken to the [police department]” did not make his subsequent statement to police custodial, given that he was not restrained during the two-hour interview; was told that he “was not under arrest for anything,” and agreed to talk; the detective was “neither hostile nor accusatory”; the detective’s question about whether defendant “would be attending his college class tomorrow … would indicate to a reasonable person in Sosniak’s position that he was not” being arrested; and defendant, despite saying he was exhausted and wanted to go home, made no effort to do so. 2. “‘[A] police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda. [Cit.]’ Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324(II) (114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293) (1994). The relevant inquiry remains how a reasonable person in Sosniak's position would have perceived his situation. See McAllister v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 228(1) (507 S.E.2d 448) (1998).” State v. Curles, 304 Ga.App. 235, 696 S.E.2d 89 (May 28, 2010). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress field sobriety evaluations, Alco-Sensor and state test results based on alleged Miranda violation; contrary to trial court’s findings, defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Trial court found that “[a] reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave[,]” when officers came to defendant’s house at 5:30 a.m., responding to a call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspected DUI driver. Defendant’s mother allowed officers in the house and woke teenage defendant up to speak with them. Defendant agreed to officers’ request to step outside and see his damaged vehicle. “[P]retermitting whether the officers told Curles to step outside or requested that he do so, the evidence did not authorize the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person in Curles's position would have believed that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Monahan v. State, 292 Ga.App. 655, 658-659(1) (665 S.E.2d 387) (2008) (motion to suppress properly denied because officer's request that a DUI suspect step outside of her home to talk to the police did not render her in custody for Miranda purposes); Amin v. State, 283 Ga.App. 830, 831-833(1) (643 S.E.2d 4) (2007) (DUI suspect was not in custody for Miranda purposes when a police officer questioned him in a restaurant, took his driver's license, asked him to step outside, and then performed field sobriety evaluations before arresting him); State v. Foster, 255 Ga.App. 704, 706 (566 S.E.2d 418) (2002) (reversing exclusion of field sobriety tests based on defendant's argument that he was not given Miranda warnings where the tests were administered after the officer told the defendant not to drive because he was visibly drunk, instructed him to remain in the back seat of his vehicle, admonished the suspect that he would be arrested if he drove the car under the influence, watched the suspect climb into the front seat and drive the car away from the scene, and then asked the suspect to exit the car after he found it behind a building). Accordingly, because the officers' requests did not render Curles in custody for purposes of Miranda, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of what occurred after he left his house on the ground that he was not then given Miranda warnings. See State v. Lupuloff, 301 Ga.App. 513, 514 (687 S.E.2d 861) (2009); Monahan, 292 Ga.App. at 659(1).” Suluki v. State, 302 Ga.App. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (March 9, 2010). Conviction for possession of firearm by convicted felon reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to file motion to suppress. Officers were hiding in hotel room awaiting a murder suspect, Head. When Suluki approached, officers took him down and handcuffed him. “One officer testified that after Suluki was handcuffed in the hallway, the officer ‘went there to pick the person up