☢ test - Í

Wing v. State, 327 Ga.App. 361, 759 S.E.2d 243 (May 27, 2014). Convictions affirmed for DUI and failure to report accident. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officer had articulable suspicion for stop. Officer was dispatched to church parking lot on report of a vehicle that had struck a parked car. “As the officer arrived, he observed a blue car leaving the parking lot. About three to five individuals standing in the parking lot motioned toward the blue vehicle and verbally identified it as the one that had just struck a parked vehicle. The officer immediately pursued the blue car and initiated a traffic stop, believing that its driver was attempting to leave the scene of an accident.” Held, the dispatch, corroborated by the witnesses onsite, gave the officer articulable suspicion to stop defendant, citing Brown (May 12, 2003) below (identical facts). Contrary to defendant’s argument, officer wasn’t required to “interview the driver of the parked vehicle, [or] assess the amount of damage rendered to the parked vehicle” before stopping defendant. “The collision at issue had been sufficiently compelling such that police were summoned; [cit.] the officer, having received information from dispatch about the automobile collision, proceeded to the reported location; [cit.] when the officer arrived, the car being driven away by Wing was pointed out by several onlookers who exclaimed that she was the one who had driven her car into another.[Cit.] These facts gave the officer grounds for conducting a brief traffic stop of Wing's car for investigatory purposes, and demonstrated that such stop was not premised on mere caprice, hunch, or inclination, and was neither arbitrary nor harassing in nature.” State v. Vaughn, 325 Ga.App. 633, 754 S.E.2d 614 (February 4, 2014). In prosecution for underage alcohol possession, no error in granting motion to suppress; evidence failed to establish basis for detention of defendant by first officer. Off- duty officer working security at a club detained defendant as she was leaving the club, and summoned on-duty officer, saying “she had several subjects that were intoxicated under age.” Second officer testified that all of the subjects “appeared to be under the influence of alcohol,” but “could not recall whether he performed the alco-sensor tests recorded in his report. [Second] Officer Wood acknowledged that he did not have any first-hand knowledge of the details concerning [first] Officer Ferree's observations before he detained Vaughn. He also testified that he did not have any particularized information about the grounds used by Officer Ferree to detain Vaughn and ask her to submit to an alco- sensor test. While Officer Wood testified that he recalled the smell of alcoholic beverage about Vaughn's person when he arrived, his report did not reflect this observation, and he initially misidentified Vaughn as someone else at the beginning of the motion to suppress hearing.” Acknowledging that hearsay is admissible to determine articulable suspicion for detention, and that detention may be based on officers’ collective knowledge, “the arresting officer acknowledged that he did not have any particularized information about the grounds used by Officer Ferree to detain Vaughn and to ask her to submit to an alco-sensor test-the subject of Vaughn's motion to suppress. Therefore, even if the trial court had considered the hearsay information provided to Officer Wood by Officer Ferree, there would still be an absence of evidence on the critical issue of the motion to suppress: What were the specific and particularized facts justifying Officer Ferree's detention of Vaughn? … We therefore affirm the trial court's order suppressing ‘[a]ny inculpatory evidence gained after Defendant's detention and before Officer Wood's arrival.’” Edmond v. State, 297 Ga.App. 238, 676 S.E.2d 877 (March 31, 2009). Stop was supported by collective knowledge of officers: “Officer Tatroe testified that on the day in question he attended a briefing session before he began his shift. Tatroe said that he was told to be on the lookout for a maroon Ford Explorer with two African-American males inside. The SUV had been stopped the night before and one of the occupants had run away, throwing down illegal drugs as he did so.” “There is no requirement that the officer or officers providing the information testify at the motion to suppress. See [ Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105 (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996)]; State v. Pennyman, 248 Ga.App. 446 (545 S.E.2d 365) (2001); Russell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 651 (512 S.E.2d 913) (1999).” Accord, Brown v. State , 307 Ga.App. 797, 706 S.E.2d 170 (February 11, 2011). Beck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 472, 665 S.E.2d 701 (June 23, 2008). Traffic stop was supported by collective knowledge of officers: “The detective who directed the officer to pull the black Ford Explorer over had just witnessed a distinctively- clad male enter the CI’s vehicle, overheard via audio transmission the conversation between the CI and that male in which drugs were sold in exchange for $100, and had seen that male then exit the CI's vehicle and enter as a passenger into the Explorer. The detective maintained constant visual contact as the officer pulled behind the Explorer; he then told the officer to pull over the Explorer that was right in front of him and to identify the distinctively-clad male passenger. The collective knowledge of the police in this carefully-orchestrated operation, in which the detective was in close communication with the officer conducting the stop, provided ample grounds for reasonable suspicion if not probable cause that the passenger in the Explorer had just committed a crime, which justified the stop. See Weldon v. State , 291 Ga.App. 309, 661 S.E.2d 672 (April 25, 2008).” Lester v. State, 287 Ga.App. 363, 651 S.E.2d 766 (August 28, 2007). Second-tier stop was justified based on dispatch and