☢ test - Í

Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Stop of defendant’s vehicle was justified by articulable suspicion of crime. “Here, [Officer] Jackson knew that crimes, including theft from vehicles, had occurred recently in the apartment complex; that several reports had been made about the same car parking in the complex several times in the past week; that the driver of the car had been seen sitting in the car without going into or out of any of the apartment buildings; that either the identified car or another in the parking lot had broken out windows; that the driver had been sitting in the described car on September 26, 2007, without any apparent business at the complex; and that the driver appeared to decide to leave when the driver saw the police car. … [W]e hold that under the totality of the circumstances, Jackson had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Thomas might be about to engage in criminal activity in the apartment complex. Jackson then performed a brief stop during which he ran the license tag, which showed that the car had been stolen, thereby justifying the arrest for theft by receiving. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Thomas's motion to quash the arrest or suppress evidence.” State v. Allen, 330 Ga.App. 752, 769 S.E.2d 165 (February 23, 2015). In prosecution for methamphetamine possession, trial court properly granted motion to suppress; officer lacked articulable suspicion to detain defendant. Officer ran tag of “suspicious” looking truck in parking lot and learned that its male owner was wanted for a parole violation. “The deputy then turned his vehicle around, at which point he saw the truck now parked and a male and a female, who appeared to have just exited the vehicle, walking toward a Mexican restaurant in the shopping center. Believing the male to be Couch, the deputy used his patrol vehicle's PA system to request that both individuals stop. The couple, however, ignored this request and continued into the restaurant.” The officer found the female sitting alone in the restaurant; an employee told the officer that the male had exited the rear of the building. “[A]fter checking the bathroom and determining that Couch was not there, the deputy ordered Allen to step outside for further questioning, and she complied. By this time, a second law-enforcement officer arrived on the scene, and during the ensuing questioning, Allen acknowledged that Couch had mentioned that there was a warrant out for his arrest. The second officer then told Allen to call some of Couch's friends to inquire as to his whereabouts and ultimately asked Allen if he could search her purse. Allen consented, and during the search, the officer found a clear wrapper containing methamphetamine.” Held, the officers detained Allen, and had no articulable suspicion justifying the stop. 1. The encounter was a second-tier stop. “[T]he deputy who observed Allen and Couch walking toward the restaurant first requested that they stop, then approached Allen as she sat in a booth and, shortly thereafter, directed her to accompany him outside. Given these circumstances, no reasonable person in Allen's position would have felt free to end the encounter, and, in fact, the second officer to arrive on the scene explicitly testified at the hearing that Allen was not free to leave.” 2. “[A]lthough the deputy certainly possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Couch, he had no basis whatsoever for believing that Allen was either committing, or was about to commit, a crime.[fn] Indeed, at the motion-to-suppress hearing, the deputy admitted that when he first approached Allen, as she sat in the restaurant booth, he had no suspicion that she had committed, or was about to commit, a crime. And while the deputy added that he believed Allen was untruthful when she told him that she was unsure as to where Couch had gone, the trial court, in granting Allen's motion to suppress, obviously found that her response did not provide an objective basis for a reasonable suspicion that she was obstructing the deputy in the lawful discharge of his official duties.” State v. Holmes, 326 Ga.App. 451, 756 S.E.2d 679 (March 21, 2014). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress; officer lacked articulable suspicion for stop. In the early morning hours, dispatch reported that “several people were basically destroying the baseball field” at a local park. Deputy “briefly investigated the fields,” found no one there, then drove where other officers had vehicles stopped. Deputy then stopped defendant’s vehicle as it approached from the direction of the park. Held, trial court could find that stop lacked articulable suspicion. Trial court could also find that deputy’s testimony about additional grounds for stop (driving rapidly, crossing yellow line), not mentioned in incident report, lacked credibility. Deleon-Alvarez v. State, 324 Ga.App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (November 14, 2013). Defendants’ convictions for kidnapping for ransom affirmed; officers had articulable suspicion for stop. “Trial evidence showed that, based on telephone surveillance, the police had discerned that an abducted individual was being held against his will at a particular residence in Floyd County. A warrant had been issued to search that residence. Police had maintained direct observation of the residence and had seen persons exiting the house and leaving in vehicles, including the Expedition, which police then followed at close range prior to effecting the stop. Those circumstances provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop of the Expedition. See [ Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 6777-678(2) (524 S.E.2d 211) (1999)] (determining that police were justified in conducting stop of vehicle after it left a residence at which it had been determined there was probable cause that it was then the location of controlled substances and the site of illegal activity, the nature of some of the illegal