☢ test - Í

Given that the police had no way to contact the complainant, … the police investigation could not be reasonably characterized as likely to conclude within any particular time frame. Meanwhile, the police were detaining Grandberry based solely on the word of the complainant, whose identity could not be confirmed and whose reliability had become an issue. Under these circumstances, law enforcement’s detention of Grandberry for 40 minutes exceeded the scope of the brief investigatory stop authorized by Terry . ” “As police lacked objective facts and circumstances to believe Grandberry had committed a crime, they lacked probable cause to detain him beyond that authorized by Terry. ” McDevitt v. State, 286 Ga.App. 120, 648 S.E.2d 481 (June 25, 2007). Defendant was not under arrest merely because officer “expressed frustration at McDevitt’s excessive speed by asking what justified his driving at 70 mph in a residential area.” “[Officer] Whelchel did not make any statement or take any overt act that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not merely temporarily detained during an investigation. [Cits.] Nor did the fact that Whelchel did not let McDevitt drive home without determining whether it was safe for him to do so place McDevitt ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes here. [Cits.] Thus, the trial court’s conclusion on this issue was not clearly erroneous. [Cit.]” Marshall v. State, 286 Ga.App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674 (June 22, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statement; evidence did not demand a finding that defendant was in custody. “The evidence shows that after [victim] Spivey reported that Marshall had stolen her car, police placed Marshall in a patrol car and brought him to Spivey’s apartment to make sure he was the right suspect. After Spivey positively identified Marshall as the culprit, police asked Marshall about the car, at which point he made the statement at issue. Marshall also told police that he knew a woman … who would corroborate his statement. It was then that Marshall was formally arrested.” “[A] suspect in a criminal investigation is not automatically under arrest upon being placed in the back of a patrol car. See Campbell v. State, 255 Ga.App. 502, 505-506(1)(b) (565 S.E.2d 834) (2002). Rather, a suspect may be temporarily detained in this manner during the investigation without triggering the requirement that Miranda rights be given. See id. Here, the Officer testified unequivocally that Marshall was not under arrest and that he was merely investigating Spivey’s allegation that her car had been stolen. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marshall’s motion to suppress. Poole v. State, 270 Ga.App. 432, 433-434(1)(a) (606 S.E.2d 878) (2004).” Tune v. State, 286 Ga.App. 32, 648 S.E.2d 423 (June 20, 2007). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was not under arrest when asked to perform field sobriety tests: “Tune knew she was being investigated for DUI, and had been told that she was drunk, however, she was not placed in the back of a patrol car nor was she handcuffed. ‘Under these circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude that [her] freedom of action was only temporarily curtailed and that a final determination of [her] status was simply delayed.’ [Cit.] The trial court’s finding that Tune was placed under arrest only after [Officer] Richie conducted the field sobriety tests is not clearly erroneous. [Cit.]” Accord, Parker v. State , 326 Ga.App. 175, 754 S.E.2d 409 (February 4, 2014). United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir., June 12, 2007). Officers detained defendant at a gas station after he left premises under surveillance for drug trafficking. Although the officers had no prior knowledge of defendant in relation to their drug investigation, they decided to have a drug dog sniff the car. Finding that the drug dog was busy elsewhere, the officers decided to transport defendant (in handcuffs) and his vehicle to the location where the drug dog was, which they did without defendant’s consent. The drug dog alerted to drugs in defendant’s trunk. Held, the trial court properly held that the non-consensual transport of defendant and his vehicle was a seizure requiring probable cause, and that officers had no probable cause. “A seizure occurs when there is a meaningful interference with a person’s possessory interest in property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). The bounds of investigative detention of personal property are defined by the limits applicable to the detention of a person. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny, an investigatory detention can be supported by reasonable suspicion; however, an arrest, i.e. the seizure of a person, must be supported by probable cause. Therefore, the factors used to determine whether a Terry stop has matured into an arrest are also useful in evaluating whether a seizure of property required probable cause. The non-exclusive factors we consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop are: ‘“[1] the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, [2] the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, [3] the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and [4] the duration of the detention.”’ United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146 (11th Cir., 2004) (citations omitted). The seizure here was unreasonable absent probable cause because of its scope and intrusiveness. While not unduly lengthy, the seizure was accomplished by the taking of Virden’s vehicle to a new location for the purposes of investigation. We have frowned upon the movement of individuals for such purposes. See United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 760-61 (11th Cir., 1988); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985) (‘[O]ur view continues to be that the line is crossed when the