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that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing because, ‘[g]iven that the objective facts ... would have given rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, any subjective reason for which this [unidentified] officer may have detained [[defendant]] is not relevant’); Garrett v. State, 259 Ga.App. 870, 875(2) (578 S.E.2d 460) (2002) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence on the ground that the detention was illegal because, regardless of whether the officer believed that reasonable suspicion existed, ‘we decide whether reasonable suspicion justifies a detention based on all the objective facts [and] are not limited by the detaining officer's subjective opinions’); Cole v. State, 254 Ga.App. 424, 722(2) (562 S.E.2d 720) (2002) (‘The officer's subjective belief that he lacked authority to detain [[defendant]] for continued investigation does not control where the facts objectively show the officer had such authority.’). Cf. Kline v. KDB Inc., 295 Ga.App. 789, 791(1) (673 S.E.2d 516) (2009) (‘[I]f the objectively viewed facts and circumstances were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest for some offense, the arrest was not unlawful because the officer subjectively based the arrest on an offense for which probable cause was lacking.’); Farmer v. State, 156 Ga.App. 837, 839(2) (275 S.E.2d 774) (1980) (‘[I]n spite of the police officer's belief that probable cause was lacking ..., the trial court still had the independent duty to determine objectively if probable cause was present.’). Compare State v. Tollefson, 259 Ga.App. 320, 322(1)(b) (577 S.E.2d 21) (2003) (affirming the trial court's grant of [defendant]'s motion to suppress when both a subjective and objective analysis of the facts failed to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).” Accord, Oglesby v. State , 311 Ga.App. 615, 716 S.E.2d 742 (September 8, 2011); See also Fitz (October 13, 2005), below. State v. Lanes, 287 Ga.App. 311, 651 S.E.2d 456 (August 21, 2007). Grant of defendant’s motion to suppress affirmed; based on facts as found by trial court, “ the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask Lanes to get out of his car,” thus turning first tier encounter into second-tier stop. Officer “observed a car parked in a closed gas station at 2:45 a.m. She approached the car and observed the driver, later identified as Lanes, ‘slumped down’ or ‘leaning forward’ and looking at a contact lens case in his hand . The officer tapped on the window, and Lanes ‘slowly looked over at’ her; she tapped again and he rolled down the window. When she asked what he was doing, he told her that he had just come from a nightclub and was ‘having problems with his contacts and wanted to let his eyes rest .’ His speech was ‘very, very slow,’ and his eyes were red and watery. She did not, however, smell any odor of alcohol. She asked Lanes if he had been smoking marijuana, and he denied it, although he said he had had a couple of beers at the nightclub. The officer asked for Lanes’s driver’s license, which she checked and found no outstanding warrants. She then asked him to step out of the car.” Trial court “found that Lanes gave a ‘reasonable explanation’ for his red and watery eyes, noting explicitly, ‘I don’t find anything else .... there was nothing there that I could see that would justify her asking him to step out of the car and taking his license from him.’” Distinguished, Langston v. State , 302 Ga.App. 541, 691 S.E.2d 349 (March 1, 2010) (officer could order driver from vehicle during lawful second-tier traffic stop based on articulable suspicion). Lyttle v. State, 279 Ga.App. 659, 632 S.E.2d 394 (May 12, 2006). Trial court erred in denying motion to suppress; “ the act of driving at night, lawfully, on a public road in a high crime area does not justify an investigative stop in the absence of additional circumstances. [Cit.] See also Baker v. State, 256 Ga.App. 75, 77-78(1) (567 S.E.2d 738) (2002) (stop was not warranted where suspect turned down a difficult-to-traverse road at night towards a business that had experienced numerous thefts); Howden v. State, 240 Ga.App. 139, 140-141 (522 S.E.2d 279) (1999) (stop was not warranted where suspect was seen driving late at night away from a warehouse in an area known for criminal activity); Attaway v. State, 236 Ga.App. 307, 309 (511 S.E.2d 635) (1999) (stop was not warranted where suspect drove around a subdivision where there had been many incidents of vandalism several times late at night). In this case, the deputy did not observe Lyttle doing anything other than driving at night, lawfully, on a public road in a high crime area. The deputy stopped Lyttle immediately upon seeing headlights approaching because of his generalized suspicion, based on the pattern of activity in the area, that anyone in Lyttle’s location at that time of day was ‘there for illicit purposes,’ and not because of any particularized information suggesting that the occupants of Lyttle’s specific vehicle were, or were about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Stephens v. State, 278 Ga.App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (April 7, 2006). “[U]nlike reasonable suspicion of general criminal activity (which justifies an investigative stop), probable cause for arrest requires that the particular crime be specified and that therefore some circumstances reflecting the elements of that crime must be present. See Bothwell v. State , 250 Ga. 573, 576(2) (300 S.E.2d 126) (1983) ( Terry stop ‘can be based on a showing of “reasonable suspicion” to believe that criminal activity is afoot rather than the more rigorous standard of “probable cause” to believe that a particular crime has been committed’ ); Aguero v. State , 169 Ga.App. 462, 464-465(2) (313 S.E.2d 735) (1984) (same).” Fitz v. State, 275 Ga.App. 817, 622 S.E.2d 46 (October 13, 2005). “The presence of an empty vehicle parked for at least