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“within the wide range of professional conduct.” Jackson v. State, 330 Ga.App. 108, 766 S.E.2d 558 (November 21, 2014). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance “in failing to adequately challenge the testimony regarding the polygraph examination. [Defendant] contends counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the examiner's qualifications and failing to restrict his testimony regarding the evidence to its limited lawful purpose. Trial counsel testified that he did not recall particularly asking questions regarding the examiner's foundation as an expert, but that if he didn't ask, it was for the purpose of ‘not further bolstering his credentials.’ Counsel explained further that his strategy was to challenge the manner in which the examiner conducted the examination because the video recording of the exam showed the examiner ‘fondling with the equipment ... placing ... the leads on [ ] Jackson's body ... put them on, take them back off, and ... he kind of went behind the machine and unplugged something and plugged it back up.’ Counsel testified that because it appeared either that the machine wasn't working properly or the examiner was not conducting himself properly, he chose to challenge the administration of the test. Trial counsel's decision here was a matter of reasonable trial strategy. Cf. Johnson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 341, 343(3)(c), 634 S.E.2d 134 (2006) (counsel's decision to attack State's polygraph expert through cross-examination and not call polygraph expert in rebuttal to save closing argument, reasonable trial strategy).” Haynes v. State, 326 Ga.App. 336, 756 S.E.2d 599 (March 19, 2014). Rape and related convictions affirmed; counsel was not “deficient in failing to cross-examine [child forensic interviewer] Dr. Hopkins–Naylor on her interviewing technique. Trial counsel did not recall why he did not pursue this line of cross-examination, but he said that ‘what jumped out at [him]’ from the interview were the inconsistencies and not necessarily the interviewing techniques. He also acknowledged that the techniques employed were similar to those he had seen in other forensic interviews of sexual abuse victims. He further recalled that S.M.'s story changed dramatically during the middle of the interview, but he was not sure that this was due to the interviewing techniques or to her just changing her story. Although it appeared to trial counsel that Dr. Hopkins–Naylor ‘had to lead [S.M.] a little bit’ to get her to say Haynes had sexual intercourse with her, his primary focus in reviewing the videotape was the many inconsistencies in the victim's story. Moreover, we note that trial counsel addressed the leading nature of the forensic interview during his closing argument. … [W]e find that Haynes has failed to establish that trial counsel was not acting in accord with a reasonable trial strategy.” Jones v. State, 325 Ga.App. 895, 755 S.E.2d 815 (March 4, 2014). Robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “in failing to cross-examine a police officer regarding inconsistencies between what the witnesses testified and what he observed on the day of the incident. Trial counsel testified that he did not want to give the officer the chance to explain away the inconsistencies, or to add more unfavorable testimony on cross-examination, but preferred to address any inconsistencies in closing argument. This strategy is … not patently unreasonable. [ Flemister v. State, 317 Ga.App. 749, 757(4)(b), 732 S.E.2d 810 (2012).] Counsel's strategic decision to forego cross-examination of the officer and employ another tactical method or goal was reasonable and did not constitute deficient performance. Pitts v. State, 323 Ga.App. 770, 775(3), 747 S.E.2d 699 (2013).” Lavertu v. State, 325 Ga.App. 709, 754 S.E.2d 663 (February 7, 2014). DUI and open container convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown “for failing ‘to question the witnesses regarding the handling of the blood sample taken from [her] on the date of her arrest.’” “ Lavertu has not even speculated about what her trial counsel could have asked the witnesses that would have caused the jury to question the test's reliability, much less proffered evidence about their responses. ‘Absent a proffer, defendant cannot meet his burden of making an affirmative showing that specifically demonstrates how counsel's failure would have affected the outcome of his case.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hortman v. State, 293 Ga.App. 803, 807(e) (670 S.E.2d 99) (2008) (defendant cannot establish that trial would have ended differently without proffering evidence at the motion for new trial hearing that would have been revealed if counsel had subpoenaed telephone records).” Foster v. State, 319 Ga.App. 815, 738 S.E.2d 651 (February 20, 2013). Conviction for felony shoplifting affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failing to cross-examine witness of inconsistencies between his testimony and his statements contained in police report. Counsel “testified that he felt he could cast doubt on the witness's memory during closing argument and did not want to ‘give the [s]tate the chance to rehabilitate the witness.’” Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 734 S.E.2d 876 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in strategic failure to object to improper testimony. Counsel didn’t object when prosecutor asked witness to speculate about why defendant might have put a gun in witness’s shed. “Wright's counsel testified at the