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motion to suppress; traffic stop was not supported by articulable suspicion, based on BOLO, which “provided a description of the vehicle and occupants and stated that the vehicle was headed toward North or South Carolina and possibly contained unspecified ‘contraband’ in the trunk.” No evidence of the source of the information was provided. “Likewise, the State presented no evidence of any specific facts on which the lookout might have been based, such as the nature of the suspected criminal activity, the reason for the belief that criminal activity was afoot, or the type of contraband at issue. In the absence of any such information, we have no basis for concluding that the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Citing Tarwid v. State , 184 Ga.App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63 (1987): “In Tarwid, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and requested permission to search the car, but the driver refused. After giving the driver a warning ticket, the officer broadcast a lookout for the car in which he explained, without elaboration, that the occupants ‘had shown signs of trafficking in drugs.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 853(1), 363 S.E.2d 63. Another officer heard the broadcast, stopped the car again based solely on the broadcast, and discovered drugs inside. …[I]n the absence of any evidence establishing the factual basis for the first officer's belief that drug trafficking was taking place, we concluded that the ‘signs’ to which he referred appeared to be ‘nothing more than “inarticulate hunches” and thus insufficient to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.’ Id. at 856, 363 S.E.2d 63.” State v. Burns, 238 Ga.App. 683, 520 S.E.2d 39 (June 25, 1999). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking and related offenses, trial court properly granted motion to suppress; BOLO didn’t give officers articulable suspicion for traffic stop.” Stop was based on look-out for an “‘older, yellow in color Monte Carlo driven by or occupied by two suspects, one unknown and one ... believed to be a white man,’ that had been involved in a purse snatching three days earlier at a Lowe's store about two miles away” from the stop location. The stopped vehicle was occupied by two black males; tinted windows made it diffuclt to see them before the stop. Distinguishing Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997) (stop shortly after “lookout for a brown 1978 or 1979 Oldsmobile Cutlass with a lighter brown top driven by a white male” was supported by articulable suspicion). “If an alert is issued immediately after an incident, as in Thomason, a general description of the vehicle (e.g., by color, model, and year) may suffice to justify a stop, as it is more likely that a vehicle matching the general description, in the vicinity and near the time of the incident, is in fact the vehicle that the police are looking for. This is especially true where, as in Thomason, the vehicle itself is rather uncommon (a 13– or 14– year–old Cutlass with distinguishing colors). Where a lookout alert is several days old, however, it is much less likely that a car matching a general description is in fact the car that is being sought. In this case, we cannot say that the mere fact that an older model yellow Monte Carlo was seen three days after the issuance of an alert was sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that it was the same car involved in a purse snatching three days earlier at a location two miles away.” 5. COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF OFFICERS/DISPATCH Blanks v. State, 334 Ga.App. 626, 778 S.E.2d 261 (November 3, 2015). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as collective knowledge of officer and dispatcher was sufficient to establish articulable suspicion for stop. Anonymous 911 caller reported the erratic driving of a black GMC Sonoma truck before 3:00 a.m. at a certain location. The caller followed the truck for some five minutes, reporting its actions, location, and direction of travel. Dispatcher alerted officer who saw and intercepted a vehicle matching the description, location and direction of travel. “We … agree with the State that the question whether [Officer] DiGrazia had articulable suspicion to perform the stop should be resolved based on all the information known to both DiGrazia and the dispatcher. ‘Probable cause [and articulable suspicion] may rest upon the collective knowledge of the police when there is some degree of communication between them, rather than solely on the information possessed by the officer who actually makes the arrest.’ Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985) (citation omitted); State v. Maddox, 252 Ga.App. 414, 416, 556 S.E.2d 501 (2001) (“Police officers are authorized to use information received by radio dispatch as part of their basis for articulable suspicion to conduct a stop.”) (footnote omitted); Buffington v. State, 228 Ga.App. 810, 811, 492 S.E.2d 762 (1997). Thus, we are authorized to consider the additional details regarding Blanks’s driving that the caller provided during the 911 call but that were not related to DiGrazia.” Defendant here “notes that DiGrazia did not have the license tag number of the vehicle, a description of the driver, or any indication of wrongdoing other than speeding.” Harvey v. State, 328 Ga.App. 94, 761 S.E.2d 507 (July 9, 2014). Interlocutory review in prosecution for kidnapping and related offenses; trial court properly denied motion to suppress based on articulable suspicion for stop. “The officer in this case had been dispatched to investigate suspicious activity at a particular gas station involving a white man slightly over six feet tall and possibly other people. She testified that, on a road near the gas station, she saw a group of men that included a man she believed matched the description given in the suspicious activity call. Based on this evidence, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for making a second-tier, investigatory stop of the men.”