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including the allegation that Farris had used drugs, was part of a valid trial strategy. That this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful in securing a defense verdict on all charges does not show that trial counsel's actions were objectively unreasonable. ‘The standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is not errorless counsel and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel rendering reasonably effective assistance.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 375(3), 627 S.E.2d 562 (2006). The cases cited by Farris in his brief do not demand a different conclusion, because there was no evidence that the alleged errors of trial counsel in those cases were part of a valid trial strategy. See Whitaker v. State, 276 Ga.App. 226, 226-227(1), 622 S.E.2d 916 (2005); Emilio v. State, 263 Ga.App. 604, 650(1), 588 S.E.2d 797 (2003). Rather, trial counsel in those cases inadvertently introduced evidence showing that their client had been charged with other, substantially similar crimes.” Accord, Nelson v. State , 302 Ga.App. 583, 691 S.E.2d 363 (March 2, 2010) (counsel admitted prior statements of child molestation victim and her friend, including damaging allegations not otherwise before the jury, “to show the vivid imagination that both of these girls have.”). Gary v. State, 291 Ga.App. 757, 662 S.E.2d 742 (May 15, 2008). At defendant’s burglary trial, no ineffective assistance where defense counsel cross-examined investigator about other similar offenses on which he questioned defendant. “At the motion for new trial hearing, [trial counsel] explained that he had decided to ask the investigator about having confronted Gary with the other crimes as a matter of trial strategy. The defense theory was that Gary had been coerced into admitting the car wash burglary in order to avoid being charged with the other four allegedly similar crimes. In order to support this defense theory, counsel wanted to show the jury that Gary had made his admission only after having been threatened by the investigator with prosecution for those other crimes.” Held, this strategic decision “do[es] not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” Adams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 299, 659 S.E.2d 711 (March 14, 2008). At defendant’s child molestation trial, no ineffective assistance where counsel intentionally elicited officer’s testimony that he believed the victim. “The record shows, however, that counsel elicited this testimony while attacking the police investigation, suggesting that the investigator took a young child’s allegations as ‘gospel’ and investigated no further.” Decision was thus strategic. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga.App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (July 26, 2007). Aggravated assault and burglary convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where defense counsel decided to reveal defendant’s past criminal record on defendant’s direct examination rather than allow prosecutor to bring it out on cross. “Here, trial counsel, ‘in an attempt to portray [Gonzalez] as a truthful man with nothing to hide, pursued the reasonable strategy of placing the damaging information before the jury through [Gonzalez’s] direct testimony, rather than risk having the information extracted from him on cross-examination.’ Collins v. State, 276 Ga. 726, 728(2) (583 S.E.2d 26) (2003). See Rose [ v. State, 258 Ga.App. 232, 235(2)(a) (573 S.E.2d 465) (2002)] (counsel’s decision to put defendant’s prior drug conviction before jury to ‘beat the State to the punch’ was a reasonable strategic decision and not deficient performance); Crawford v. State, 252 Ga.App. 722, 725(3) (556 S.E.2d 888) (2001) (reasonable strategy and not deficient performance for counsel, who believed talkative defendant was likely to ‘open the door’ for prosecution, to put defendant’s past crimes into evidence on direct examination). Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that such was not deficient performance was not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Wilson v. State , 291 Ga.App. 69, 661 S.E.2d 221 (April 11, 2008); Terry v. State , 284 Ga. 119, 663 S.E.2d 704 (July 7, 2008); Smallwood v. State , 296 Ga.App. 16, 673 S.E.2d 537 (February 11, 2009); Everett v. State , 297 Ga.App. 351, 677 S.E.2d 394 (April 6, 2009) (reasonable trial strategy for defense counsel to put defendant’s prior conviction into evidence before State could impeach him with it, in an effort “to be very honest and not hide anything.”); Cobble v. State , 297 Ga.App. 423, 677 S.E.2d 439 (April 9, 2009); Contreras v. State , 314 Ga.App. 825, 726 S.E.2d 107 (March 15, 2012); Crumity v. State , 321 Ga.App. 768, 743 S.E.2d 455 (May 16, 2013) “no ineffective assistance where as a matter of trial strategy defense counsel elicited negative information from a defendant or defense witness as a means of beating the State to the punch.”). Venegas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 768, 647 S.E.2d 422 (June 8, 2007). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed. “At the motion for a new trial hearing, [trial counsel] Pagano explained he had a strategic reason for informing the jury about Venegas’ prior drug crime . He believed that revealing the prior crime would show Venegas had been caught and punished for one drug conviction; therefore, Venegas would not be foolish enough to commit another crime while on probation. Pagano also stated that it was his intention to put Venegas on the stand to tell his version of the events; however, Pagano had to make changes in his strategy as the trial progressed and in response to the state’s case. Pagano testified that his act of mentioning the past drug conviction was driven by his decision of in-trial strategy and tactics. Counsel’s decisions on matters of tactic and strategy, even if unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Suits v. State, 150 Ga.App. 285 (257 S.E.2d 306) (1979). Hindsight is not the measuring rod to be utilized