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professional judgment, the statement supported the argument that the child was fantasizing. It is sufficient to note that trial counsel's strategic choices made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. Ferrell v. State, 261 Ga. 115, 120(3), 401 S.E.2d 741 (1991); Skillern v. State, 240 Ga.App. 34, 36–37(3), 521 S.E.2d 844 (1999). The evidence in this case supports the trial court's determination that trial counsel's deliberate decision to allow the jury to hear J.A.G.'s last statement fell within the broad range of acceptable trial strategy.” Lovelace v. State, 241 Ga.App. 774, 527 S.E.2d 878 (January 11, 2000). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; no ineffective assistance for using alibi witness “despite knowledge of minor time discrepancies between the testimony of Lovelace and this witness, was acceptable trial strategy.” Turpin v. Bennett, 270 Ga. 584, 513 S.E.2d 478 (March 1, 1999). “This habeas corpus case presents an issue of first impression in this state: Does a defendant have a right to effective assistance of an expert witness which is distinct from his right to effective assistance of counsel? We answer this question in the negative. We hasten to add, however, that the adequacy of an expert’s assistance can be examined within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Defendant’s psychiatric expert, unknown to defense counsel, was suffering from AIDS-related dementia when he took the stand at defendant’s murder trial. “His clothes were disheveled; he was unkempt and sloppy. His testimony was the worst defense counsel had ever seen: He confused names and appeared to be irrational; his voice fluctuated inappropriately; and his facial expressions were ‘cartoonish.’” His testimony varied significantly from what he told counsel, and seriously damaged the defense. “The due process clause ensures that a defendant will be given access to a competent psychiatrist when the defendant’s mental state is in issue. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). But this is not to say that a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of a psychiatrist in addition to the effective assistance of counsel. On the contrary, a defendant has no right to the effective assistance of a psychiatrist, or any other expert. Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765 (4 th Cir., 1989) (per curiam).” Remanded “to determine whether defense counsel were ineffective in presenting Dr. Harris’ testimony once it became apparent that he was incompetent, [or] in failing to seek a continuance to procure the assistance of another expert for the remainder of the guilt/innocence and the penalty phases of the trial.” Grant of petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel affirmed after remand, 272 Ga. 57, 525 S.E.2d 354 (January 14, 2000). 33. DEFENDANT UNCOOPERATIVE Daniels v. State, 296 Ga.App. 795, 676 S.E.2d 13 (March 20, 2009). “‘A defendant may not refuse to cooperate with appointed counsel and then claim he was not effectively represented,’” quoting Jefferson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 859, 861(1) (434 S.E.2d 814) (1993). Defendant here rejected counsel’s effort to waive his speedy trial demand and seek a continuance, and so now cannot complain about the trial court’s denial of continuance. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). Defendant can’t complain that his appointed counsel was unprepared for trial where trial was forced to proceed five days after counsel’s appointment by defendant’s refusal to withdraw his statutory speedy trial demand. “Having declined to withdraw his speedy trial demand, Celestin cannot now complain that his attorney proceeded to trial without conducting a lengthier investigation of his case.” Accord, Hubert v. State , 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). Bradford v. Brown, 277 Ga. 92, 586 S.E.2d 631 (September 15, 2003). “[A] defendant cannot fail to cooperate with his counsel and ‘then claim that, because of that lack of cooperation, he was not effectively represented.’” Mack v. State, 242 Ga.App. 256, 529 S.E.2d 393 (February 7, 2000). Robbery by force conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where “Mack did not assist his counsel and was not forthcoming with information. He cannot now complain of counsel's alleged deficiencies that were caused by his own failure to communicate and fully cooperate with counsel. Compare Bolden v. State, 224 Ga.App. 389, 390(2)(c), 480 S.E.2d 395 (1997).” Cromartie v. State, 241 Ga.App. 718, 527 S.E.2d 228 (December 15, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to meet with defendant where “the only reason more meetings did not occur was because Cromartie, who was out on bond, would not call counsel or set up an appointment to come to counsel's office. The record indicates that Cromartie was more interested in seeking a continuance of his case than preparing for trial. Thus, counsel was not ineffective due to a failure to discuss the case with Cromartie.” 34. DEFENDANT’S CUSTODIAL STATEMENT, FAILURE TO OBJECT