☢ test - Í

showed that trial counsel raised the issue before the trial court, the trial court examined Slan before he testified, and the court found that the device was not visible. The court instructed that photographs be taken of Slan's legs, and they were admitted as court exhibits. We note that no leg security device is visible from the photographs. Furthermore, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that Slan testified at trial from behind a podium and that counsel brought over to Slan exhibits about which Slan testified. Accordingly, Slan has failed to establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient.” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 584, 723 S.E.2d 431 (February 27, 2012). Felony murder conviction affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel didn’t tell defendant, before defendant decided to take the stand, that counsel was going to tender into evidence the recording of defendant’s statement to police. “At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he introduced the videotape because he believed it supported appellant's self-defense claim and believed it cast a favorable light on appellant and an unfavorable light on the police investigator. … Since trial counsel presented reasonable strategic reasons for introducing the videotape, the fact that appellant was ill-prepared or made uncomfortable by the cross-examination regarding the videotape and, in hindsight, may not have elected to testify, does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rudolph v. State, 313 Ga.App. 411, 721 S.E.2d 625 (December 19, 2011). 1. Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure “to advise him about his right to testify.” “Based on his common practice, trial counsel stated that he would have directed Rudolph not to testify, but would have made it clear that it was ultimately Rudolph's decision. See Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162(1) (535 S.E.2d 760) (2000) (‘Certainly, evidence of a routine or standard practice or procedure can be used in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards.’ ) (citation omitted).” 2. “In any event, Rudolph has not shown that there is any likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had testified at trial. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Rudolph did not present any evidence as to what the content of his testimony would have been had he testified at trial, and therefore, he failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. See Brown v. State, 288 Ga.App. 671, 672(1)(a), (b) (655 S.E.2d 287) (2007).” Smith v. State, 306 Ga.App. 693, 703 S.E.2d 329 (November 3, 2010). Felony shoplifting conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failing to advise defendant to testify after State rested. Defendant and counsel had discussed his right to testify pre-trial, and had agreed that he would not, due to prior felony convictions; but State’s evidence developed differently than expected. Still, “[a] trial attorney has no obligation ‘to inform a defendant of a “continuing” right to testify or, as in this case, to re-advise a defendant of the right to testify after the State presents [its] evidence.’ Thomas v. State, [282 Ga. 894, 896-897(2), 655 S.E.2d 599 (2008)]. Smith's counsel previously advised him not to testify because she was concerned that it could open the door to evidence of his prior felonies and undercut his credibility. [fn] ‘Such advice is a classic example of trial strategy and tactics that do not fall outside the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. [Cit.]’ Mathis v. State, 265 Ga.App. 541, 544(2)(a), 594 S.E.2d 737 (2004). See also Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 218- 219(4)(a), 675 S.E.2d 1 (2009); Williams v. State, 239 Ga.App. 598, 599, 521 S.E.2d 650 (1999).” Spencer v. State, 287 Ga. 434, 696 S.E.2d 617 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defendant’s three attorneys gave conflicting advice on whether defendant should testify. “Spencer points first to the conflicting advice he received from his three lawyers about whether he should testify, asserting that a defendant is entitled to unified advice from counsel. All three of Spencer's lawyers had substantial experience in criminal defense practice. Whether Spencer should testify was an issue they discussed with him from the beginning of the representation, and … the trial court gave Spencer an overnight recess to consult further with counsel before making his final decision. Two of his attorneys thought it was good strategy for Spencer not to testify; his lead attorney disagreed. They presented their advice to Spencer, and he then made the decision not to testify, which was ultimately his decision and not theirs to make. See Davenport v. State, 283 Ga. 171, 174 (656 S.E.2d 844) (2008). Spencer was fortunate to have not one but three experienced lawyers to advise him, and their advice did not in any way violate his Sixth Amendment right. The record shows both that counsel's performance was not professionally deficient and that Spencer has shown no prejudice from their performance.” Accord, Rivers v. State , 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015) (“Having been informed that he, and not his attorney, makes the ultimate decision whether to testify on his own behalf, appellant cannot complain about his election to follow his counsel's tactical advice.”). Clements v. State, 299 Ga.App. 561, 683 S.E.2d 127 (August 5, 2009). No ineffective assistance in advising defendant not to testify: “Clements's trial counsel testified that he had continuing discussions with Clements over several days regarding her right to testify. He advised Clements that she should not testify because (i) her testimony would add no new