☢ test - Í

Price v. State, 270 Ga. 619, 513 S.E.2d 483 (March 8, 1999). “We agree with Price’s contention that she was placed under arrest when she was handcuffed and read her Miranda rights when she came out the front door of her apartment.” Compare Oliver (June 11, 2003), above. Hennings v. State, 236 Ga.App. 473, 512 S.E.2d 357 (February 15, 1999). “As acknowledged by Hennings, there is no authority for the proposition that merely taking a driver’s license and proof of insurance would, alone, cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave. In fact, the authority is to the contrary. E.g., State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 475, 502 S.E.2d 314 (1998); Morrissette v. State, 229 Ga.App. 420, 421(1)(a), 494 S.E.2d 8 (1997); State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga.App. 316, 474 S.E.2d 122 (1996).” Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 548, 512 S.E.2d 19 (February 3, 1999). Defendant was not under arrest during traffic stop, even though officer told him he couldn’t leave. “Although the officer told Smith during the investigation that he was not free to leave, not every detention is an arrest. See Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 238(3), 244 S.E.2d 346 (1978). We conclude, as did the trial court, that a reasonable person under these circumstances would not have believed his freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed by the investigation and, therefore, he was not in custody for Miranda purposes.” “Here, the officer was still conducting her investigation at the time she denied Smith’s request to leave and asked him to step out of the car.” Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (February 2, 1999). Traffic stop lasting 45-50 minutes, in part waiting for an officer with an alco-sensor to arrive and in part looking for consent to search forms, did not amount to arrest. “We do not believe that the delays … was [sic] unreasonable, evidenced a lack of diligence, or converted the investigation into a custodial situation. ‘The stop did not exceed the bounds of an investigative detention, so [Aldridge’s] consent to search was not the product of an illegal detention. The evidence supports the court’s finding that his consent was freely and voluntarily given.’ Taylor v. State, 230 Ga.App. 749, 751(1)(c), 498 S.E.2d 113 (1998); Sutton v. State, 223 Ga.App. 721, 722(1), 478 S.E.2d 910 (1996); Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga.App. 398, 400(2), 379 S.E.2d 210 (1989).” Accord, Harper (April 26, 2000), above. State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 502 S.E.2d 314 (May 6, 1998). “[A]bsent the officer making any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that [he] was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation, the officer’s belief that probable cause exists to make an arrest does not determine when an arrest is effectuated until the officer overtly acts so that a reasonable person would believe [he] was under arrest ….” The overt act may be “either the application of force, however slight, or, where that is absent, submission to the officer’s ‘show of authority’ to restrain the [defendant’s] liberty.” Accord, State v. Dixon , 267 Ga.App. 320, 599 S.E.2d 284 (May 7, 2004); Grodhaus v. State , 287 Ga.App. 628, 653 S.E.2d 67 (September 11, 2007) (Defendant was not in custody while performing field sobriety evaluations where officers had called for tow truck, anticipating his DUI arrest, but defendant was unaware of it.). B. ARTICULABLE SUSPICION FOR STOP / TERRY STOPS See also DUI – LESS SAFE – EVIDENCE – ARTICULABLE SUSPICION FOR STOP, above, and SEARCH & SEIZURE – INFORMANTS, below Seminal case: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1. ARREST WARRANT Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga.App. 662, 738 S.E.2d 116 (February 5, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for driving without license; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Alert from license-plate reader (LPR) system, indicating that owner of vehicle was wanted, provided police with articulable suspicion justifying stop. Officer stopped vehicle based on LPR alert that male owner of vehicle he encountered was wanted. “Upon identifying the relevant vehicle and seeing that it was driven by an adult male, the officer conducted a traffic stop.” Stop revealed that driver wasn’t the wanted owner, but was driving without license. “Here, based on the alert and information he received from the LPR system, the officer had reason to believe the male driver of the relevant vehicle was wanted for failure to appear in court, which provided reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Citing Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga.App. 365, 367, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010) (“[T]he particularized and objective basis for the initial stop was the information from GCIC—in this case, that the male owner of the registered vehicle [the appellant] was operating had a suspended driver's license.”) and cases approving stops based on tag violations. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga.App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (November 7, 2007). “[T]he arrest warrant for [passenger] Williams authorized [Officer] Delatorre to stop Somesso’s car. See Nesbitt v. State, 215 Ga.App. 271, 272(2) (450 S.E.2d 310)