☢ test - Í

Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 513 S.E.2d 1 (March 1, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; officer had articulable suspicion to stop defendant. “Officer Rodriguez is an experienced police officer. At 5:00 a.m., he observed a vehicle exiting a business area where no residences were located, at a time when no businesses were open and where he believed there had been previous burglaries. In response to the officer’s emergency lights, the vehicle’s occupants attempted to flee. ‘Flight in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search ( [cit.] ); certainly these circumstances gave rise to an articulable suspicion that a criminal act may have been occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop.’ State v. Smalls, 203 Ga.App. 283, 286(2), 416 S.E.2d 531 (1992). See also United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 708-709 (11 th Cir., 1991) (investigatory stop proper when experienced police officer observed suspect parked in a parking lot in a high crime area at 4:00 a.m., when all the nearby commercial establishments were closed, and the suspect drove away from the officer in an evasive manner).” Accord, Smith v. State , 237 Ga.App. 616, 516 S.E.2d 319 (April 12, 1999). Tuggle v. State, 236 Ga.App. 847, 512 S.E.2d 650 (February 17, 1999). During traffic stop, “officers were authorized, for their own safety, to request that [passenger, who was suspected of no wrong-doing,] remain in the car until their investigation was complete.” When defendant/ passenger “bolted and ran” despite officer’s request that he remain in his seat, “his actions provided the officers with an articulable suspicion that he had committed or was committing a crime. Flight is a circumstance sufficient to give an articulable suspicion of illegal activity. Walker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 509, 511(1), 493 S.E.2d 193 (1997). Moreover, [Officer] Hutson testified that, in his knowledge and experience, when an individual flees a routine traffic stop, it is ground for caution; outstanding warrants may be out on the individual, or the person may have contraband or weapons. This elevated the encounter to the second level, justifying a brief, Terry -type stop, in which Hutson was authorized to restrain Tuggle for further brief questioning.” Accord, Davis v. State , 237 Ga.App. 890, 517 S.E.2d 115 (May 4, 1999) (flight on foot after avoiding roadblock justified stop). Guild v. State, 236 Ga.App. 444, 512 S.E.2d 343 (February 12, 1999). Officer’s observations of suspect’s behavior justified Terry stop: “[D]uring a single evening in an area known for drug trade, the arresting officer observed several apparent drug transactions in which men approached vehicles circling the Gateway Motel parking lot and ran into hotel rooms upon noticing the patrol car. After parking his car, the officer watched Guild’s co-indictee approach a vehicle in the parking lot, lean into the car and converse with its occupants. Although the officer did not specifically see any drugs, the man’s actions, in a ‘known drug area,’ both at the vehicle and after he observed the officer and ran, provided reasonable suspicion sufficient to authorize a Terry stop. Harris [ v. State, 205 Ga.App. 813, 814(1), 423 S.E.2d 723 (1992)]; In re: J.L.G., 209 Ga.App. 565, 566, 434 S.E.2d 126 (1993) ( in some circumstances, flight may provide sufficient evidence of consciousness of guilt to give rise to reasonable suspicion ). When the effort to stop the suspect proved impossible, Terry did not prohibit the officer from following the fleeing man to the hotel room. Holcomb v. State, 191 Ga.App. 379, 380-381(1), 381 S.E.2d 594 (1989).” 9. GCIC REPORTS/LICENSE PLATE READERS Hill v. State, 321 Ga.App. 817, 743 S.E.2d 489 (May 21, 2013). Convictions for marijuana possession and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Stop based on License-Plate Reader (LPR) technology was proper. Officer initiated stop after LPR system indicated “that a wanted person could be driving” the passing vehicle driven by defendant. “[T]he officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on the alert and information the officer received from the LPR system showing that a wanted person could be driving the vehicle. See Hastings v. State, 211 Ga.App. 873, 874(2) (441 S.E.2d 83) (1994) (ruling that information that a vehicle had been reported stolen provided sufficient articulable suspicion for a traffic stop, even though that information was later determined to be inaccurate); Self v. State, 245 Ga.App. 270, 274(3)(a) (537 S.E.2d 723) (2000) (ruling that information showing that vehicle's license plate was registered to another vehicle supported initial stop).” Rodriguez v. State, 321 Ga.App. 619, 746 S.E.2d 366 (April 12, 2013). Vacated, 295 Ga. 362, 761 S.E.2d 19 (June 30, 2014). Whole court, physical precedent only. Interlocutory appeal affirming denial of motion to suppress in prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant waived claim that traffic stop lacked articulable suspicion by failing to address the issue in written motion. Doyle, writing for four others, dissents, would find no waiver based on trial court’s order following motion hearing on another issue, giving parties opportunity to brief the issue of articulable suspicion. Doyle would reverse, based on lack of articulable suspicion for stop. Stop was based on alert from automated license plate reader (LPR) system which alerted officer to an outstanding warrant on a person “for failure to appear in court on citations issued … while driving the Impala with the displayed license plate.” The warrant was for Enrique Sanchez; the two occupants of the vehicle were both female. The officer observed no traffic violations and made the stop based solely on the LPR alert. After stopping the vehicle, the officer ran the tag; the car was