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matter of choice, free to change his mind and go home to bed. Nor is it significant, as the state court thought, that the sheriff’s department ‘routinely’ transported individuals, including Kaupp on one prior occasion, while handcuffed for safety of the officers, or that Kaupp ‘did not resist the use of handcuffs or act in a manner consistent with anything other than full cooperation.’ [Cit. to record.] The test is an objective one, see, e.g., [Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)], and stressing the officers’ motivation of self-protection does not speak to how their actions would reasonably be understood. As for the lack of resistance, failure to struggle with a cohort of deputy sheriffs is not a waiver of Fourth Amendment protection, which does not require the perversity of resisting arrest or assaulting a police officer.” “Although certain seizures may be justified on something less than probable cause, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we have never ‘sustained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there for investigative purposes ... absent probable cause or judicial authorization.’ Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985).” Mere reading of Miranda warnings does not necessarily make the custodial statement admissible; trial court must also consider whether the statement was voluntary in light of all the circumstances, including “‘[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,’” ( quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)) all of which, from this record, appear to favor suppression. Conviction reversed and remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statement. State v. Picot, 255 Ga.App. 513, 565 S.E.2d 865 (May 23, 2002). Officers did not have to read Miranda warnings before asking for field sobriety evaluations unless they had actually placed defendant under arrest or led defendant to believe that she was under arrest. The fact that officers had probable cause to arrest or intended to arrest because of suspended driver’s license was inapposite unless such intention was communicated to defendant. “[T]he proper inquiry is whether the individual was formally arrested or restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest, not whether the police had probable cause to arrest.” State v. Jones, 245 Ga.App. 763, 538 S.E.2d 819 (August 31, 2000). In drug prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress; officers’ detention of defendant following traffic stop over her objection amounted to arrest without probable cause. After issuing warnings for traffic violations, officer asked to search defendant’s car; defendant declined to consent, said she was in a hurry to get to work, and told officer he’d have to get a warrant. She did offer, however, for officer to search her parked car while she went inside to work, but officer insisted she stay with the vehicle. Officer instead called for drug dog. It took about three minutes for the drug dog to arrive, then another 15-20 for a supervisor to observe the dog, per department policy. 1. Detention was an arrest. “In this case, the detention was more than a mere investigative stop requiring only reasonable suspicion. Jones had arrived at work, parked her car, and was attempting to report for work. She told the officer she was late for work and that he could search her parked car while she was at work. Thus, there was no rapidly developing situation which would justify detaining Jones. Furthermore, since the drug dog and his handler were already on the scene, despite any departmental rule to the contrary, police could have conducted the free- air search while the officer was issuing warnings for the traffic offenses. Such a procedure would have quickly confirmed or dispelled the officer's suspicions. The officer acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue the less intrusive means of accomplishing his objective. See Alex v. State, 220 Ga.App. 754, 756(2), 470 S.E.2d 305 (1996). We agree with the trial court that, in requiring Jones to wait for the supervisor to arrive before the free-air search began, police detained Jones longer than was necessary and effected more than just a brief investigative stop. DiSanti [ v. State, 190 Ga.App. 331, 378 S.E.2d 729 (1989)], citing Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga.App. 85, 87, 372 S.E.2d 440 (1988); see Migliore v. State, 240 Ga.App. 783, 786, 525 S.E.2d 166 (1999).” Officers lacked probable cause for arrest. “The information possessed by the officer at the time of the arrest—that Jones appeared to be nervous, perhaps because she was late for work, that she had used drugs in the past but had stopped, and that police had very general information from an unknown or at least undisclosed source that Jones was ‘possibly’ transporting drugs—may have established reasonable suspicion to briefly detain her, but it certainly did not establish probable cause to arrest Jones or search her car and purse. See DiSanti, supra.” Harper v. State , 243 Ga.App. 705, 534 S.E.2d 157 (April 26, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress field sobriety results. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his detention hadn’t ripened into arrest, requiring Miranda warnings prior to field sobriety testing. Even if detention was up to an hour, as defendant contends, “[w]e have previously held that a wait of 45 to 50 minutes from the time of a traffic stop to the commencement of an investigative search of a car did not convert the investigation into a custodial situation. See Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 213(3), 515 S.E.2d 397 (1999). Here, Harper was allowed to walk around. He was not placed in the back of the police car, nor was he handcuffed. Officer Stewart told Harper that he had called for a DUI task force