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ineffective assistance in failing to present alibi testimony of defendant and his grandmother, never disclosed to counsel. “Here, the transcript of the remand hearing reveals that Lewis would have testified that he was at home sick during the time of the crimes. Lewis also presented testimony from his grandmother, who allegedly would have given testimony to show that Lewis did not own the gun used in the crimes and to support Lewis' claim that he was at home sick with the flu during the entire time of the crime spree that formed the basis of the charges against him. However, the transcript also reveals that Lewis and his grandmother never told first appellate counsel about any defense theory involving Lewis' alleged illness at the time of the crimes. In fact, first appellate counsel testified that the first time that he had heard anything about this alleged alibi defense was at the remand hearing itself. In this connection, first appellate counsel cannot possibly have performed deficiently by having failed to present testimony of which Lewis and his grandmother had never made him aware. See, e.g., McIlwain v. State, 287 Ga. 115, 118(5) (694 S.E.2d 657) (2010) (Attorney ‘could not be ineffective for failing to ... call a potential alibi witness of whom she was not informed’).” In any event, “the alibi defense fails to rebut the overwhelming evidence connecting Lewis to the crime spree.” Accord, Smith v. State , 328 Ga.App. 863, 763 S.E.2d 251 (August 25, 2014) (counsel’s advice to defendant, not to testify, couldn’t be judged based on a version of events never shared with counsel by defendant, and contrary to the one defendant did share); Wingster v. State , 295 Ga. 725, 763 S.E.2d 680 (September 22, 2014) (counsel not deficient in failing to seek suppression of defendant’s statement to officers where defendant never claimed the statement was involuntary until after trial, citing Lewis ); Styles v. State , 329 Ga.App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (September 24, 2014). Cheeks v. State, 325 Ga.App. 367, 750 S.E.2d 753 (November 13, 2013). Rape and related convictions reversed; trial counsel provided ineffective assistance “in failing to object to argument by the State regarding Cheeks' silence and failure to come forward to police.” “At Cheeks' trial, the State argued during its opening statement that Cheeks refused to talk to investigating officers. The prosecutor then called Cheeks' mother as a witness and questioned her extensively regarding Cheeks' failure to turn himself in. And during its closing, the State again contended, repeatedly, that Cheeks refused to speak with and ‘evade[d]’ the police and that he did so because he was guilty: ‘You didn't do anything wrong? Go down and talk to the police. Tell them what happened.’” Counsel testified at motion for new trial that it was her first trial as lead counsel and that she failed to object because she was nervous, not for strategic reasons. Distinguishing cases where reference to defendant’s silence wasn’t solicited or exploited by prosecutor: “[h]ere, in contrast, the State's conduct was precisely the aggressive exploitation of a defendant's silence that we have repeatedly and unequivocally condemned.” Following State v. Moore, 318 Ga.App. 118, 123(3) (733 S.E.2d 418) (2012) (trial court properly granted motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to prosecutor’s references to defendant’s silence). Williams v. State, 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to enlist trial judge to caution defendant against testifying. “ Williams complains that, once his lawyers believed that he intended to testify at the sentencing hearing in an inappropriate manner notwithstanding their advice to the contrary, they failed to seek the trial court's assistance to explain to Williams the limited purpose of that hearing and the options available to the court at that time. But decisions with respect to testifying in one's own defense are tactical ones ‘to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with his trial counsel[,] and there is no general requirement that a trial court interject itself into that decisionmaking process.’ Burton v. State, 263 Ga. 725, 728(6) (438 S.E.2d 83) (1994) (citations omitted). See also Spencer v. State, 287 Ga. 434, 438–439(3) (696 S.E.2d 617) (2010) (noting the potential danger of disclosing privileged content of discussions between defendant and his lawyer about whether to testify). ‘Courts thus have no duty to advise a defendant of the right to testify or to determine on the record whether the defendant's decision is voluntary, knowing, and intentional.’ Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 9(4) (717 S.E.2d 447) (2011) (citations omitted). Because the trial court had no duty to advise Williams as to his testimony at the sentencing hearing, the failure of his lawyers to request the court's assistance in that way did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ethridge v. State, 283 Ga.App. 289, 290–291(2) (641 S.E.2d 282) (2007).” Accord, Stevens v. State , 329 Ga.App. 91, 762 S.E.2d 833 (August 29, 2014). Slan v. State, 316 Ga.App. 843, 730 S.E.2d 565 (July 13, 2012). Convictions for robbery and simple battery affirmed; 1. no ineffective assistance in allowing defendant “to testify at trial despite his prior convictions. But the unrebutted testimony at the motion for new trial hearing showed that Slan had ‘insisted he was going to get on the stand.’ ‘The decision whether or not to testify is a tactical one made by the defendant himself after consultation with counsel. The choice of whether to testify is ultimately a defendant's. We will not second-guess tactical decisions made at trial,’ in this regard. Nichols v. State, 288 Ga.App. 118, 125(3)(g) (653 S.E.2d 300) (2007) (punctuation and footnotes omitted).” Accord, Russell v. State , 322 Ga.App. 553, 745 S.E.2d 774 (July 1, 2013); New v. State , 327 Ga.App. 87, 755 S.E.2d 568 (March 27, 2014) (“The choice of whether to testify is ultimately a defendant's.”). 2. No ineffective assistance in allowing defendant to testify with security device on leg, as no evidence that jury saw the device. “The trial transcript