☢ test - Í

drive by a different station twice at 3:45 a.m., and station had also been the scene of recent armed robberies). ] And although the deputy observed conduct which he subjectively believed was consistent with a general pattern of criminal activity, Lewis's mere presence in an area of recent criminal activity did not give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. See Hughes, 269 Ga. at 261(1); Adkinson, supra. As we have previously emphasized, ‘an officer's feeling that a person is acting in a suspicious way does not amount to a particularized and objective basis for suspecting him of criminal activity.’ Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga.App. 656, 661(1) (727 S.E.2d 257) (2012) (punctuation omitted).” Felton v. State, 322 Ga.App. 630, 745 S.E.2d 832 (July 3, 2013). Conviction for marijuana possession reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress on other grounds, but Terry stop was proper. “[A] police officer responded to a dispatch based upon a 911 call from a concerned citizen about a violent, verbal dispute between a man and a woman in a white car parked in a convenience store parking lot . … When the officer arrived at the location, however, he found a white car stopped in the turn lane of the roadway with a woman behind the steering wheel. A man, later identified as Felton, was walking near the car toward the convenience store.” “In this case the basis for the stop was clear and the complaint by the concerned citizen, who remained on the scene, provided ample basis for concluding that the officers' actions were neither arbitrary nor harassing. Further, although the evidence did not show that Felton was engaging in criminal activity at the time, based upon the complaint, the officers were authorized to detain him briefly to determine whether he was about to engage in such activity.” State v. Wolf, 317 Ga.App. 706, 732 S.E.2d 782 (September 28, 2012). Physical precedent only. In prosecution for marijuana possession and burglary, trial court properly granted motion to suppress; officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for stop. Mail carrier reported seeing “a gray Nissan pickup truck and several black men who entered the truck and left the residence [at Vickers Circle and Coffee Road], apparently after they had seen the mail carrier. The mail carrier suspected that the men were about to break into the residence. The next day, around noon, a police officer on patrol in the area observed a ‘gray Nissan four-door pickup truck coming off of Vickers Circle onto Coffee Road.’ The officer, driving an unmarked police vehicle, followed the truck, which drove away and then circled back to Vickers Circle. … The officer testified that the truck stopped on Vickers Circle and picked up a ‘black male [who had] come out of a yard.’ The truck drove away, but before it reached Coffee Road again, the officer activated the blue lights on his vehicle and initiated a stop of the truck.” Both citings occurred during the day, when the neighborhood was largely deserted. “It is clear from the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing that the officers did not have the requisite particularized basis for suspecting the occupants of this particular vehicle of criminal activity. … There was no testimony that any law enforcement officers had, in response to the mail carrier's report, investigated whether the vehicle was properly at the residence the day before. The fact that the first officer had no details about the occupants of that vehicle other than their race and gender and that their vehicle was the same make and color as the one he observed the next day in an area where prior burglaries had reportedly been committed did not provide the requisite particularized basis for suspecting Wolf or the other occupants of the vehicle of criminal activity, justifying a stop of the vehicle. [Cits.] And there was no evidence that there was anything unlawful about the circumstances under which an individual was picked up. [Cits.] Nor was there testimony about the alleged recent burglaries in the area. [Cits.]” Jones v. State, 314 Ga.App. 107, 722 S.E.2d 918 (February 13, 2012). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as stop was based on articulable suspicion. Deputies responded to 911call reporting domestic disturbance, and encountered defendant driving away from premises. “Here, it was reasonable for the deputy to infer, based on his training, experience, and common sense, that upon arriving in the vicinity of the area where law enforcement was dispatched because of a domestic disturbance and shots fired, and being informed by another deputy that the vehicle was pulling out of the driveway, and seeing only Jones' vehicle pulling out of a driveway, that Jones might have been involved in criminal wrongdoing, specifically the incident under investigation. Under the totality of circumstances, the stop was neither arbitrary nor harassing, but was based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity.” This despite defendant’s arguments that “there was no description of the suspect or vehicle, the area was densely populated and the split driveway serviced several homes, and there was no testimony about the elapsed time between the alleged crime and when his vehicle was stopped.” Accord, Gonzalez v. State , 334 Ga.App. 706, 780 S.E.2d 383 (November 19, 2015) (officer had articulable suspicion to stop defendant leaving scene of reported domestic disturbance, although no gunshots reported as in Jones ). Oglesby v. State, 311 Ga.App. 615, 716 S.E.2d 742 (September 8, 2011). Methamphetamine trafficking conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officer had articulable suspicion for stop. “Here, Oglesby was observed coming from behind a private residence that was not his own and was not a public location. The trained officer