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call 911 when a violent domestic disturbance had occurred on her [day care] premises that potentially placed the children at risk, and that she had ‘left real quick’ upon learning that the police had been summoned. The officer had also been informed Johnson may have been drinking. Finally, when Johnson returned driving a van full of young children, the officer observed that she had glossy eyes and was in an ‘over-emotional state.’ These specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, warranted the officer's temporary detention of Johnson based on a reasonable suspicion that she had committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. See generally Maloy v. State, 293 Ga.App. 648, 650(1) (667 S.E.2d 688) (2008) (the observation of glassy eyes and suspicious demeanor of a driver may justify a temporary detention); Veal v. State, 273 Ga.App. 47, 49-50 (614 S.E.2d 143) (2005) (the behavior giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity need not itself be unlawful); Johnson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 659, 661(3) (555 S.E.2d 34) (2001) (an apparent attempt to avoid police in conjunction with other factors can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Moreover, the fact that a violent domestic disturbance had erupted in the presence of children under Johnson's care and control and Johnson failed to summon the police supported a reasonable suspicion that she may also have been guilty of reckless conduct .” Adkins v. State, 298 Ga.App. 229, 679 S.E.2d 793 (June 5, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for drug possession reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant’s consent to search vehicle was product of illegal stop. “ The encounter began with an anonymous call reporting two people parked in a car in an area that usually had little or no traffic. There was no evidence, however, that the neighborhood in which Adkins was parked was a high crime area, that it was illegal to park in that area or that Adkins was engaged in any other criminal activity. … The caller reported two people in the car, but Adkins was alone when the police stopped her thus supporting her claim that she was in the neighborhood to drop off her boyfriend. The only other factor cited to support Adkins' detention was her extreme nervousness, but it is well-settled that nervousness alone is not enough to justify a detention or search. See Bell v. State, 295 Ga.App. 607 (672 S.E.2d 675) (2009); Gonzales v. State, 255 Ga.App. 149, 150 (564 S.E.2d 552) (2002). Moreover, police observations of Adkins' nervousness arose directly from the illegal stop.” In re: J.T., 297 Ga.App. 636, 678 S.E.2d 111 (April 29, 2009). Trial court properly denied juvenile’s motion to suppress; officers had two sufficient grounds to stop juvenile: first, “because of their prior contact with J.T., the officers knew that J.T. was enrolled in and supposed to be attending school on the date and time in question. The officers therefore had a reasonable, particularized and objective basis for suspecting that J.T. was truant and were consequently justified in stopping him in order to determine why he was not attending school. See In re: E.C., [292 Ga.App. 798, 799-800 (665 S.E.2d 896) (2008)].” “Second, the officers had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that J.T. and his cohorts were engaged in or about to be engaged in the commission of a burglary. Not only did the four males match the physical description provided by the witness to the Proctor Street burglary which had been committed just one day earlier, but on the day of the stop, they were seen ‘canvassing [a nearby] area, prowling and looking inside homes’ at approximately the same hour the Proctor Street burglary had occurred, a time when they were otherwise supposed to be attending school. The officers' brief stop and detention of J.T. under these circumstances was not unreasonable. See Aponte v. State, 296 Ga.App. 778, 676 S.E.2d 279 (March 20, 2009); In re: B.K.M., 247 Ga.App. 588, 589-591 (544 S.E.2d 504) (2001); [ State v. Turntime, 170 Ga.App. 740, 742-743(1) (318 S.E.2d 157) (1984)].” Aponte v. State, 296 Ga.App. 778, 676 S.E.2d 279 (March 20, 2009). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; stop was supported by articulable suspicion: “[A] police officer who was patrolling for burglary suspects and on the look out for a silver Mercury Town Car observed Aponte driving what appeared to be such a car ‘at slow speeds, not using any turn signals, going in and out of lanes.’ The officer tried to check the status of the car's Indiana license tag, but the computer returned no information. The officer watched Aponte pull into a restaurant parking lot ‘very quick.’ When the officer circled around the adjacent building, Aponte pulled out to leave and the officer stopped the car. He talked to Aponte and his passenger, checked their drivers' licenses, and ran the tag again. This time he learned that the tag had been issued to a different vehicle.” “Given the officer's knowledge that he was to be on the lookout for a car similar in description to the car Aponte was driving and his observations of Aponte's suspicious driving before the stop, we find that the officer had … a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Aponte of criminal activity. Accordingly, the stop was authorized notwithstanding the officer only learned of the information about the tag after he stopped Aponte.” See also In re: J.T. (April 29, 2009), above. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga.App. 481, 675 S.E.2d 504 (March 5, 2009). Stop was supported by articulable suspicion: “the responding officer was investigating a burglary when he observed the vehicle in which Taylor was riding driving down a service road in the very early morning hours when no one else was in the area. The sole business on the service road was closed at that hour and the gravel path led only to a construction site, the type of which, the officer