☢ test - Í

testified that he was aware that the private residence was vacant and that criminal activity had previously occurred at and directly behind the residence. The officer was also aware of prior reports in which vandalism and stolen appliances and copper had occurred at other vacant residences. Based upon the officer's observations and experience, he suspected that Oglesby's presence at the private residence may have been unauthorized and that he may have been engaging in criminal activity, such as criminal trespass, burglary, or vandalism at the vacant residence. The officer drew a reasonable conclusion based upon his experience and the objective facts before him, and the totality of the circumstances provided sufficient articulable suspicion to support Oglesby's brief detention. See Bishop v. State, 299 Ga.App. 241, 242–243 (682 S.E.2d 201) (2009) (concluding that officer had articulable suspicion justifying a stop when the officer observed the defendant leaving the driveway of a vacant lot where there had been prior incidents of illegal dumping, abandoned vehicles, and thefts; based upon the officer's knowledge and experience, she believed that the defendant may have been engaging in illegal dumping on the property).” Willis v. State, 309 Ga.App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (April 26, 2011). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; “the officers had facts sufficient to stop Willis after the victim literally pointed out Willis to an officer as the person who robbed him. Grabowski v. State, 234 Ga.App. 222, 225(4) (507 S.E.2d 472) (1998).” Gattison v. State, 309 Ga.App. 382, 711 S.E.2d 25 (April 20, 2011). Misdemeanor marijuana conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress based on lack of articulable suspicion to stop defendant. Officer “testified he observed six males on the sidewalk in what appeared to be a heated debate or discussion. He testified that although he was unable to hear the conversation, their general body language and expressions indicated to him that it was not a typical conversation and things were becoming heated. Officer McLean believed a fight may ensue between the members of the group.” Officer activated his blue lights and approached the group, who began to disperse. Officer then “said for them to ‘come back’ so he could speak with them. [Gattison] hesitantly complied.” On officer’s further questioning, defendant admitted he had marijuana in his pocket. “[C]ontrary to the trial court's finding, there is no evidence that the discussion was actually escalating into a physical altercation,” given the officer’s testimony that he “wasn’t sure” whether a fight was about to ensue. Distinguishing Nelson v. State , 252 Ga.App. 454, 556 S.E.2d 527 (2001), where “the officer followed a vehicle in which he witnessed an ongoing altercation that involved the passenger's hand only a few inches from the driver's face,” and thus had articulable suspicion for a stop. Citing Miller v. State , 288 Ga. 286, 702 S.E.2d 888 (2010) (no articulable suspicion where “officers on patrol saw a group of six or seven men standing in a parking lot as one of the men applied tint to the window of a car that had no visible license plate.”). “As the officer conceded at the suppression hearing, there was nothing illegal about Gattison standing on a sidewalk at 10:30 in the morning, engaging in a discussion with others and walking away upon the officer's arrival. Indeed, the mere fact that Gattison walked away from the officer ‘did not create an objective articulable suspicion.... [A] citizen's ability to walk away from or otherwise avoid a police officer is the touchstone of a first-tier encounter. Such conduct may not provide the basis for elevating the encounter to a second-tier ... stop.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Black [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 40, 46 (635 S.E.2d 568) (2006)].” Daniels v. State, 307 Ga.App. 216, 704 S.E.2d 466 (December 1, 2010). Conviction for felon in possession of firearm reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress based on improper pat-down. Stop, however, was supported by articulable suspicion. “The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that at approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 15, 2009, a woman flagged down a patrol officer to report that her boyfriend had struck her, leaving a knot the size of a golf ball on her forehead, took her car keys, and left on foot from their hotel. The victim described the man as a light-skinned black male wearing a black leather coat, black pants, and black ‘Jordan’ shoes. The officers began looking for the perpetrator in the area, and five to ten minutes later, they saw Daniels walking about two blocks from the scene. They detained him as soon as they saw him. … The evidence presented at the hearing on Daniels' motion to suppress shows that the officers had a sufficient basis for a brief initial Terry stop. Daniels partially fit the description given by the victim of the person who had attacked her. He had the correct skin tone, was wearing a black leather jacket, and had on dark jeans that, given the lighting, appeared black.” The stop was reasonable although Daniels turned out not to be the man who attacked victim. Groves v. State, 306 Ga.App. 779, 703 S.E.2d 371 (November 15, 2010). In defendants’ prosecution for possession of oxycodone, trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to suppress; stop lacked articulable suspicion. “[A]n officer on patrol spotted a lone sedan parked at the edge of an otherwise empty parking lot at a truck plaza. The officer pulled his marked patrol car behind the car and noticed that it was occupied by a passenger, Smith, and a driver, Groves, who was leaning briefly into the passenger side. Neither occupant noticed the officer, and approximately one and a half minutes elapsed as the officer called in the tag number. Groves then looked up, noticed the patrol car in his rear view mirror, put