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was sixty minutes does not override the other three factors weighing in favor of its validity in these circumstances. See United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (11 th Cir., 2000) (upholding detention under Terry where defendant was handcuffed in the back of a police car for seventy-five minutes); Hardy, 855 F.2d at 761 (under the circumstances detention for fifty minutes was not too long for Terry purposes).” Distinguishing “ United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir., 1992), and United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9 th Cir., 1980)” “In both cases the defendants were held in police-controlled locations and were not allowed to move. Here, on the other hand, Street was offered a choice about where he would be questioned; he was questioned in the comfort of his own home; and he was not handcuffed or restrained in any way. He was free to move about and did so. Unlike the suspects in Codd and Perez, Street was not detained for longer than sixty minutes without the existence of probable cause.” Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1 (December 11, 2006). Fact that defendant was handcuffed for transport to give police statement does not require finding that he was under arrest. “The evidence is unclear whether, after Smith freely consented to further questioning, he was handcuffed, as a safety precaution, by Officer Harris for transport to the precinct. However, even if he was, that would not necessarily demand a finding that he was under formal arrest or vitiate the consent to further questioning that he had given previously to Detective Walker. Officers may handcuff a suspect during an investigatory stop when such action is either reasonable under the circumstances to protect themselves or the public, or to maintain the status quo,” citing Bolden (October 4, 2004), below ; United States v. Williams, 185 Fed. Appx. 866 (11 th Cir., 2006). “See also United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351(II)(B) (11 th Cir., 2000) (holding that ‘to maintain the safety of the officers and the ongoing investigation, handcuffing [the suspect] and detaining her in the back of the police car was reasonable’); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556-1557 (11 th Cir., 1989).” In re: J.D.G., 278 Ga.App. 672, 629 S.E.2d 397 (January 25, 2006). Search was a search incident to arrest, even though officer had not told the defendant he was under arrest and had not handcuffed him yet (but was preparing to do so). “J.D.G. appears to advocate for a ‘bright line’ rule to determine when a suspect is actually under arrest for purposes of a search incident to the arrest. However, there is no ‘bright line’ rule when it comes to determining whether a person has been placed under arrest under these circumstances. See State v. Jones, 245 Ga.App. 763, 766(2), 538 S.E.2d 819 (2000). Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether, at the time of the allegedly improper search, the officer had probable cause to arrest the suspect. See id; Wright [ v. State, 272 Ga.App. 423, 428(3), 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005)]; Satterfield v. State, 251 Ga.App. 141, 144, 553 S.E.2d 820 (2001). In this case, [Officer] Higgins’ discovery of the cellophane bag of marijuana, which was still warm to the touch, gave her probable cause to arrest J.D.G., and she was thus authorized to search him incident to that arrest. See id. It follows that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. See id. at 144-145, 553 S.E.2d 820.” Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459, 604 S.E.2d 133 (October 4, 2004). Defendant’s statement was non-custodial: although she was taken to the police station in handcuffs, she voluntarily went with the investigator, was told she was not being arrested, and was only handcuffed for officer safety because the investigator was driving an unmarked vehicle with no protective shield. At the station the handcuffs were removed “and she sat in a sitting room rather than an interrogation room. Before any questioning began, she was again told she was not under arrest and she could leave after giving her statement.” She was driven home after the statement, and not charged with murder until two weeks later. Accord, Smith v. State , 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1 (December 11, 2006). Amerson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 855, 602 S.E.2d 857 (July 30, 2004). Court could find that defendant was not under arrest while giving statement to officer in patrol car. Defendant was not handcuffed, was told he was not under arrest, did not have to answer questions and was free to leave. Conversation was held in unmarked police car for privacy. Lewis v. State, 268 Ga.App. 547, 602 S.E.2d 278 (July 15, 2004). Police found Lewis at Bishop’s house when they went to execute a search warrant there. Lewis was apparently engaged in a drug transaction when police arrived. Lewis was taken outside, detained and questioned. Lewis admitted that he was buying drugs from Bishop. He was then released, but later arrested and charged with being Bishop’s drug seller, not a buyer. Held, 6-1 majority finds that Miranda did not apply to this questioning because Lewis was only being temporarily detained, not arrested. “While it is true that the search in this case was made pursuant to consent rather than a search warrant, it is also true that a ‘law enforcement officer coming upon the scene of suspected criminal activity will conduct a general on-the-scene investigation and may detain temporarily anyone at the scene. Such detentions do not trigger the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786 (546 S.E.2d 525) (2001) . In this case, the statements made by Lewis were made during just such an on-the-scene investigation, and Miranda was not triggered.”