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than a year and who had previously given him reliable information. The employee asked the deputy to come to the truck stop because a waitress had complained that a woman and a man, who smelled of alcohol, were causing a disturbance in the restaurant. As the deputy was driving to the truck stop, he received another call from the employee telling him that the man and the woman were leaving the truck stop in a car. The employee described the car and gave the sheriff its license plate number. Upon arriving at the truck stop, the deputy saw the described car driving out of a nearby gas station. When the driver of the car saw the deputy, he stopped and backed up into the gas station. After the deputy drove past the station, the driver pulled the car out of the station and headed in the opposite direction. The deputy turned his car around and followed the other car onto an interstate highway. The deputy eventually stopped the car for exceeding the speed limit.” “When hearsay information is supplied by an identified interested citizen, the citizen's credibility is not as suspect and the analysis is not as stringent as when information is given by an anonymous tipster; a law- abiding concerned citizen has a built-in credibility and is deemed to be reliable. Hinson v. State, 229 Ga.App. 840, 842(1)(c), 494 S.E.2d 693 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 269 Ga. 862, 506 S.E.2d 870 (1998). The hearsay information in the current case was provided by a reliable and concerned citizen known to the deputy. Her credible information that Yearwood had caused a disturbance at the truck stop and was believed to be driving while under the influence of alcohol gave the deputy a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the stop of Yearwood's car. See State v. Noble, 179 Ga.App. 785, 347 S.E.2d 722 (1986).” See also Brown (May 12, 2003), above (call regarding disturbance at Waffle House justified stop). Richardson v. State, 239 Ga.App. 345, 521 S.E.2d 239 (July 28, 1999). “When Officer Edwards was informed that a described criminal suspect was located in a specified area and then observed Richardson, who was in the area and fit the suspect's description and appeared to be fleeing the scene, there existed reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. Cf. McDaniel v. State, 227 Ga.App. 364, 366(2), 489 S.E.2d 112 (1997).” Russell v. State , 236 Ga.App. 645, 512 S.E.2d 913 (February 24, 1999). At defendant’s trial for armed robbery, evidence that arresting officer ran vehicle’s tag and computer reported the vehicle stolen was admissible as part of the circumstances of defendant’s arrest as “collective knowledge” of police officers. “Steele maintains first that notwithstanding that no objection was interposed at trial to the admission of this testimony, it was hearsay and admitting it into evidence was prejudicial to him and not harmless. The officer testified that ‘the tag was run and it did come back with what we call a “Code 4,” or stolen.’ First, the testimony was information in the collective knowledge of the police officers. It was derived from a reliable ‘chain of information-sharing.’ Beck v. State, 216 Ga.App. 532, 535, 455 S.E.2d 110 (1995). And it is well established that a traffic stop based upon such collective knowledge is valid. Id.; State v. Wright, 221 Ga.App. 202, 204-205(3), 470 S.E.2d 916 (1996). We note that Steele does not challenge the stop, thereby at least implicitly acknowledging this principle. In this case, the routine procedure of running the car tag was also a circumstance of the arrest, and therefore a part of the res gestae. And in Russell [ v. State, 230 Ga.App. 546, 497 S.E.2d 36 (1998)] , we affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion in limine made by Steele to preclude any mention that the truck was stolen. We stated there that ‘“[w]here evidence is relevant for the purpose of showing flight or the circumstances of arrest, it will not be excluded because it incidentally shows the commission of another crime.” [Cits.]’ Id. at 550(6), 497 S.E.2d 36.” State v. Harris, 236 Ga.App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1 (February 1, 1999). Trial court erred in ruling that traffic stop was “pretextual”: “The arresting officer testified that other police officers in his department told him in the ‘last few weeks’ preceding the stop that Harris’ driver’s license had been suspended. The officer recognized Harris and pulled him over,” and Harris acknowledged that his license was suspended. “Information which an officer receives from another officer can provide sufficient grounds to create an articulable suspicion that will justify an investigative stop of a car. See Walton v. State, 194 Ga.App. 490, 491(2), 390 S.E.2d 896 (1990).” “ We do not agree with Harris’ contention that the stop was improper because the officer did not check to see if Harris’ license had been reinstated before stopping him. The officer was entitled to rely on the information given to him by fellow officers. See Chumbley v. State, 180 Ga.App. 603, 349 S.E.2d 823 (1986). We point out that, in most cases, a driver must wait a minimum of 30 days after his license is suspended before applying for reinstatement. See OCGA § 40-5-67.2(a)(1), (2), (3); OCGA § 40-5-70; OCGA § 40-5-84; OCGA § 40-5-85. Indeed, a suspension in some cases lasts up to five years. OCGA § 40-5-75. The officer was not required to verify that the information he received within the few weeks preceding the stop was still accurate before making a brief stop of the car. ” 6. COMMERCIAL VEHICLES See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE – EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY – COMMERCIAL VEHICLES, below Solano-Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga.App. 896, 673 S.E.2d 351 (February 10, 2009). Officers of the Motor Carrier