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suspicious answer); Crowley v. State, 267 Ga.App. 718, 719 (601 S.E.2d 154) (2004) (same); see also State v. Devine, 276 Ga.App. 159, 260–61 (622 S.E.2d 854) (2005).” “[N]one of Ewumi's described activities—walking away from the officer, ignoring the officer, being present in a high-crime area (and returning home from a school function), walking in a slumped position, and wearing a hooded sweatshirt in early March—are a crime in and of themselves, “nor are they enough to make an objective determination that [Ewumi] was about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Brown [ v. State, 301 Ga.App. 82, 85-86 (686 S.E.2d 793) (2009)]. Additionally, the mere refusal to identity oneself to an officer is not a crime. Wagner v. State, 206 Ga.App. 180, 182 (424 S.E.2d 861) (1992).” Accord, Smith v. State , 327 Ga.App. 224, 757 S.E.2d 884 (April 21, 2014) (“The evidence that Smith ran from a first-tier encounter cannot support a finding that he committed the offense of obstruction.”). Galindo-Eriza v. State, 306 Ga.App. 19, 701 S.E.2d 516 (September 10, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for drug trafficking and obstruction reversed; trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Police knocked on a residence door, investigating suspected drug dealing but without a warrant or probable cause; occupants ran out the back door. Officers gave chase and detained the occupants (who were not known to police). In doing so, an officer observed drugs in the house while behind the house. Held, where officers had no particularized suspicions about these occupants, they were free to leave the residence, and their flight provided no basis for officers to enter the rear of the residence. “[T]he totality of the circumstances here consisted of the occupants running from a house that the police had on one occasion observed a suspected drug dealer enter. However, neither the occupants' presence in the house nor their running away from the officers could provide the officers with a reasonable articulable suspicion. In Black [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 40, 44-47(1), 635 S.E.2d 568 (2006)], we held that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining or arresting an individual who had just left a residence that had been under surveillance for illegal drug activity. In State v. Mallard, 246 Ga.App. 357, 357-358, 541 S.E.2d 46 (2000), we held that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify stopping a vehicle that had just left a residence upon which officers were preparing to execute a search warrant for marijuana. Here, as the testifying officers acknowledged, no warrant had been issued and no search was imminent. In State v. Harris, 261 Ga.App. 119, 122, 581 S.E.2d 736 (2003) , we found that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to detain a defendant based on nervousness and on defendant's cohort's exiting and then immediately returning to a motel room upon seeing police. In this matter, the mere fact that during this first-tier encounter the occupants of the house sought to ‘be let alone’ by avoiding contact with police did not create an objective articulable suspicion. See Black, supra, 281 Ga.App. at 46(1), 635 S.E.2d 568; Harris, supra, 261 Ga.App. at 122, 581 S.E.2d 736. Accordingly, Galindo-Eriza's and the other occupants' exercise of their right to avoid police gave the officers no grounds to detain them and conduct an investigative stop.” Accord, Groves v. State , 306 Ga.App. 779, 703 S.E.2d 371 (November 15, 2010) (where officer drove up to vehicle “parked at the edge of an otherwise empty parking lot at a truck plaza,” occupant had right to simply drive away). Spence v. State, 295 Ga.App. 583, 672 S.E.2d 538 (January 16, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; traffic stop was supported by articulable suspicion. “‘Flight in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search ( [cit.] ); certainly these circumstances gave rise to an articulable suspicion that a criminal act may have been occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop.’ State v. Smalls, 203 Ga.App. 283, 286(2) (416 S.E.2d 531) (1992). See also United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 708-709 (11 th Cir., 1991) (investigatory stop proper when experienced police officer observed suspect parked in a parking lot in a high crime area at 4:00 a.m., when all the nearby commercial establishments were closed, and the suspect drove away from the officer in an evasive manner). Because Spence bolted when the sergeant had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he was the person recently seen by the patrol officer violating the law, the sergeant was authorized to chase and briefly detain Spence to complete his investigation after he ordered Spence to stop when he ran.” Defendant’s subsequent flight thus supported obstruction conviction. Accord, Williams (March 9, 2016), above. McClary v. State, 292 Ga.App. 184, 663 S.E.2d 809 (June 24, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; officer had grounds for second-tier stop. Officer encountered defendant walking at 4:00 a.m. and asked about circumstances. Defendant answered and further explained that he ‘got mad at [his] girl,’ so he was walking to another location. When the officer asked whether they had gotten into a fight, McClary replied, ‘no.’ The officer then asked where McClary lived, to which he replied ‘Joree Street,’ and the officer radioed to dispatch, requesting that they ‘[c]all down to the City and see if they have any 10-16’s [domestic disturbances] on Joree Street, I’d say in the past hour.’ At that point, McClary fled into some nearby woods. The officer ordered McClary to stop, pursued McClary into the woods, and eventually tackled him from behind.” Defendant fought the law, but the law won. “McClary contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his resistance to the arrest because the officer allegedly had no basis for pursuing him into the woods and arresting him. In light of the circumstances of this case, we disagree. … We hold that, in light of the facts