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conflict of interest in that she continued to represent both defendant and the co-defendant after finding out that the defendants relied on inconsistent versions of the same defense that they were not present at the scene of the crime. Further held, this conflict affected the attorney’s performance because she did not ask the defendant whether he would testify against his co-defendant in exchange for a more favorable plea bargain. Pike v. State, 245 Ga.App. 518, 538 S.E.2d 172 (August 10, 2000). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty pleas to aggravated child molestation and related offenses; plea counsel labored under no prohibited conflict of interest. “Pike correctly argues that after leaving public employment, a lawyer ‘should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving.’ State Bar Rule 3-109, Ethical Consideration 9-3. And here, defense counsel was employed by the district attorney's office at the time the charges were brought against Pike. But Pike stated during the plea hearing that he waived any possible conflict. Furthermore, defense counsel testified that when Pike retained him, he discussed his previous employment as an assistant district attorney with Pike's brother and with Pike. He also stated that when employed as a prosecutor, he never had any responsibility with respect to Pike's prosecution and never had any discussions with any prosecutor or staff member about the case. In fact, he stated that while working in the district attorney's office, he ‘possessed no knowledge of the case’ and learned after he left the district attorney's office ‘that the file existed.’ Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that defense counsel “had substantial responsibility” with respect to the prosecution of Pike's case requiring him to decline employment by Pike.” Ellison v. State, 242 Ga.App. 636, 530 S.E.2d 524 (March 8, 2000). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel where “counsel represented seven other people who were arrested for buying illegal drugs in the same reverse sting operation but who chose to plead guilty … . But the record is devoid of any evidence of an actual conflict of interest. ‘Single representation of multiple defendants raises no per se presumption of conflict of interest or prejudice.’ (Citation omitted.) Hamilton v. State, 255 Ga. 468, 470(2), 339 S.E.2d 707 (1986). Nothing shows that Ellison was at cross-purposes with any of the other persons arrested for other transactions that day. Because any conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants must be palpable and have a substantial basis in fact, speculative conflicts afford no basis for an ineffective assistance claim. Lamb v. State, 267 Ga. 41, 42(1), 472 S.E.2d 683 (1996); see Curry v. State, 238 Ga.App. 511, 518(3)(a), 519 S.E.2d 269 (1999).” Williams v. State, 242 Ga.App. 1, 528 S.E.2d 521 (January 20, 2000). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on conflict of interest where defense counsel chose not to call State’s confidential informant as a witness due to animosity between counsel and the informant arising from counsel’s prior representation of the informant in another criminal case. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel acknowledged animosity in his relationship with the confidential informant, testifying that his decision not to call the informant as a witness was in part based on the informant's attitude toward him. However, trial counsel further testified that he regarded the confidential informant's potential testimony as unpredictable and harmful to defendant's case. This amounted to no more than a decision on trial strategy. ‘Counsel's decisions on matters of tactic and strategy, even if unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. [Cits.]’ Scott v. State, 238 Ga.App. 258, 260(2), 518 S.E.2d 468 (1999). We further conclude that conflict of interest in trial counsel is here not in issue. Beyond trial counsel's decision not to call the informant as a witness, a matter of trial strategy in defendant's interest rather than against it, the record reflects that trial counsel did not simultaneously represent the confidential informant at the time of trial in the case sub judice. Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 24(2), 494 S.E.2d 661 (1998) (‘The legal presumption is, of course, that an attorney-client relationship terminates once the case or controversy in which the attorney was originally employed is resolved by the entry of a final judgment.’); see Craddock v. State, 173 Ga.App. 133(1), 325 S.E.2d 804 (1984). Additionally, there is no indication in the record before us that trial counsel had any pecuniary interest in possible future business from the confidential informant given their strained relationship, and neither party having called the confidential informant as a witness, the possibility that privileged information obtained from informant might have been relevant is moot. Hill v. State, 269 Ga. at 24(2), 494 S.E.2d 661, supra. Consequently, we need not address the question of whether defendant voluntarily waived any objection to trial counsel's remaining in the case for alleged conflict of interest.” Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. 705, 523 S.E.2d 871 (November 15, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to malice murder; defendant shows no actual conflict of interest in defense counsel where counsel’s “partner had been related by marriage to the victim's mother and represented her in the probate of the victim's estate. That representation was completed prior to trial counsel's appointment to represent the defendant and was disclosed to Jackson, who expressed satisfaction with his attorney's performance during the plea hearing.” “Jackson has not shown in this case how his attorney's conflict caused divided loyalties, compromised his attorney's representation of