☢ test - Í

was called to testify about the subject of the book: false memories planted in small children by suggestive interview techniques. “The psychologist acknowledged, when asked by the state, that he had been ordered to suspend giving testimony in “the narrow area of child custody,” but reported further that he had appealed that ruling, that the decision was subsequently vacated by this court, and that his case had been remanded to the trial court for further consideration. [fn] The psychologist steadfastly maintained that, notwithstanding that pending matter, he remained in good standing with the state licensing board.” “Adem's trial lawyer conceded at the new trial hearing that he had not known about the psychologist's licensing issue, but nevertheless insisted that the defense needed expert testimony to discredit the evidence of the child's memory. Furthermore, the lawyer recalled that he had been unable to obtain another expert in the pertinent areas, that Adem had no money, and that a request for additional funds had been denied. The lawyer testified, ‘So even if I would have known [about the psychologist's licensing issue], I still would have brought him in. It's better to have him, in my opinion, than nothing else at all.’” Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga.App. 568, 683 S.E.2d 10 (July 10, 2009). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where defense counsel strategically introduced defendant’s prior criminal record. “Trial counsel reasoned: ‘it was important that the jury be aware of the fact that during a large portion of the time, when the children were saying they were being abused, Mr. Sarratt was nowhere around them. That while he was being incarcerated there were other men in the mother's life that could have been doing this. And as far as just saying that he wasn't around, without saying he was locked up, quite frankly, he was planning to testify.... It was going to come out that he had a long criminal history anyway.’ According to trial counsel, introducing the criminal history also showed the jury that Sarratt had committed minor offenses like shop lifting, not ‘bad things’ like child molestation. It is undisputed that this trial strategy has worked in the circuit before. We find no ineffective assistance of counsel.” Johnson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 823, 678 S.E.2d 531 (May 13, 2009). At defendant’s drug trial, no ineffective assistance for eliciting damaging information from defense witness. “Although there appears no strategic reason for defense counsel's elicitation of testimony from the defense witness concerning her one criminal conviction, the conviction itself was relatively innocuous and, as argued by Johnson, did not involve felonious conduct, dishonesty, or making a false statement. We thus find no reasonable probability that either counsel's mentioning of it or his failure to object to the state's admission of the paperwork concerning it affected the outcome of the case.” Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 676 S.E.2d 196 (April 28, 2009). Murder conviction affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel called witness whose testimony varied from what he told counsel prior to trial, surprising counsel and harming defendant. “[I]t cannot be said that trial counsel's decision to call Dawes as a witness was … unreasonable. See, e.g., Browne v. State, 261 Ga.App. 648(2), 583 S.E.2d 496 (2003).” Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga.App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (December 1, 2008). Armed robbery and related convictions reversed. Defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel introduced co-defendants’ custodial statements absolving themselves and blaming defendant, where co-defendants did not testify at trial. “‘Where a conspirator states to police that another person committed a crime but that the declarant had no part in it, declarant is seeking to pin the blame on the other and escape punishment for himself.’ Crowder v. State, 237 Ga. 141, 152-153 (237 S.E.2d 230) (1976). Such a statement is ‘inherently untrustworthy.’ Id. Yet Rayshad had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine either [co- defendant].” Deliberating jurors sent out two notes referencing the statements, thus exhibiting “a reasonable probability that trial counsel's deficient performance resulted in inadmissible evidence that influenced the jury.” Farris v. State, 293 Ga.App. 674, 667 S.E.2d 676 (September 10, 2008). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance; defense counsel’s presentation of potentially-damaging information was strategic. Counsel asked child molestation/incest victim whether she had alleged that defendant used illegal drugs – information not otherwise before the jury. “Defense counsel testified that he elicited this testimony to undermine the credibility of [victims] J.D. and J.L. – i.e., to convince the jury that ‘these two witnesses were capable of saying anything about [Farris].’ Given the charges against Farris, trial counsel concluded that there was more to gain than to lose by introducing this evidence. This was a reasonable decision. The testimony established (i) that the victims made an outcry of sexual abuse in the context of having first volunteered to help their mother gain custody of their half-brother; (ii) that the actual accusation of sexual abuse was made only after J.D. and J.L. claimed that Farris had used drugs and their mother had asked them if there was ‘anything else’ that would prevent Farris from gaining custody of the couple's son; and (iii) that, when asking for additional information that could be used against Farris, their mother specifically asked J.D. and J.L. if Farris had ever touched them inappropriately. In light of trial counsel's testimony, the trial court properly concluded that defense counsel's questioning of J.D. about the entire circumstances of her outcry of sexual abuse,