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in such situations, but ‘whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial court could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.’ Mency v. State, 228 Ga.App. 640, 643-44(2)(a) (492 S.E.2d 692) (1997). Here, Pagano clearly was utilizing a particular trial strategy. Because there is no testimony that provides evidence to the contrary, and in light of Pagano’s testimony, the trial court did not err in determining that Pagano’s representation fell within the broad range of acceptable professional conduct.” Accord, Merritt v. State , 329 Ga.App. 871, 766 S.E.2d 217 (November 20, 2014) (not error to present defendant’s prior convictions in his direct examination, “rather than risk having the information extracted from him on cross-examination.”). Shelton v. State, 281 Ga. 660, 641 S.E.2d 536 (February 26, 2007). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel called witness who harmed defendant’s case: “Johnson originally gave a statement to police that supported Shelton’s self-defense claim, but subsequently recanted the statement. At trial, she testified that her original statement had been erroneous and that Shelton’s actions had not been justified. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Shelton’s trial counsel testified that Shelton demanded that he call Johnson to testify because Shelton was convinced that she would again support his self-defense claim in her sworn testimony. Trial counsel testified that he knew that her testimony could be damaging, but that he presented her testimony because Shelton insisted and because it would at least allow the jury to hear her original statement. We find that trial counsel’s strategic decision to call Johnson to testify, particularly in light of Shelton’s demand that he do so, does not amount to ineffective assistance. Myers v. State, 275 Ga. 709, 713-714 (572 S.E.2d 606) (2002); Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 4 (426 S.E.2d 360) (1993).” Hopkins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 654, 642 S.E.2d 356 (February 21, 2007). DUI and open container convictions affirmed. “[T]endering the [police] report into evidence, knowing that it contained the otherwise inadmissible numerical result of the alcosensor test, fell below the standard of reasonable professional conduct. [Cit.]” Counsel thought she had to tender the report to use it to impeach the officer on an inconsistency with his testimony; in fact “‘there is no requirement in Georgia law that a witness’s prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence prior to its use for impeachment.’ (Citation omitted.) Holsey v. State, 281 Ga. 177, 179(2) (637 S.E.2d 32) (2006). See OCGA § 24-9-83.” No prejudice, however, given overwhelming evidence of guilt on DUI. Joiner v. State, 245 Ga.App. 415, 537 S.E.2d 792 (July 28, 2000). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; trial counsel was not ineffective in presenting surveillance video from another recent shoplifting charge, for which defendant had already been acquitted at trial. “Trial counsel testified that the defense in both cases was mistaken identity and that she admitted the videotape from the first trial because the jury in that trial indicated to her that they did not believe Joiner was the person depicted on the tape. Strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of counsel after consultation with the client. [Cits.] The tactical decision to use the videotape, in the hope that the jury would have difficulty making an identification as did the jury in the previous case, is not any evidence that counsel's performance fell outside the broad range of acceptable performance that members of the bar in good standing are presumed to render.” Conger v. State, 245 Ga.App. 399, 537 S.E.2d 798 (July 28, 2000). Aggravated child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown. “Conger contends that trial counsel's failure to redact portions of a large medical record, introduced as a defense exhibit, fell below the professionally reasonable standard. Specifically, Conger asserts that trial counsel failed to redact three statements implicating Conger as the perpetrator. But trial counsel testified that he consciously chose not to redact the comments as a matter of trial strategy. He felt that redactions would cause the jury to believe that Conger was hiding something. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation are ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Rowe v. State, 244 Ga.App. 654, 538 S.E.2d 452 (June 27, 2000). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; decision to present possibly damaging evidence was strategic, not deficient. Counsel here “elicited testimony about Rowe's nickname and the name of his rap group, were matters of trial strategy intended to elicit possibly unfavorable testimony before the State succeeded in doing so.” Opinion doesn’t disclose the allegedly damaging names. Green v. State , 242 Ga.App. 868, 532 S.E.2d 111 (March 17, 2000). Aggravated sodomy and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel expressly asked for victim’s improper speculation in out-of-court statement to be played for jury. “At the conclusion of his videotaped interview, in response to the question whether he knows of any other child whom defendant sodomized, J.A.G. speculates, ‘Probably some other friends. I don't know. Probably. I'm just saying probably.’ At the pretrial hearing on the admissibility of this tape, the State's attorney conceded that this statement should not be put before the jury and promised to ‘mute the tape toward that portion....’ But defendant's trial counsel testified he ‘expressly told them we did not want it muted; we did not want it eliminated.’ In counsel's