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testified that he had announced over police radio to be on the lookout (BOLO) for a black, four-door Toyota Camry and its traveling direction. Within two or three minutes of the BOLO, a nearby officer spotted a vehicle he believed matched the description. In addition, this second officer confirmed over police radio with the patrol officer that the sought-after Camry had shiny wheels, as did the one the second officer had spotted. ‘This detailed information provided the [officers] with the requisite articulable suspicion to warrant the investigative stop and detention’ of the Camry.” LeRoux v. State, 300 Ga.App. 310, 684 S.E.2d 424 (October 6, 2009). Officer had articulable suspicion to stop vehicle “[d]riving through the University of Georgia golf course at 2:30 a.m.” “[N]umerous crimes had been committed on the golf course property after hours, to the point that the police department directed that officers on the midnight shift patrol the golf course a certain number of times during the night. LeRoux drove at 2:30 a.m. through a gate and past signs clearly indicating that the roadway was private property. He drove past many places where he could have turned around or stopped if he had taken a wrong turn or stopped if he needed to consult a map or make a telephone call. Once he reached the end of the roadway, he entered a parking lot and began circling, and he continued to circle rather than exit the parking lot when he returned to the entrance,” citing Bozeman v. State, 196 Ga.App. 743, 743-744(1), 397 S.E.2d 30 (1990). See also Singleton v. State, 235 Ga.App. 88, 89, 508 S.E.2d 461 (1998) (officers authorized to question occupants of car parked in remote area of parking lot at 3:00 a.m. in apartment complex known for drug activity).” Accord, Thomas (March 27, 2015), above. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga.App. 120, 684 S.E.2d 290 (September 17, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress; stop was not supported by articulable suspicion. While searching for suspect near abandoned stolen car, officer “saw [Thomas] driving his truck slowly on Penland Road looking into the wood lines as if looking for someone. [Thomas] would drive very slowly and almost come to a stop and then proceed further[,] still looking in the woods[,] and pause again.” When defendant stopped in the road, officer approached his vehicle. “[Thomas] had his [cellphone] in his hand as if he were about to use it. [Officer] Pause ordered [Thomas] to give him his [cellphone,] and when [Thomas] did not do so, Pause took the phone from him.” Officer found suspect’s name in cellphone’s memory. Officer asked defendant to exit vehicle so officer could photograph defendant and vehicle. Defendant refused, and officer arrested him for obstruction. “Thomas's mere presence at the scene of the abandoned vehicle alleged to have been stolen by Morris, however, was insufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Thomas. [Cit.] While Thomas's slow driving and intermittent stops may have caused Pause to closely observe him, [Cit.] it was not sufficient to indicate that Thomas was or might have been ‘engaged in illegal activity so as to provide a reasonable articulable suspicion’ to detain him. [Cit.]” Bishop v. State, 299 Ga.App. 241, 682 S.E.2d 201 (July 16, 2009). Stop of defendant’s car was authorized where deputy saw defendant “driving out of the driveway of a vacant lot” at 10:30 a.m. on a Sunday in an area “where people illegally dump trash and leave abandoned vehicles. There had been a rash of catalytic converter thefts in the area, and the neighboring businesses were closed at the time.” Deputy “did not know how long the vehicle had been in the lot; and he did not see anyone discard anything while there. Nonetheless, as he could think of no legitimate reason for the vehicle's presence in the lot, Shirley decided to stop the van because he suspected that its occupant had been dumping trash illegally.” Held, “[a]lthough an investigative stop would not generally be authorized merely by the defendant's act of driving lawfully late at night in a high crime area on a public road, [fn] given the totality of the circumstances here, Officer Shirley was authorized to stop Bishop's car.” Distinguishing Howden v. State , 240 Ga.App. 139, 522 S.E.2d 279 (1999): “We specifically noted therein that the officer did not articulate any particular fact indicating that the defendant was or was about to be engaged in criminal activity nor did he explain that crimes had been committed in the area. Id. At 140. In the instant case, however, additional circumstances were present. Shirley testified that he thought Bishop had engaged in illegal dumping and explained that the crimes of illegal dumping, theft, and burglary had been committed in the area.” Distinguishing State v. Winnie , 242 Ga.App. 228, 529 S.E.2d 215 (2000), where “there was no claim that the truck had been parked or out of the officer's sight long enough for a burglary to occur. We reasoned that even if the officer suspected an attempted burglary, the basis for his suspicion disappeared when the truck started to leave the parking lot. Id. Here, the officer did not see Bishop enter the lot; rather, he only saw him exiting a lot where people illegally dumped trash. It was this factor that prompted the officer's suspicion, particularly given his additional knowledge of the area. The officer testified unequivocally that he stopped Bishop because he thought that Bishop had dumped trash on the lot. Therefore, unlike in Winnie, there was no evidence here from which the inference could be made that the reason for the stop dissipated with Bishop's exit from the lot.” See also Cox (September 3, 2003), below. Johnson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 474, 682 S.E.2d 601 (July 2, 2009). Officer’s temporary detention of defendant was supported by articulable suspicion. “At the time that the officer detained Johnson, he was aware that Johnson had failed to