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off the floor.’ As he was picking up Suluki, the officer ‘noticed what I felt may have been a handgun in his waistband, rear waistband. He was laying face down when I went to pick him up and I grabbed it and pulled it out and definitely it was a handgun.’ We find that the evidence presented at trial satisfies Suluki's burden of demonstrating ‘a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion. [Cit.]’ Richardson [ v. State, 276 Ga. 548, 553(3) (580 S.E.2d 224) (2003)]. ‘An arrest warrant is valid only against the person named in it. An officer arresting one not bearing the name set forth in the warrant acts at his peril. And even though he acted in good faith in arresting another than the person named, the warrant will not justify the action.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grant v. State, 152 Ga.App. 258(1) (262 S.E.2d 553) (1979).” Trial court properly found that defendant was effectively arrested, not merely detained: “the trial testimony demonstrates a strong showing that a person in Suluki's position would have believed that his detention would not be temporary. The police surprised him from inside his room, he either fell or was taken down to the floor by police officers, placed in handcuffs, and questioned about a murder before the gun was located by the police.” Minor v. State, 298 Ga.App. 391, 680 S.E.2d 459 (June 16, 2009). Defendant’s detention for two hours while officers obtained a warrant to search his residence was an arrest (but supported by probable cause). “[I]t is clear from the evidence that once the deputies secured the premises and required that Minor wait outside of his home while they obtained a search warrant, Minor was not free to come and go as he pleased. In fact, both Deputy Cooley and the deputy who assisted her in securing the premises testified that Minor was not allowed to leave at that point. Additionally, both deputies pursued Minor and subdued him when he attempted to go back inside his home. Furthermore, Minor's detention for approximately two hours while the deputies waited for the search warrant cannot be characterized as a brief, investigatory stop. See Jackson [ v. State, 191 Ga.App. 439, 441(2) (382 S.E.2d 177) (1989)] (defendant's detention for nearly two hours cannot be justified as a second-tier encounter); Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga.App. 85, 87 (372 S.E.2d 440) (1988) (physical precedent only) (defendant's 30 minute detention while officers waited for drug dog constituted an arrest); Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 238-239(3) (244 S.E.2d 346) (1978) (physical precedent only) (‘where detention exceeded 40 minutes, it tortures the English language to say it was a “brief” stop or “momentary detention”’).” Gray v. State, 296 Ga.App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36 (March 24, 2009). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s statement. Defendant was not under arrest although officers ordered him off his mother’s couch and handcuffed him; “rather, the record shows that Gray was placed in investigatory detention at that point for valid officer safety reasons.” Officers were investigating armed robbery of defendant’s next door neighbors, and followed his footprints to his door. “An ‘officer must make quick decisions as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger,’ Jackson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 492, 495(2) (512 S.E.2d 24) (1999), and the officer is not required to risk his life in order to effectuate an investigatory detention. Holsey [ v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 861(6) (524 S.E.2d 473) (1999)]. Mindful of these principles, we have held that in sufficiently dangerous circumstances, officers may handcuff a suspect as part of an investigatory detention without transforming the detention into a de facto arrest. See Jackson, 236 Ga.App. at 495(2). We conclude that the circumstances of the present case were sufficiently dangerous to justify the officers in handcuffing Gray as part of his investigatory detention,” especially since “the armed robbery had been an extremely violent one in which the victim had been threatened and beaten badly with a firearm.” Monahan v. State, 292 Ga.App. 655, 665 S.E.2d 387 (July 10, 2008). Officer’s request that defendant come outside her house, as part of DUI investigation, did not place her under arrest. “A recording of Monahan's initial encounter with the officer captured the officer saying to her: ‘How are you doing? – Do what? – Good. Can I get you to come out? You the one driving? – No? Who's driving your car? Oh, OK. Come on out here and talk to me, if you don't mind. Your neighbor was? So, all these people out here who saw you is just gonna lie, right? – No, all these people that followed you. Come on out here for me if you don't mind.’” “[T]he evidence … authorized a finding that the investigating officer's request was not with any language, tone, or accompanying gesture such that a reasonable person would have believed that his or her freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Grandberry v. State, 289 Ga.App. 534, 658 S.E.2d 161 (February 7, 2008). Detention for 40 minutes after emergency call from named purported robbery victim exceeded the scope of a second-tier stop where veracity of information couldn’t be verified and was called into question. “Although police initially had reason to believe that they had received information from an identified victim who was going to meet with officers within minutes, it became apparent shortly after Grandberry was detained that the complainant had failed to appear at the crime scene, contrary to his promise to do so. Moreover, police had no way to contact the complainant because he had not called 911 using his own phone. While the complainant had claimed Grandberry had a shotgun, no weapon was found in Grandberry’s car. The police nevertheless held Grandberry while ‘rid[ing] around in the area’ in the hopes that they would find the complainant. …