☢ test - Í

of this case, including that McClary said he was ‘mad at [his] girl’ and the officer’s radio call within earshot of McClary, McClary’s immediate headlong ‘flight [was] a circumstance sufficient to give an articulable suspicion of illegal activity, justifying a brief investigatory stop.’ [Cits.]” Underwood v. State, 266 Ga.App. 119, 596 S.E.2d 425 (March 4, 2004). Controlled substance conviction affirmed. “Underwood’s undisputed flight from the premises, coupled with the evidence of his presence at premises being searched pursuant to a lawful warrant, provided probable cause for the officer to believe that he possessed, or was, at least, a party to the crime of possessing, the unlawful contraband specified in the warrant,” citing Ledford v. State , 233 Ga.App. 445, 504 S.E.2d 512 (1998), and Travis v. State , 192 Ga.App. 695, 385 S.E.2d 779 (1989). Accord, Sheats v. State , 305 Ga.App. 475, 699 S.E.2d 798 (July 30, 2010). State v. Stilley, 261 Ga.App. 868, 584 S.E.2d 9 (June 4, 2003). In prosecution for DUI and related offenses, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress. Unanimous full court decision. Driver’s failure to stop when officer activated his blue lights and siren constituted a violation of OCGA § 40-6-395(a) (fleeing and eluding police), and thus gave officer articulable suspicion for stop even where officer’s initial attempt to pull the driver over was not supported by articulable suspicion. “This new criminal act essentially purged the taint of the otherwise illegal stop,” and evidence seized as a result of the stop was thus admissible. Accord, Faulkner v. State , 277 Ga.App. 702, 627 S.E.2d 423 (February 21, 2006); Prather v. State , 279 Ga.App. 873, 633 S.E.2d 46 (June 16, 2006); Hardnett v. State , 285 Ga. 470, 678 S.E.2d 323 (May 18, 2009); Heard v. State , 299 Ga.App. 44, 681 S.E.2d 701 (July 13, 2009). State v. Harris, 261 Ga.App. 119, 581 S.E.2d 736 (May 5, 2003). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking and related offenses, trial court properly granted motion to suppress. While patrolling near a motel in a known drug area, officer observed defendant standing in a breezeway. Upon spotting the officer, defendant turned and walked through the breezeway to the other side of the motel. Officer later saw him talking on a cell phone, then saw men at another motel on the other side of the parking lot also talking on a cell phone. The other men then drove over to the first motel, backed into a parking lot, and looked in the trunk. Defendant approached them. When the officer stared at the three, they “trotted” up the stairs to a room. The officer approached defendant, who appeared nervous, stuttered, and gave incoherent answers. One of the other men came out of the motel room, saw the officer, and quickly went back in. The officer told defendant to “take a seat,” and called for back-up. The officer testified that defendant was not free to leave at that point. The officer asked defendant for id, which he said was in the room. The officers testified that defendant gave them permission to enter the motel room. Subsequent search of the room and vehicle revealed large amount of cash and drugs. Held, trial court properly suppressed results of search, as it was a second-tier stop supported by no articulable suspicion. Nervousness, “trotting” away from officer (as opposed to headlong flight), are not sufficient, even in a known drug area. Hamm v. State, 259 Ga.App. 412, 577 S.E.2d 85 (February 3, 2003). Obstruction and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. An “officer called for assistance in looking for a suspect described as an African-American male wearing a white t-shirt” running from an apartment complex. “One of the officers who responded to the call stated that he went to a field where there was a pathway between two apartment complexes. He said that he went there because that was the direction in which the suspect was heading when the officer chased him, and he knew from experience that ‘when people flee from [the police] in Pinedale or Forest Villas, they usually transgress this path.’ The officer testified that he arrived at the field between the apartments only 45 seconds to a minute after receiving the ‘be on the lookout’ call. Approximately 30 seconds after positioning himself in the field, the officer saw Hamm walking toward him on the path and asked him to stop. When asked for identification, Hamm gave the officer a social security card, saying he did not have a picture ID. The officer took down Hamm’s date of birth and called in the information to his dispatcher. Officer Martel talked to the officer who sent out the call for assistance and described Hamm. The officer said that he did not believe Hamm was the suspect in question. Nevertheless, Officer Martel decided to wait until the results of the background check had been run before telling Hamm he could leave.” Held, the officer had articulable suspicion to detain defendant. Witcher v. State, 258 Ga.App. 430, 574 S.E.2d 455 (November 18, 2002). Probation revocation affirmed. Officers had articulable suspicion for brief investigatory stop where officer, knowing that defendant had just been placed on probation, observed him in at a street corner where numerous drug arrests had been made. When defendant saw officers approaching he “began messing with his pants pocket” and fled. Gray v. State, 254 Ga.App. 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (January 25, 2002). Controlled substance convictions affirmed. Defendant jumped out of his car and ran when police signaled the driver to pull over. As he ran, police saw him throw