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activity made it reasonable to conclude that there would be contraband in the vehicle leaving the residence, and which stop was conducted within 20 minutes of police monitoring wiretap of telephone at residence and overhearing discussion of illegal activity).” In re: L.P., 324 Ga.App. 78, 749 S.E.2d 389 (October 2, 2013). Adjudication of delinquency based on participation in street gang activities and other offenses affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officer had articulable suspicion for stop. “Here, Lieutenant Keys, the officer who conducted the stop, had received information from an eyewitness that the shoot-out at J.R. Cricket's involved Eastside and Southside gangs, the shooter left in a silver Honda Accord, and the shooter could be found in the area near Pamela Drive and George Circle. About an hour after the shooting, while officers were conducting a stop of the suspected shooter near Pamela Drive in south Griffin, Lieutenant Keys observed a Chevy Malibu driving slowly down the road. Lieutenant Keys shone his light into the car and recognized L.P. and the other occupants of the Malibu as being ‘Eastside guys’ based on prior contacts with them. More importantly, Lieutenant Keys saw the suspected victim of the prior shooting in the Chevy Malibu. Lieutenant Keys also testified that in his experience, right after a shooting, individuals would load up in a car and go searching for the person who shot at them. Under the totality of these circumstances, Lieutenant Keys had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that L.P. and the other occupants of the Chevy Malibu were or were about to be involved in criminal activity.” Dryer v. State, 323 Ga.App. 734, 747 S.E.2d 895 (August 21, 2013). Conviction for felony marijuana possession reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Officer approached defendant’s vehicle when he saw it at 11:00 p.m. backed into deserted golf course parking lot; defendant then began heading toward the parking lot exit, prompting officer to activate his blue lights. Held, Contrary to trial court’s ruling, encounter between defendant and officer began as a second-tier stop, not a first-tier encounter, and officer lacked articulable suspicion to conduct stop. “There is no evidence in the record that Dryer committed any traffic violation warranting a stop. And while Dryer was parked in the country club parking lot after the club had closed, there was no evidence presented that this was a high-crime area or, more specifically, that any crimes had recently been committed at the club. Compare LeRoux v. State, 300 Ga.App. 310, 312–13, 684 S.E.2d 424 (2009) (affirming denial of motion to suppress when officer saw no traffic violation, but defendant was driving through a private golf course late at night, and there recently had been crimes committed on the golf course after hours). We further note that ‘a person's mere presence in a high crime area does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if police observe conduct which they believe consistent with a general pattern of such activity.’ State v. Hopper, 293 Ga.App. 220, 223, 666 S.E.2d 735 (2008) (punctuation omitted). Additionally, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the officer specifically believed that Dryer was trespassing, but only generally that he did not think there was any reason for Dryer to be there. However, an officer's subjective feeling that a person is ‘acting in a suspicious way does not amount to a particularized and objective basis for suspecting him of criminal activity.’ Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga.App. 656, 661(1), 727 S.E.2d 257 (2012) (punctuation omitted).” Accord, Hernandez-Espino v. State , 324 Ga.App. 849, 752 S.E.2d 10 (November 19, 2013); Williams v. State , 327 Ga.App. 239, 758 S.E.2d 141 (April 30, 2014). Lewis v. State, 323 Ga.App. 709, 747 S.E.2d 867 (August 13, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for DUI and related offenses; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress, as officer lacked articulable suspicion for stop. “[T]he stop was not justified by the deputy's personal observation of the vehicle driving very slowly late at night in an area known for recent metal theft because even when viewed in the totality of the surrounding circumstances, such conduct does not, in and of itself, constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. [FN: See Hughes [ v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 261(1) (497 S.E.2d 790) (1998)] (‘There is no objective manifestation that a person is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity merely because the person is a white man in a black neighborhood late at night, who picks up a black man at a location police consider a high-crime area, and who then drives slowly in a circular fashion through the neighborhood.’); Adkinson v. State, 322 Ga.App. 1 (2) 743 S.E.2d 563 (May 23, 2013) (holding that officer did not have facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the defendant's presence in a high-crime area and his behavior which was consistent with a general pattern of illegal activity); Baker v. State, 277 Ga.App. 520, 522–23(1)(a), (b) (627 S.E.2d 145) (2006) (holding that stop was not justified when a police officer received a tip of unknown reliability and observed the vehicle slowly circling around a gas station before making two brief stops at other locations); Thomas v. State, 300 Ga.App. 120, 123 (684 S.E.2d 290) (1998) (holding that officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop based on the defendant's presence at the scene of an abandoned vehicle alleged to be stolen and his slow driving with intermittent stops). ] Indeed, Lewis was merely driving slowly through an area recently subject to several thefts, rather than repeatedly passing by a particular property that had been the target of recent crimes. [FN: Cf. Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 342–43 (211 S.E.2d 294) (1974) (holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop when a gas station nearby was robbed at gunpoint hours before the officer observed the defendant slowly