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articulable suspicion, regardless of ulterior motives of officers making the stop. “If an officer witnesses a traffic violation, the ensuing stop is never pretextual, regardless of the officer’s subjective intentions. State v. Bute, 250 Ga.App. 479, 480- 481 (552 S.E.2d 465) (2001), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813(II)(A) (116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89) (1996). A traffic stop may also be justified based on the collective knowledge of all the police officers engaged in a joint investigation. Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105(3)(a) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996). Here, the evidence is undisputed that Officer Hamilton stopped Noble on the basis of the first two police officers’ observations that Noble had followed too closely and made an improper lane change. See OCGA §§ 40-6-49 (following too closely), 40-6-123(b) (improper lane change). Hamilton thus had probable cause to make the traffic stop. Bute, supra; Burgeson, supra.” Accord, Harris v. State , 239 Ga.App. 537, 521 S.E.2d 462 (August 6, 1999) (seat belt stop motivated by drug report); Thomas v. State , 289 Ga.App. 161, 657 S.E.2d 247 (January 9, 2008) (traffic stop valid despite ulterior motive of drug search); Pincherli v. State , 295 Ga.App. 408, 671 S.E.2d 891 (December 31, 2008) (same as Thomas ). Hannah v. State, 280 Ga.App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (June 30, 2006). “‘Probable cause may rest upon the collective knowledge of the police when there is some degree of communication between them, rather than solely on the information possessed by the officer who actually [conducts the search].’ Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13) (336 S.E.2d 757) (1985) (citation omitted); see Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105(3)(a) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996).” Here, officer who encountered defendant at hospital could rely on information obtained by officer at scene of accident in determining that probable cause existed to seek DUI implied consent testing, notwithstanding that officer at hospital did not know full details of other officer’s information. Dixon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 740, 615 S.E.2d 838 (June 17, 2005). Officers here “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity that justified stopping and detaining the men briefly. [Cit.] At the time of the investigatory stop, [co-defendant] was driving a full-sized white pickup truck with a loud exhaust system and the vehicle was discovered within three minutes of the lookout and about a mile from the scene of the crime. [Cit.]” Fisher v. State, 267 Ga.App. 426, 599 S.E.2d 361 (May 14, 2004). “Sergeant Stanley Wheeler and Officer Robbie Ray were dispatched separately by police radio to the Kennesaw residence of Fisher’s former spouse, Deneice Smith. Fisher had gone to the residence to pick up his son from weekend court-ordered visitation. The dispatcher advised Wheeler and Ray that Smith had called 911 and reported him at her residence in violation of a temporary protective order and driving on a suspended license. [Cit.] As Wheeler and Ray proceeded to Smith’s residence, further radio traffic ensued. The dispatcher advised Wheeler and Ray that Fisher had left the residence, gave them a physical description of Fisher, and a description of his vehicle and the tag number. Seeing a vehicle and driver fitting the descriptions he had been given en route to Smith’s residence, Sergeant Wheeler activated his blue lights and stopped Fisher’s vehicle. Officer Ray arrived on the scene as this occurred and shortly thereafter detected signs that Fisher had been driving under the influence. On this, Officer Ray called the Sheriff’s office and learned that no temporary protective order had been entered against Fisher and that he was driving on a valid driver’s license. Fisher was arrested after he failed the field sobriety tests administered at the scene, and an Intoxilyzer 5000 later measured his blood alcohol content at 0.118.” Held, stop was supported by articulable suspicion, notwithstanding that the information later proved untrue. “Because Sergeant Wheeler properly relied upon information provided to him by another officer, the state court did not err in denying Fischer’s motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication discovered after Sergeant Wheeler legally stopped him.” Saxon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 547, 597 S.E.2d 608 (March 25, 2004). After series of thefts from vehicles in school parking lot, headmaster saw strange vehicle which had been previously reported on premises. Giving chase, he relayed information on description and location of vehicle until deputy arrived to stop the vehicle. Held, “[a]lthough Allen did not personally talk with [headmaster] and did not personally observe any traffic violation, these facts do not render the traffic stop illegal. ‘Information received by an officer from a dispatcher’s call may provide articulable suspicion to perform an investigative stop.’ (Footnote and citation omitted.) Hudson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 210, 211 (558 S.E.2d 420) (2001). [Headmaster] was not an anonymous tipster, and the information received by Allen was hardly ‘a vague tip from an anonymous caller.’ Brooks v. State, 208 Ga.App. 680, 682(1) (431 S.E.2d 466) (1993). Instead, the information came from a ‘known, law-abiding concerned citizen who testified at trial and who on the day in question had the opportunity to personally observe’ Saxon’s suspicious activities. Hudson at 211. Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Allen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Saxon was involved in criminal activity sufficient to conduct the traffic stop. Brown v. State, 261 Ga.App. 228, 582 S.E.2d 183 (May 12, 2003). Deputy dispatched to altercation at Waffle House arrived “in a minute or so.” As he did, he saw a green truck leaving, and several people, including at least two Waffle