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been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation.’ 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4 th ed.), § 9.5(g). In considering these factors we find (1) that for the reasons stated above the description of the vehicle and the suspect were inadequate. (2) We have no idea of the size of the area in which the offender might be found because no information was provided about the lapse of time between the crime occurring and Dias being stopped. We only know that the officer stopped Dias two minutes after he heard the BOLO, but we have no information about the time elapsed between the crime and the stop. (3) No information was provided about the number of persons about in the area. (4) The known or probable direction of the offender’s flight was provided. (5) Dias was not engaged in any activity which would have otherwise authorized a traffic stop. (6) The officers had no knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped had been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation. Therefore, even applying Professor LaFave’s factors we find that no reasonable suspicion existed sufficient to warrant a stop and investigatory detention of Dias.” Distinguishing “ Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 301-302(2)(a) (486 S.E.2d 861) (1997) (the officer ‘knew the color of both the car and its top, the manufacturer, model, and model year of the car, and the driver’s gender and race.’); Burnham v. State, 277 Ga.App. 310, 311(1) (626 S.E.2d 525) (2006) (the officer knew ‘the description, make and model of the car. He knew that it was suspected that Burnham would return to his house soon. And, he observed a car matching the description drive directly into the cul-de-sac and stop in front of the Burnham home.’); Hestley v. State, 216 Ga.App. 573, 574(1) (455 S.E.2d 333) (1995) (a white panel van that ‘didn’t have a lot of windows,’ in the same general vicinity as reported by a concerned citizen.’)” Accord, Allen (November 22, 2013), above. Murray v. State, 282 Ga.App. 741, 639 S.E.2d 631 (December 6, 2006). Trial court erred in denying motion to suppress in defendant’s DUI prosecution; officer lacked particularized suspicion to stop defendant’s “gold Ford pick-up truck” based solely on BOLO. “According to the dispatcher, the male driver of that truck had been involved in a domestic dispute and had thrown a female from the truck. [Deputy] Powell was less than a mile from Selfridge Road [the BOLO location], and he drove to intercept the pick-up. Several minutes later – before Powell reached Selfridge Road – he saw a gold Ford truck heading away from the general direction of Selfridge Road, and he turned his patrol car around and stopped the truck. At that time, Powell admittedly did not know the year or model of the Ford truck, the license plate number, the age or race of the driver, the direction in which the gold truck was allegedly traveling, or even whether the truck was in fact moving.” Analogized to Vansant v. State, 264 Ga.App. 319, 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994) and McNeece v. State, 246 Ga.App. 720, 541 S.E.2d 696 (2000); distinguishing Faulkner (February 21, 2006), Francis (August 17, 2005), and Harden (May 12, 2004), all above under Search and Seizure – Articulable Suspicion for Arrest – BOLO – Description Adequate. Accord, Allen (November 22, 2013), above. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga.App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299 (May 10, 2004). Officers had no articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on these facts: “[A] female called 911 at night from a payphone near an intersection on a major thoroughfare in Hall County reporting that she had been assaulted by a white male and that a dark colored sport utility vehicle (SUV) was involved. The record is not clear as to whether the 911 caller identified herself to the operator. However, the record shows that the police officers who made the stop had no information as to the identity of the woman or the man; when or where the assault occurred; how the SUV was involved, or any other information identifying the SUV. When police arrived at the payphone to investigate the report, they found no one there, but they saw a dark colored Ford Explorer SUV about a block away traveling on the thoroughfare from the area in light traffic conditions. Police briefly followed the SUV and noticed the outline of two heads visible in the vehicle, although they could not determine if they were male or female. They observed no traffic or other offenses, but activated the patrol car’s blue lights and stopped the SUV solely to investigate whether the SUV and its occupants had any connection to the reported assault.” Kazeem v. State, 241 Ga.App. 175, 525 S.E.2d 437 (November 18, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to suppress; evidence didn’t support finding that officers had articulable suspicion justifying a stop of defendants’ vehicle. Bank manager testified that defendants appeared to be casing bank, but the officers who made the stop didn’t testify. A different officer testified about a detailed look-out broadcast, but no evidence showed that the officers who made the stop heard this report. “We hold that, because it is unclear what facts the officers who initiated the stop had before they made the stop, the evidence should have been suppressed. … Without the testimony of the officers who stopped and detained Aramolate and Kazeem, we do not know what information those officers had before making the stop and whether they had an objective and particularized basis for stopping the men. Therefore, the state has not met its burden of showing that the stop was justified. See generally Barnes v. State, 228 Ga.App. 44, 46, 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997).” McSwain v. State, 240 Ga.App. 80, 522 S.E.2d 565 (September 15, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendants’