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officer because he was under suspicion of DUI. And although Officer Stewart told Harper that he was not free to leave while they waited for the DUI task force to arrive, not every detention is an arrest. See State v. Dible, 232 Ga.App. 73, 74, 502 S.E.2d 245 (1998). Under these circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude that his freedom of action was only temporarily curtailed and that a final determination of his status was simply delayed. The trial court's finding that Harper was placed under arrest only after the field sobriety test is not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Aldridge (February 2, 1999), below; Abrahamson v. State , 276 Ga.App. 584, 623 S.E.2d 764 (November 30, 2005) (while waiting 10-15 minutes for DUI officer, sergeant had defendant wait in defendant’s own car, with door open, not handcuffed, not told she was under arrest); Thomas v. State , 294 Ga.App. 108, 668 S.E.2d 540 (October 17, 2008) (forty minute detention, according to defendant); Owens v. State , 308 Ga.App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (March 10, 2011) (twenty minute wait after initial portable breath test was for defendant’s benefit, to clear any residual mouth alcohol, and didn’t place defendant in custody). Brice v. State, 242 Ga.App. 163, 529 S.E.2d 178 (February 1, 2000). Less-safe DUI conviction affirmed; defendant wasn’t in custody when field sobriety conducted. “The officer's request that Brice step out of her car did not amount to a custodial arrest. See State v. Peters, 222 Ga.App. 484, 474 S.E.2d 623 (1996).” Threatt v. State, 240 Ga.App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276 (November 1, 1999). Defendant was not in custody such as to require Miranda warnings, just because officers illegally entered defendant’s home. Officers entered the apartment when defendant’s wife opened the door, looking for a suspected drunk driver, but with no probable cause for arrest, no warrant, no consent, and no exigent circumstances. “Although the police officer briefly questioned Threatt from a position a couple of feet inside his apartment, we find nothing in this encounter which would have caused a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of action had been more than temporarily restrained by the questioning.” Statements suppressed instead based on Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Burks, 240 Ga.App. 425, 523 S.E.2d 648 (October 19, 1999). Trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; officer’s attempt to detain defendant did not amount to arrest. Officer was at residence known for drug activity, to arrest someone else, when he encountered defendant. “Burks entered the fenced-in backyard through an opening in the fence and proceeded toward the back door where Officer Smith was located. Burks had a hood over his head and his hands in his coat pockets. When Burks proceeded closer to the door, Officer Smith drew his gun and yelled, “Stop, police!” At this point, Smith was unaware whether Burks had any weapons in his possession. Upon hearing Officer Smith's instruction, Burks ran.” “Burks contends he was illegally arrested after he entered the property through an opening in the fence and Officer Smith drew his gun and ordered him to stop. Because Burks was not arrested when he was ordered to stop, we disagree. ‘An investigatory stop is not automatically an arrest simply because an officer is armed with a shotgun.’ Franklin v. State, 143 Ga.App. 3, 5, 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977). Additionally, ‘[i]t is often necessary for the police to approach a person with a drawn weapon in a suspiciously dangerous situation in order to protect the physical well-being of both police officers and the public.’ Id. Officer Smith reasonably believed that any person coming onto this particular property under the outlined circumstances warranted investigation and could also pose a danger to him. It was certainly reasonable for him to inquire as to why anyone would enter the property at 4:15 a.m.” Accord, Lewis v. State , 294 Ga.App. 607, 669 S.E.2d 558 (November 17, 2008) (Trial court could find that encounter was second-tier, despite officer’s pointing gun at defendant and ordering him to the ground, citing Burks). Gunn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 901, 514 S.E.2d 77 (March 12, 1999). Trial court properly found that defendant was not in custody when she performed field sobriety evaluations: after her car ran off the highway, defendant climbed an embankment, left the scene of the accident and went to a pay phone. A deputy found her at the pay phone and transported her back to her car in his patrol vehicle, where a state trooper was investigating the one-vehicle accident. “The trooper testified that he had not placed Gunn under arrest when he began questioning her. Further, he did not believe the deputy had arrested Gunn but was simply assisting her in getting back to her car.” Trooper questioned defendant about the accident and the smell of alcohol about her; she admitted drinking, took an alco-sensor test and apparently performed other field sobriety evaluations. Held, “although Gunn was seated in the back of a patrol car [with the door open] when she was questioned, she was not ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes. Gunn was in the patrol car because she had been transported back to the scene of the accident. She had a duty to remain at the scene during the investigation of the accident. OCGA § 40-6-270(a). A reasonable person would conclude that, under these circumstances, Gunn’s detention was temporary and not the equivalent of a formal arrest.”