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his car into gear, and ‘continued to drive on.’ The officer immediately activated his emergency lights and executed a traffic stop of the vehicle.” “[T]he officer testified at the suppression hearing that the car seemed ‘extremely out of place’ in the empty truck plaza parking lot, but he had no other reason to suspect any criminal activity. … That the car was ‘out of place’ perhaps gave rise to a generalized suspicion or hunch, but in the absence of other circumstances, Groves's mere presence in an empty truck plaza parking lot was not sufficient to warrant a traffic stop. [Cits.]” “Moreover, Groves's actions prior to the stop – putting the car into gear and proceeding on his way – were not sufficient to justify the stop, because at that point the encounter was a consensual, first-tier encounter, and Groves was entitled ‘to exercise his right to ignore the police and to leave. Indeed, a citizen's ability to walk away from or otherwise avoid a police officer is the touchstone of a first-tier encounter.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Black [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 40, 44(1) (635 S.E.2d 568) (2006)]. See also In re: J.M., 276 Ga. 88-89(1) (575 S.E.2d 441) (2003) (Georgia's constitution provides citizens a ‘fundamental constitutional right to “be let alone,” provided they are not interfering with the rights of other individuals or of the public.’).” Odom v. State, 304 Ga.App. 615, 697 S.E.2d 289 (June 25, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to file a motion to suppress, as officer had articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying stop . “[A]round 11:00 p.m., plain-clothed and uniformed officers were en route to a convenience store because of complaints of loitering and prowling in the area. … The evidence showed that Odom was in a high-crime area plagued with loitering and prowling. He walked around from the side of the convenience store and upon seeing officers approach another person, mouthed ‘oh, sh,’ pulled down his cap so as to hide his face, put his hand in his pocket, and walked quickly away and back around the side of the building. When [Officer] Pippen shouted to Odom, he fled. The officer testified that Odom exhibited suspicious behavior and that he was concerned that Odom had a gun by the way he immediately put his hand in his pocket upon seeing the other officers. ‘[A] location's characteristics are relevant in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation, and ... nervous evasive behavior is another pertinent factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.’ (Citation omitted.) Williams [ v. State, 269 Ga.App. 616, 618 (604 S.E.2d 640) (2004)]. Under the totality of circumstances here, Odom's actions supported a reasonable, particularized suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., id. at 618-619.” State v. Jones, 303 Ga.App. 337, 693 S.E.2d 583 (April 1, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence seized when police stopped and searched him without probable cause. “[T]wo policemen on bicycle patrol each approached the driver's and passenger's sides of a vehicle respectively, where a female was leaning into the driver's side window and a male (later identified as Jones) was sitting in the passenger seat. Neither officer observed the violation of any laws. After speaking briefly with the female and determining that she was fine, the officer on the driver's side observed Jones remove a ‘Crown Royal’ bag from the cupholder and hold it in his hand, while a pizza box lay in his lap. Jones began to exit the vehicle but was prevented from doing so by the presence of the second officer on the passenger's side. He replaced the bag in the cupholder. The first officer asked what was in the bag, but Jones did not reply. The officer repeated his question several times, but Jones again declined to answer, at one point attempting to place the pizza box over the bag. The officer leaned into the vehicle and opened the bag so he could see its contents, which appeared to be cocaine. The officer seized the bag and determined that it contained cocaine, the drug ‘ecstasy,’ and marijuana.” 1. “[O]nce the second officer prevented Jones from exercising this right [to leave the encounter] and exiting the vehicle, the encounter escalated to a second-tier encounter. Thomas v. State, 301 Ga.App. 198, 201(1), 687 S.E.2d 203 (2009).” 2. Defendant’s “refusal to answer the officer's questions as to what was in the bag, and his placing the bag back in the cupholder (and even placing the pizza box on top of it) also gave the officer no basis for an investigatory detention,” as “Jones was free to ‘refuse to answer or ignore the request[s of the officer] and go on his way if he [chose.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Black [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 40, 43(1), 635 S.E.2d 568 (2006)].” 3. “Thus, the State's attempt to justify the search of the bag as a search for a weapon so as to protect the officers' safety fails. A limited search for a weapon for an officer's safety only arises during a legally-justified second-tier encounter (see Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 508, 604 S.E.2d 171 (2004)), which was not present here.” Harper v. State, 300 Ga.App. 757, 686 S.E.2d 375 (November 5, 2009). In defendants’ trial for armed robbery and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence obtained in stop of vehicle, as officers had articulable suspicion for stop. “Here, the patrol officer proceeding to the armed robbery scene witnessed a Camry run a stop sign. Even without any connection with the recent jewelry store heist, that Camry was thus subject to being stopped for a traffic violation. The officer soon realized that the original getaway vehicle, the Buick, had been abandoned. At the suppression hearing, the officer recounted his experience in previous cases where perpetrators had abandoned an initial getaway vehicle for a second one. Recounting further the erratic maneuvers of the Camry, the officer