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motion for new trial hearing that he did not object to this testimony because it was his strategy to use the witness' words against him to portray him as a liar on cross-examination. In this connection, the witness had previously told police that another man, not Wright, had placed a gun in the shed, and the witness had said nothing about Wright being involved with a gun at the time that he was initially interviewed by Wright's counsel. Because counsel's strategy to portray the witness as a liar rather than object to his testimony was reasonable, Wright has not met his burden of showing ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 659(3)(a), 581 S.E.2d 518 (2003) (‘The manner in which an attorney attacks the credibility of a witness falls within the ambit of trial tactics’) (citation omitted).” Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (October 29, 2012). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; 1. no ineffective assistance in failing to cross-examine State’s witness at deposition to preserve witness’s testimony. Counsel instead obtained two-week delay in cross, but witness died in the interim. State was allowed to play the recorded deposition at trial . “[T]rial counsel chose to waive their opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Mincher on that particular day because they believed that it was reasonable for them to choose to prepare further and risk Mr. Mincher's death during those preparations rather than to go forward immediately with less preparation. One of Rice's lawyers testified at Rice's competency trial about the decision not to cross-examine Mr. Mincher immediately after the State's direct examination, stating as follows: ‘It was a strategic decision because we wanted to have an effective cross-examination.’” Even if deficient, no prejudice shown: “Rice has failed to show anything specific and significantly helpful that could have been brought out under cross-examination of Mr. Mincher. Instead, the argument Rice makes about the prejudice stemming from trial counsel's decision to delay their cross-examination is essentially limited to simply naming general topics that might have been raised with Mr. Mincher on cross-examination, such as the possible limits of Mr. Mincher's ability to recall the type of automobile Rice drove, the fact that Mr. Mincher might not have preserved evidence of Rice's harassment, and the fact that Mr. Mincher might not have reported any harassment to the police. Rice has failed to demonstrate what specific, useful information on those topics trial counsel could have actually elicited from Mr. Mincher.” 2. Given counsel’s strategic decision to delay cross, defendant wasn’t entitled to a special jury instruction “ that explained that Mr. Mincher's testimony ‘was not subject to cross-examination by the defense.’” Dunham v. State, 315 Ga.App. 901, 729 S.E.2d 45 (May 17, 2012). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel “ask[ed] a witness whether he was a legal alien, after the trial court had already sustained the State's objection to Dunham asking the previous witness whether he had a visa to be in this country. When the state objected to the legal alien question, the trial court sent the jury out and pointedly questioned Dunham's trial counsel about why he asked the question in violation of the court's earlier ruling, to which counsel responded that the ruling had been made regarding a different witness. Dunham admits that his testimony showed he was prejudiced against these victims and argues that ‘giving the jury the impression that counsel shared in that bias or prejudice could not benefit [him] in any manner.’ As the trial court found in its order denying Dunham's motion for a new trial, ‘This contention is merest speculation on the part of defendant.... The point of the attempt [to ask about the victim's or witness's immigration status] was to show that the victim himself was a lawbreaker and thus subject to impeachment.’ The court concluded that this was a matter of trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. Terry v. State, 284 Ga. 119, 120, 122(2)(d) (663 S.E.2d 704)(2008).” Westbrook v. State, 291 Ga. 60, 727 S.E.2d 473 (May 7, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defense counsel was not “deficient in eliciting an arresting officer's testimony that he had heard over the police radio that Appellant ‘was armed with a gun and had stated that he was prepared to use it.’ Appellant acknowledges that ‘trial counsel is afforded tremendous deference over matters of trial strategy’ but notes that ‘trial strategy must be reasonably supported and within the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’ Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 239, 497 S.E.2d 216 (1998). Trial counsel's question to the officer was designed to show that he was being overly dramatic on the witness stand, and the officer's answer supported that theory.” Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga.App. 694, 725 S.E.2d 824 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel declined to cross-examine certain witnesses. “[T]rial counsel testified that her strategy was to challenge the State's evidence of identity. As explained by trial counsel's testimony, the witnesses she did not cross-examine were not useful in her challenge to the identity evidence because they were not part of the State's evidence establishing Mitchell as the perpetrator of the crimes. … Based on the evidence in this case, this was a reasonable trial strategy and does not constitute deficient performance.” Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 715 S.E.2d 104 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel elected not to seek evidence from GBI agent about parts of defendant’s statement under rule of