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testified that being held in contempt made her nervous, but she did not identify any other adverse impact on her representation, and she admitted that she was able to cross-examine State’s witnesses. Even if she was not at her best after the contempt proceeding, ‘that does not mean counsel’s performance fell to a level of ineffectiveness.’ Ramsay v. State, 220 Ga.App. 618, 620(1) (469 S.E.2d 814) (1996). ‘[T]he trial court was authorized to conclude that there was no prejudice to defendant.’ Ramsay v. State, supra.” Collier v. State, 280 Ga. 148, 625 S.E.2d 757 (January 17, 2006). Defense counsel’s outburst during prosecutor’s closing argument did not mandate finding of ineffective assistance. “Collier asserts his trial counsel’s courtroom demeanor, in engaging in an argument with the prosecutor during her closing statement, so inflamed the jury that the jury was unable to consider the case in an unbiased manner. During his closing argument, when defense counsel paused to respond to an objection interposed by the prosecutor, he believed he witnessed the prosecutor attempt to display a document to the jury that the court had previously ruled inadmissible. Counsel became so infuriated with the perceived impropriety that he grabbed the document and threw it on the floor. Following the outburst, the court promptly excused the jury. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court instructed the jurors to disregard the outburst, Collier’s counsel apologized to the jury, and completed his closing argument. The following morning, the court denied Collier’s motion for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s conduct in attempting to publish inadmissible evidence to the jury. Although Collier contends that the performance of his trial counsel so prejudiced his defense as to deprive him of a fair trial, our review of the record does not compel a finding that counsel was ineffective. The trial court controlled the proceedings, maintained the dignity of the courtroom, and gave a detailed curative instruction to the jury to not consider either counsel’s disruptive conduct. Applying the Strickland standard, we find that, however unprofessional defense counsel’s conduct might be, nothing in the record suggests that but for this isolated incident the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, as an ‘error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’ [Cit.] Goodwin v. Cruz- Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 (458 S.E.2d 623) (1995).” O’Brien v. State, 242 Ga.App. 344, 529 S.E.2d 657 (February 11, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; “we agree with the trial court's finding that counsel's performance was not deficient. … Counsel's demeanor at trial was aggressive and perhaps occasionally patronizing, but this was a matter of style within the bounds of reasonable behavior.” 29. CREDIBILITY, See subheading BOLSTERING WITNESS CREDIBILITY, FAILURE TO OBJECT, above 30. CROSS-EXAMINATION/QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES Oliver v. State, A16A0096, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1726153 (May 2, 2016). Kidnapping, rape, and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in questioning of victim which led to admission of evidence of a prior prosecution of defendant on similar charges. On cross, counsel asked victim she hadn’t previously reported an alleged prior assault on her by defendant; she replied that she was afraid to report it. On re-direct, trial court allowed victim to elaborate on her fear, which was based on defendant’s prior attack on a previous girlfriend. Defendant was acquitted of that attack, but admitted to victim here that he actually committed those acts and made various threats against the prior victim. Trial court held that counsel’s cross of victim opened the door to explaining her fears, but Court of Appeals holds that that decision was strategic, and not deficient. “We agree with the motion judge that questioning F.W. about her prior failure to contact law enforcement was a reasonable strategy. How to conduct cross-examination is a tactical decision within the exclusive province of counsel. Mack v. State, 242 Ga.App. 256, 258(2)(c) (529 S.E.2d 393) (2000). We can see few avenues of defense in this case other than challenging F. W.’s story by attacking her credibility.” Campbell v. State, A16A0142, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1652685 (April 27, 2016). Conviction for trafficking in marijuana affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel decided to recall a State’s witness, to cross- examine him about comments he made about defendant on Facebook after testifying for the State. “In the comments, Brown berated those who criticized him for testifying on behalf of the State, accused Campbell of not taking responsibility for his conduct, and suggested at one point that Campbell had been involved with another drug dealer who was being prosecuted for the murder of a police officer and other crimes. Subsequently, during closing argument, defense counsel argued that the comments on the Facebook page were a ‘long rambling diatribe’ that showed that Brown was ‘ranting, raving, [and] angry’ about being caught and was ‘going to blame everyone else’ for his troubles, and more generally that Brown had a pattern of ‘lying about everything he thinks can help himself and somehow or other make himself look better.’” “‘In retrospect, [defense] counsel’s decision may appear unwise, but particularly in regard to matters of trial strategy and tactic, effectiveness is not judged by hindsight or result.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dyer [ v. State, 295 Ga.App. 495, 499(1), 672 S.E.2d 462 (2009)].” Rather, the strategic decision to recall the witness