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Mayberry v. State, 267 Ga.App. 620, 600 S.E.2d 703 (May 27, 2004). Trial court erred in finding that defendant was not under arrest: “we fail to see how a reasonable person in Mayberry’s position would not have considered himself under arrest, given that initially he was surrounded by police cars, the police handcuffed him to the gurney and accompanied him in the ambulance, and later they handcuffed him to the stretcher at the hospital and restrained his legs. The record shows that the restrictions on Mayberry’s freedom were not due to his status as a hospital patient, as the trial court found, but rather were instituted by the police. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that Mayberry’s statement was made under non-custodial circumstances. See McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493 (591 S.E.2d 788) (2004).” Evans v. State, 267 Ga.App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (May 25, 2004). Distinguishes statutory definition of arrest as found in OCGA § 17-4-1 and “‘arrest’ for purposes of constitutional analysis” such as requires Miranda warnings. “The provisions of OCGA § 17-4-1 were made part of our original Code of 1863 [Cit.] and have long been interpreted as meaning an arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of a person to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. Clements v. State, 226 Ga. 66, 67(2) (172 S.E.2d 600) (1970). This remains the law.” A different definition applies for purposes of Miranda , however: “whether a challenged detention involves the degree of restraint associated with a formal arrest. In [determining this], we apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable person would feel so restrained as to equate the detention to a formal arrest. [Cit.] Notably, a ‘reasonable person’ has been defined as one ‘neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances.’” “Evans’ statement made upon exiting her vehicle to perform sobriety exercises that, ‘I know you’re going to take me in,’ demonstrates her apprehension, not the fact of arrest.” State v. Pierce, 266 Ga.App. 233, 596 S.E.2d 725 (March 12, 2004). During traffic stop, after observing signs of alcohol use and defendant’s admission that he had had “two or three beers,” officer walked “toward Pierce’s open car door, saying, ‘ I’m just going to shut your car door so some other drunk doesn’t take it off. ’” Trial court found this comment sufficient to place defendant in custody, triggering Miranda and making subsequent non-Mirandized field sobriety evaluations inadmissible and subsequent implied consent reading untimely. Court of Appeals reverses; “when all the surrounding circumstances are considered, [officer’s] off-hand comment, though ill-advised, was insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that his detention would not be temporary . [Cit.]” Distinguishes Price v. State , 269 Ga. 222, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998), where defendant was told she was going to jail regardless of performance of field evaluations; “[h]ere, far from indicating that the tests were irrelevant, [officer] stated that the results of the field sobriety tests would determine Pierce’s status.” Accord, Padidham (July 13, 2011), above (officer’s statement to defendant “that he thought [defendant] was too intoxicated to drive, but that he was going to verify this suspicion,” not enough to place defendant under arrest, where defendant not handcuffed or placed in patrol car.); Holt (November 17, 2015), above (trooper’s comment to second trooper, “I’ve got two DUIs, I’ll give you one of them,” was ambiguous, and did not communicate intent to arrest defendant.). State v. Oliver, 261 Ga.App. 599, 583 S.E.2d 259 (June 11, 2003). Merely reading Miranda and Implied Consent warnings does not place defendant under arrest . “We will not penalize an officer for going the extra mile by informing a motorist suspected of alcohol impairment of his Miranda and Implied Consent rights prior to performing field sobriety tests, where, as here, that information is purely superfluous.” Officer read warnings as defendant was being treated at accident scene by paramedics. Trial court held that officer did not yet have probable cause for arrest, so subsequently-acquired evidence (FSE’s) must be suppressed. Court of Appeals reverses: even if defendant was under arrest, the subsequent investigation was authorized because officer had articulable suspicion of DUI; thus the evidence “is sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to be purged thereof.” “[T]he mere fact that an arrest is flawed does not render all subsequently discovered evidence inadmissible.” Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (May 5, 2003). Suspected of complicity in a murder, defendant, “[a] 17-year-old boy[,] was awakened in his bedroom at three in the morning by at least three police officers, one of whom stated ‘we need to go and talk.’ He was taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his underwear in January, placed in a patrol car, driven to the scene of a crime and then to the sheriff’s offices, where he was taken into an interrogation room and questioned. This evidence points to arrest,” contrary to the finding of the trial court. The considerations cited by the trial court for finding that defendant was not under arrest “are no answer to the facts. Kaupp’s ‘okay’ in response to [officer’s] statement is no showing of consent under the circumstances. [Officer] offered Kaupp no choice, and a group of police officers rousing an adolescent out of bed in the middle of the night with the words ‘we need to go and talk’ presents no option but ‘to go.’ There is no reason to think Kaupp’s answer was anything more than ‘a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’... It cannot seriously be suggested that when the detectives began to question Kaupp, a reasonable person in his situation would have thought he was sitting in the interview room as a