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police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.’). Furthermore, to effectuate this seizure the officers handcuffed Virden, and without formally arresting him, drove him to another location. Such a seizure exceeds the boundaries of a Terry stop .” No probable cause here: “The officers lacked the requisite probable cause to seize Virden’s car while at the gas station. At the time of the seizure, the officers were aware of the following suspicious facts about Virden: (1) he left a location of suspected drug activity, (2) he appeared to have control over the garage because the garage door closed without anyone else being seen, and (3) he misstated exactly where he had been to the police. However, neither Virden nor his vehicle were known to the investigation, despite more than year of detective work . Cf. United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1262-64 (11th Cir., 2006) (finding probable cause exists where driver arrives on rural scene of drug activity driving a vehicle associated with the head of the drug conspiracy). Additionally, we have consistently held that mere presence at a crime scene without more is insufficient to establish probable cause. Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1081 (11th Cir., 2003). Without more, the facts in the officers’ knowledge at the time of seizure were insufficient to give rise to probable cause.” Amin v. State, 283 Ga.App. 830, 643 S.E.2d 4 (March 1, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; defendant was not under arrest at the time he made certain statements and performed field sobriety evaluations. Finding a damaged vehicle, parts, and oil in a McDonald’s parking lot, an officer went to investigate. Persons in the parking lot told him the driver was in the restaurant. Defendant was the only customer in the restaurant, “and he matched the description given to the officer. The officer asked Amin if he was the driver of the vehicle. At this point, the officer noticed that Amin’s ‘eyes were glazed over, bloodshot, and he smelled of an odor of alcoholic beverage.’ When Amin did not respond, the officer asked him for his driver’s license and asked him to step outside, which he did. According to the officer, he asked Amin to step outside so that he could talk to him in front of the vehicle and make sure that the two were talking about the same vehicle and so the witness could identify him. Once they were outside, the officer pointed to the vehicle and asked Amin again if he was the driver. Amin stared at the officer, and after a long pause responded, ‘no.’ The officer then told Amin that he believed Amin was driving the vehicle and that he believed the tag would show that the vehicle belonged to Amin or someone he knew. The officer asked Amin to ‘just be honest with me.’ The officer also told Amin he had a witness that saw him driving the vehicle. … Amin then told the officer he was driving the vehicle.” “[Defendant] argues that he was under arrest when the officer informed him of the presence of witnesses.” Held, defendant was not under arrest. “ A person is not in a state of custody merely because he is a prime suspect at the time he is interrogated by the police or their agent. Even if the police have probable cause to arrest at the time of the interview and secretly intend to charge the suspect at some future time, such facts are immaterial to a determination of whether the suspect was in custody at the time of the interview, except when and to what extent the police communicate their future intent to arrest during the course of the interview. Thompson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 74, 75-76(1)(a) (506 S.E.2d 201) (1998). The officer in the present case was investigating whether Amin was driving the vehicle, and, while Amin certainly knew he was driving the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a reasonable person would not believe he would be arrested for merely driving a vehicle. ‘ The “reasonable person” in this situation does not mean a person with a guilty conscience who knows as soon as they see the blue light that they will be arrested for matters known to them, but which are not as yet known to the police.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 116, 119(2) (506 S.E.2d 234) (1998). Although Amin may have known he was subject to arrest for driving the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the officer did not know this when he began his investigation regarding the automobile parts and oil on the curb and trailing to the vehicle. We conclude, as did the trial court, that a reasonable person under these circumstances would not have believed his freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed by the investigation.” United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir., December 20, 2006). Trial court properly characterized officers’ detention of defendant as a Terry stop, not an arrest, although defendant was detained for approximately 60 minutes before officers formally arrested defendant for bank robbery. “In United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (11 th Cir., 1988), we set out four, nonexclusive factors to aid us in differentiating between a Terry stop and an arrest: (1) the law enforcement purpose served by the detention; (2) the diligence with which the officers pursued the investigation; (3) the scope and intrusiveness of the investigation; and (4) the duration of the detention. Id. at 759. In balancing these factors, we are to focus on ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.’ United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1147 (11 th Cir., 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)).” First three of these factors weigh in favor of trial court’s finding: obvious law enforcement purpose in investigating bank robbery suspect; diligent pursuit of that purpose; and fact that investigation was conducted, by defendant’s choice, at defendant’s home, where he was not restrained and where his parents were present. “The fact that the duration of the stop