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him, or influenced his decision to plead guilty. Without any showing of an adverse effect, the trial court did not err in concluding that Jackson was afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Gray v. State, 240 Ga.App. 716, 523 S.E.2d 626 (October 19, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and false imprisonment affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on conflict of interest, just because co-defendants’ counsel “were both affiliated with the same public defenders' office.” Contrary to defendants’ argument, “Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 … does not propose that having lawyers from the same office represent co-defendants constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se, and we decline to create such a rule here.” Rather, the opinion holds “that, if a lawyer must decline multiple representation due to a conflict, then no attorney listed as ‘of counsel’ on the lawyer's letterhead may accept or continue that employment.” Defendants “have not argued or shown any actual conflict of interest, much less any resulting adverse effect. Without such a showing, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the Grays' lawyers were not ineffective.” Abney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 280, 523 S.E.2d 362 (October 6, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for burglary affirmed; no per se ineffective assistance where defense counsel was “married to a lawyer in the district attorney's office who prosecuted Abney in a previous, unrelated case.” “With respect to attorneys whose spouses are affiliated with opposing counsel, the Supreme Court has held that ‘[a] per se rule of disqualification on the sole ground that an attorney's spouse is a member of a firm representing an opposing party would be not only unfair to the lawyers so disqualified and to their clients but would also have a significant detrimental effect upon the legal profession.... While we cannot disagree with the proposition that the marital relationship may be the most intimate relationship of a person's life, it does not follow that professional people allow this intimacy to interfere with professional obligations.’ (Footnote omitted.) Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406, 408-409, 276 S.E.2d 607 (1981). Accordingly, ‘absent a showing that special circumstances exist which prevent the adequate representation of the client, disqualification based solely on marital status is not justified.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Jones, 258 Ga. 353, 354, 369 S.E.2d 478 (1988). Here, Abney showed no actual conflict of interest on the part of his trial counsel and no deficiencies in counsel's performance.” Brumelow v. State, 239 Ga.App. 119, 520 S.E.2d 776 (July 14, 1999). Defendant could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal based on conflict of interest in joint representation of co-defendant, where both defendants, before trial, “confirmed to the court that they had discussed the case with their attorney, that there was no conflict between them and that they had no objection to the attorney representing them both. Where defendants state on the record that they have discussed the case with counsel, that there is no conflict of interest and that they are satisfied to proceed with one counsel, any error was induced by the defendants' statements, and induced error is impermissible. Pittman v. State, 208 Ga.App. 211, 217(5), 430 S.E.2d 141 (1993). ‘A party can not during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sartin v. State, 223 Ga.App. 759, 760(1), 479 S.E.2d 354 (1996). Because Baxter waived a conflict of interest claim prior to trial, he cannot now complain of such conflict. See Howard v. State, 220 Ga.App. 267, 271-272(4), 469 S.E.2d 396 (1996).” Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). No prejudice where district attorney hired defendant’s original counsel to represent him personally in a matter prior to defendant’s trial, and different counsel was appointed for defendant. “Pruitt complains that the hiring of his original lead counsel by the district attorney caused an irreconcilable conflict, and therefore reversible error, because it led to his counsel’s disqualification. The concurrent representation of a defendant in a capital case and the district attorney seeking the death penalty against the defendant is an obvious conflict. See generally Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446, 499 S.E.2d 897 (1998); Chapel v. State, 264 Ga. 267, 443 S.E.2d 271 (1994); Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185 (1980). However, without addressing the issue of waiver, we conclude that Pruitt does not show any harm resulting from this simultaneous representation. The conflict was resolved … when the trial court removed Chandler, at the defendant’s request. New lead counsel was appointed for Pruitt six months before trial, and Pruitt had the same co-counsel throughout his case. There is no evidence that Chandler’s performance was affected during the simultaneous representation, or that his removal affected Pruitt’s representation at trial.” Fogarty v. State, 270 Ga. 609, 513 S.E.2d 493 (March 8, 1999). Trial counsel did not have conflict of interest based on fee arrangement. Prejudice is presumed where defendant demonstrates that “counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ [Cit.]” Strickland v. Washington, [cit.]. Thus, the entire focus in such a case is upon the adequacy of counsel’s performance, rather than upon actual prejudice to the defense. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348(IV)(B), 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 92 S.Ct. 1551, 32 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972); Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed.