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House employees, standing outside pointing at the green truck. He therefore stopped the truck and found the defendant to be DUI. Held, the dispatch and the people pointing gave the deputy articulable suspicion that the occupants of the truck were involved in the altercation, notwithstanding that he had no description of the persons involved or the occupants of the truck. Cites Overand (October 18, 1999), below. Accord, State v. Melanson , 291 Ga.App. 853, 663 S.E.2d 280 (June 6, 2008) (officer had articulable suspicion for stop based on McDonald’s employee pointing to vehicle leaving premises; occupants “had been swearing and banging on the restaurant’s drive-through window – i.e., engaging in disorderly conduct.”); Wing (May 27, 2014), above. See also Yearwood (August 18, 1999), below. Camp v. State, 259 Ga.App. 228, 576 S.E.2d 610 (January 15, 2003). “ Reasonable suspicion need not be based on an arresting officer’s knowledge alone, but may exist based on the ‘collective knowledge’ of the police when there is reliable communication between an officer supplying the information and an officer acting on that information. In this regard, police are authorized to stop an individual based on a ‘be-on-the-look-out’ dispatch or even a radio transmission from another officer who observed facts raising a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a traffic violation. “Here, the information regarding the dangerous driver was provided to Gwinnett County police by an experienced off-duty police officer. This off-duty officer remained on the scene with the Gwinnett County officers when they arrived, dispelling the inference that the Gwinnett County officers could have somehow targeted the wrong vehicle. The Gwinnett County officers were authorized to rely on the information received from dispatch based on the activities observed by the off-duty officer. Thus, reasonable suspicion was established, and the trial court did not err in denying Camp’s motion to suppress.” Accord, McBurrows v. State , 325 Ga.App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 436 (November 7, 2013); Gonzalez v. State , 334 Ga.App. 706, 780 S.E.2d 383 (November 19, 2015). Penland v. State, 258 Ga.App. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (December 3, 2002). “[I]nformation which police transmit to one another, by any accepted means of communication, can provide sufficient grounds to create an articulable suspicion warranting reasonable cause to stop an automobile.” In this case, city street drug unit was monitoring a street corner known as “an open-air drug market,” where over 100 previous arrests for drug deals had been made. One officer, watching the corner, observed what he thought was a drug sale, radioed two nearby officers, informed them of the transaction, and described the truck and its driver involved in the transaction. The officers stopped the truck less than a minute later, and, based on the information from the first officer, were authorized to do so. Duke v. State, 257 Ga.App. 609, 571 S.E.2d 414 (September 11, 2002). City police officers requested that defendant’s vehicle be stopped as possibly being involved in a drug transaction. Sheriff’s deputy did so, and found drugs. At motion to suppress hearing, no evidence was presented as to the basis for the city officers’ belief that defendant was involved in a drug transaction. Held, although the deputy was, in fact, entitled to rely on the radio dispatch in making the stop, “to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge, the state had to present some evidence of the factual basis for the 911 dispatch.” “Because the state failed to present any evidence that the 911 dispatch in question was based on specific, articulable facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, ... the investigatory stop [of Defendant’s vehicle] violated the Fourth Amendment.” The state must present some evidence of the factual basis for the dispatch, such as the reason for the belief that criminal activity was afoot. “‘That which is insufficient in its own right cannot be made sufficient by the fact that it is broadcast over a police network,’” quoting State v. Fowler, 215 Ga.App. 524, 525, 451 S.E.2d 124 (1994). Anderson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 338, 559 S.E.2d 85 (January 16, 2002). Officer stopped Defendant’s car because of a dealer’s drive-out tag without an expiration date. Defendant showed documentation proving that temporary tag had not expired. Officer ran check on driver’s license and was informed by the radio dispatcher that the license had been suspended because of three drug convictions. Defendant was arrested and gave his consent to search the car. Cocaine was found in the car; then, officer was informed by dispatch that information had been overlooked and that defendant had been given a probationary driver’s license after his permanent license was suspended. Held, an arresting officer may be entitled to rely on information received by radio dispatch or provided by other officers even if the information later proves incorrect. Here, the evidence supported a finding that the radio dispatch received by officer, although erroneous, was reliable enough to underlie the reasonable belief which is needed to establish probable cause for arrest. State v. Pennyman, 248 Ga.App. 446, 545 S.E.2d 365 (February 5, 2001). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress; traffic stop was supported by probable cause based on collective knowledge of officers. Defendant was stopped for speeding. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer driving the vehicle was not available to testify. The officer who was the passenger in the patrol car testified that the driving officer indicated that there was a speeding vehicle ahead of them. The officer testified that he knew that the vehicle was speeding because he knew what it