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officer’s observations: “[Officer] Gianfala was authorized to briefly detain Lester to investigate the report of a fight involving a man pulling a woman into a car. See State v. Harden, 267 Ga.App. 381, 383 (599 S.E.2d 329) (2004); State v. Gomez, 266 Ga.App. 423, 425-426(3) (597 S.E.2d 509) (2004). The dispatch regarding the 911 call provided a description of the vehicle and persons involved, and Gianfala corroborated this information when he arrived at the scene. Under these circumstances, Gianfala had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying the brief detention. See id.; Harden, supra; compare Ward v. State, 277 Ga.App. 790, 792-793 (627 S.E.2d 862) (2006) (motion to suppress evidence seized during investigatory stop should have been granted where officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for stop).” Ingram v. State, 286 Ga.App. 436, 649 S.E.2d 576 (July 9, 2007). Stop was supported by articulable suspicion, based on off-duty captain’s call to officer. The captain advised the officer that he was following a white Ford dually pick-up truck weaving over the highway at a certain location. The officer proceeded to the location where he found the vehicle parked in the middle of an intersection, blocking traffic. The officer pulled the truck over as it attempted to leave. The captain arrived and verified that it was the correct vehicle, although it turned out to be a Chevy, not a Ford. Held, captain’s information here was sufficient to justify stop. “See, e. g., Hestley v. State, 216 Ga.App. 573, 574-575(1) (455 S.E.2d 333) (1995) (reasonable suspicion for stop present where, among other things, officer on lookout for a white Chevrolet panel van that ‘didn’t have a lot of windows,’ encountered a white Chevrolet panel van in area reported by concerned citizen). See also Walton v. State, 194 Ga.App. 490, 491(2) (390 S.E.2d 896) (1990) ( ‘[i]nformation which police transmit to one another, by any accepted means of communication, can provide’ reasonable cause to initiate a traffic stop). The officer knew the road and direction of travel of the suspected vehicle. See Boone v. State, 282 Ga.App. 67, 70(2) (637 S.E.2d 795) (2006) (truck’s color, number of occupant, road and direction of travel provided articulable suspicion to support traffic stop).” Stroud v. State, 286 Ga.App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476 (June 25, 2007). Officers’ collective knowledge justified stop and search of defendant’s vehicle during undercover drug buy. Drug dealer appeared to be looking for vehicle to arrive in subdivision; defendant’s black Ford Expedition “with ‘very black tinted out windows’” stopped nearby, then moved on. After dealer saw the SUV, he “announced he was leaving to get the cocaine and would call them when he had it. When [dealer] walked away, the undercover agent realized that the SUV was gone and alerted an assisting narcotics agent stationed near the subdivision entrance that he believe that Davis was walking to meet the supplier of the cocaine and to be on the lookout for a possibly involved black SUV.” Assisting agent saw the vehicle enter the subdivision and was suspicious because of its “darkly tinted windows and ‘flashy, expensive’ tires and wheels. This agent further testified that he had become suspicious that the cocaine would be sold from that SUV because ‘a lot of times the dealer will put a lot of his money into a vehicle with flashy wheels, tires, dark tinted windows so nobody [can] see who [is] inside.’ This agent also had observed Davis walking in the direction the SUV had traveled. Because this agent never saw the SUV exit the subdivision, he related his suspicion that the drug supplier was in that SUV to other assisting narcotics agents staged throughout the subdivision.” After dealer was taken down, SUV was found parked in driveway of house, defendant reclined in driver’s seat to avoid being seen. “Construing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light to uphold the trial court’s determination, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances known to the law enforcement officers participating in the drug investigation supplied probable cause that contraband was inside the SUV. [Cits.]” State v. Bingham, 283 Ga.App. 468, 641 S.E.2d 663 (February 6, 2007). Grant of motion to suppress reversed; stop was based on articulable suspicion. Caller to dispatch reported fight in bar parking lot. “The caller reported that two individuals involved in the fight had gotten into a truck and were leaving. The caller described the truck and the men in question and reported the truck’s license plate number and its direction of travel.” “At approximately the same time he received this information, [Officer] Hampton spotted a truck matching the description given a short distance from Lulu’s [Bar]. Hampton began following the truck and determined that the license plate number matched the one relayed by police dispatch, with the exception of one letter [APF instead of ATF].” Citing Gomez (March 22, 2004), Brown (February 14, 2002) and Overand (October 18, 1999), below . Distinguishing Duke (September 11, 2002), below: there, trial court should have granted motion to suppress; at hearing, State failed to present any evidence to support stop based on other officers’ suspicion that defendant was involved in drug transaction; here, stop was based on eyewitness information, which is sufficient to justify stop per Gomez, Brown, et al. Accord, Sims v. State , 299 Ga.App. 871, 683 S.E.2d 911 (August 27, 2009) ( citing Bingham; DUI stop based on call to dispatch provided articulable suspicion for stop where description included vehicle, driver, and tag number ). Noble v. State, 283 Ga.App. 81, 640 S.E.2d 666 (December 15, 2006). Traffic stop of drug suspect was supported by