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registered to Sonia Rodriguez, who turned out to be the driver. A subsequent consent search of the vehicle revealed marijuana. Doyle would find no articulable suspicion for stop of the vehicle based on this LPR alert. Traffic stops, she notes, require articulable suspicion that “ the driver [or occupant] or vehicle is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law. We have observed that articulable suspicion must be an objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. That determination can only be made after considering the totality of the circumstances or the whole picture. Based upon that whole picture, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,” citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) and Humphreys v. State , 304 Ga.App. 365, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010). “According to the officer's testimony, the database system used here will alert an officer to a wanted person, regardless of whether or not the identified vehicle is registered to that person. Thus, the system will associate the wanted person with a vehicle based on the person's one-time use of that vehicle, and the officer has no way of knowing the extent of the person's relationship to the vehicle in question. If the officer takes no steps to further verify the alert, this results in an overbroad detention of individuals even though the flagged vehicle is not registered to a wanted person; the vehicle does not exhibit a registration or ownership problem; and the driver is otherwise operating the vehicle in full compliance with traffic laws.” Officer here made no attempt to determine whether either of the female occupants here might be “Enrique Sanchez,” prior to making stop, including determining age or gender of the wanted person. Distinguishing Hernandez-Lopez (February 5, 2013), below , in which “the officer took an additional step to confirm that at least the gender and the general age of the person stopped matched those of the wanted person.” Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga.App. 662, 738 S.E.2d 116 (February 5, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for driving without license; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Alert from license-plate reader (LPR) system, indicating that owner of vehicle was wanted, provided police with articulable suspicion justifying stop. Officer stopped vehicle based on LPR alert that male owner of vehicle he encountered was wanted. “Upon identifying the relevant vehicle and seeing that it was driven by an adult male, the officer conducted a traffic stop.” Stop revealed that driver wasn’t the wanted owner, but was driving without license. “Here, based on the alert and information he received from the LPR system, the officer had reason to believe the male driver of the relevant vehicle was wanted for failure to appear in court, which provided reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Citing Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga.App. 365, 367, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010) (“[T]he particularized and objective basis for the initial stop was the information from GCIC—in this case, that the male owner of the registered vehicle [the appellant] was operating had a suspended driver's license.”) and cases approving stops based on tag violations. Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga.App. 365, 696 S.E.2d 400 (June 9, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for driving on suspended license affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Officer had articulable suspicion for stop based on GCIC check of car’s tag and car owner’s driver’s license, although defendant wasn’t car owner. “[W]hile performing random checks of motor vehicle tags, a patrol officer with the Morrow Police Department checked the tag of a vehicle through the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). He discovered that the owner of the vehicle was male and had a suspended driver's license. He observed that the driver of the vehicle was male, and assuming that it was the vehicle's owner, stopped the car. ” Cites to cases where GCIC check showed tag didn’t match vehicle: Thompson v. State, 289 Ga. App 661 (658 S.E.2d 122) (2007); Self v. State, 245 Ga.App. 270 (537 S.E.2d 723) (2000). Accord, Hernandez-Lopez (February 5, 2013), above . 10. GENERALLY Johnson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 474, 682 S.E.2d 601 (July 2, 2009). Whether articulable suspicion for stop existed is an objective determination, not limited to officer’s opinion. “ See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813(II)(A) (116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89) (1996) (‘[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’) (citation and punctuation omitted); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470- 471(II)(A) (105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370) (1985) (‘Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.’) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136(II) (98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168) (1978) (‘Subjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.’).” Also citing “ Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678(3) (524 S.E.2d 211) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because ‘the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry -type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police’); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga.App. 33, 37(2) (645 S.E.2d 545) (2007) (rejecting [defendant]'s argument