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feels like to drive the speed limit and looking at other traffic. The trial court held that the officer’s testimony was hearsay and that since the officer was not the driver of the police car, nor the officer who made the stop, the collective knowledge rule does not apply and Defendant’s motion was granted. Held, the collective knowledge rule provides reasonable suspicion may exist based on the collective knowledge of the police when there is reliable communication between the officer supplying the information and the officer acting on that information instead of the arresting officer’s knowledge alone. The testifying officer acted in concert with the driving officer in stopping Defendant. There was reliable communication between the two. Thus, reasonable suspicion was established and the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. Clark v. State , 244 Ga.App. 325, 535 S.E.2d 506 (June 5, 2000). Conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officers’ collective knowledge justified stop. Officers stopped vehicle based on directions from officers engaged in undercover drug buy; officers making stop weren’t fully informed about the role played by the vehicle occupants in the drug buy. “The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to allow a warrantless search of an automobile by one officer where the facts which would support probable cause are known by another officer. Westfelt v. State, 192 Ga.App. 791, 792, 386 S.E.2d 542 (1989). The searching officer need not personally be aware of all the facts which would support a probable cause determination: ‘so long as it can be established by evidence that the searching officer's actions were the end result of a chain of information- sharing, one link of which is an officer in possession of the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.; see also Waldrip v. State, 205 Ga.App. 864, 865, 424 S.E.2d 31 (1992); Parker v. State, 161 Ga.App. 37, 40(4), 288 S.E.2d 852 (1982). There is no requirement that the officer making the stop have all the information the original officer had about a suspect. Beck v. State, 216 Ga.App. 532, 535(1), 455 S.E.2d 110 (1995).” Brannon v. State, 243 Ga.App. 48, 530 S.E.2d 761 (March 9, 2000). RICO and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as stop was supported by articulable suspicion. Stop was based on information from known informant. “Contrary to Brannon's assertion, it does not matter that the officer who ordered the stop of Brannon's vehicle and executed the search had very little personal contact with [informant] Kenneth. The evidence showed that Kenneth spoke mainly with an officer from Carroll County, who in turn communicated with police from other counties working in a joint effort to investigate the marijuana distribution scheme. ‘[P]robable cause may rest upon the collective knowledge of the police when there has been communication [between] them, rather than solely on the information possessed by the arresting officer.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. (summarizing holding of Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229(13), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985)).” Overand v. State, 240 Ga.App. 682, 523 S.E.2d 610 (October 18, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for obstruction affirmed; police had articulable suspicion to detain defendant based on information from dispatch. “ A dispatcher who reports a crime at a specified location gives police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene, particularly where police observations on arriving at the scene corroborate the dispatcher’s report. Richardson v. State, 239 Ga.App. 345, 521 S.E.2d 239 (1999); see Cunningham v. State, 231 Ga.App. 420, 421(1), 498 S.E.2d 590 (1998) (‘[i]n forming an articulable suspicion, an officer is entitled to rely on the information given him by a fellow officer,’ including a dispatcher) (citation and punctuation omitted); McDaniel v. State, 227 Ga.App. 364, 366(2), 489 S.E.2d 112 (1997) (dispatcher call to look out for specified vehicle and observation of vehicle fitting the description give rise to an articulable suspicion and justify stop). Even if the dispatcher's information comes from a citizen or an unidentified informant, the investigatory detention is valid, for patrolling officers are not required to question dispatchers about the source of the information. Chumbley v. State, 180 Ga.App. 603, 604, 349 S.E.2d 823 (1986). Here police observations of a white female arguing vigorously with a white male in the driveway of the reported crime scene corroborated the information received from the dispatcher. While demanding that Overand stay, police also discovered a pistol, further corroborating the dispatcher's report. Corroboration only solidifies the existence of an articulable suspicion. See Richardson, supra; State v. McFarland, 201 Ga.App. 495, 496, 411 S.E.2d 314 (1991).” Accord, Brown v. State , 253 Ga.App. 741, 560 S.E.2d 316 (February 14, 2002); State v. Gomez , 266 Ga.App. 423, 597 S.E.2d 509 (March 22, 2004); Moore v. State , 281 Ga.App. 141, 635 S.E.2d 408 (August 15, 2006); State v. Bingham , 283 Ga.App. 468, 641 S.E.2d 663 (February 6, 2007); Johnson v. State , 302 Ga.App. 318, 690 S.E.2d 683 (February 11, 2010); Johnson v. State , 324 Ga.App. 508, 751 S.E.2d 141 (November 6, 2013) (dispatch relaying information from concerned citizen provided articulable suspicion for stop). Yearwood v. State, 239 Ga.App. 682, 521 S.E.2d 689 (August 18, 1999). Stop was based on articulable suspicion where deputy “was on patrol when he received a telephone call from a truck stop employee whom he had known for more