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statute. In this respect, he is correct. See Howell v. State , 180 Ga. App. 749, 751-52 (3) (350 S.E.2d 473) (1986).” “Necessary sustenance” refers to food and nourishment, not medical care. “‘The denial of necessary and appropriate medical care for a child under 18 years of age can constitute cruelty to a child when it causes the child “cruel or excessive physical or mental pain,” under OCGA § 16-5-70(b) but it does not constitute a denial of “sustenance”.’ Id. at 751-52 (3). In order for the State to have charged Everhart sufficiently with cruelty to children in the first degree for the failure to seek timely medical care following the severe beating of the victim, the State needed to allege that the failure maliciously caused the child ‘ cruel or excessive physical or mental pain .’ OCGA § 16-5-70(b) (emphasis added); see also Howell , 180 Ga. App. at 751-52 (3); Williams v. State , 285 Ga. App. 628, 629 (1) (647 S.E.2d 324) (2007). The State’s indictment omitted these essential elements of the crime and therefore failed to charge Everhart with any crime at all. Therefore, Count 1 of the indictment was fatally defective and would have been dismissed if Everhart’s counsel had filed a general demurrer.” Lowe v. State, S15A1691, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 111, 2016 WL 687315 (February 22, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to demur to indictment based on misspelling of defendant’s middle name. “Insofar as Lowe does not challenge his identity as the accused in this case, Lowe cannot demonstrate any prejudice from the typographical error in the indictment or counsel’s failure to take corrective action in that regard.” “See OCGA § 17-7-112 (plea of misnomer should state that defendant ‘was not known and called by the name’ in the indictment).” Brewer v. State, 328 Ga.App. 801, 762 S.E.2d 622 (August 6, 2014). Convictions for child exploitation affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel filed general demurrer, at defendant’s insistence, alerting State that it had charged defendant with the wrong offense. State then obtained new indictment, charging the correct offense – child exploitation by electronic device rather than attempted child molestation – resulting in defendant’s conviction. At motion for new trial hearing, defense counsel testified that she tried to explain to defendant that it would be better not to raise the issue pre-trial because it would give the State the opportunity to correct the defect – precisely what happened – but defendant insisted. Court of Appeals rejects defendant’s argument that trial counsel was deficient for acceding to his threats and demands, thus “abandoning” her own professional judgment. “This Court has repeatedly held that, in connection with an ineffective assistance claim, ‘a defendant cannot blame trial counsel for a decision he himself made over counsel's objection.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gunter v. State, 316 Ga.App. 485, 488(3), 729 S.E.2d 596 (2012) (The defendant could not prevail on an ineffective assistance claim when she waived the charge of a lesser included offense against her attorney's advice.). Pretermitting whether [trial counsel] should have agreed to file the demurrer under the circumstances presented, ‘[a] defendant will not be allowed to induce an asserted error, sit silently hoping for acquittal, and obtain a new trial when that tactic fails. Induced error is impermissible and furnishes no ground for reversal.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alvarado v. State, 271 Ga.App. 714, 719(3), 610 S.E.2d 675 (2005) (The defendant could not prevail on an ineffective assistance claim when he waived a trial by jury over his attorney's advice that to do so would be unwise.). See Sanders v. State, 211 Ga.App. 859, 861(1), 440 S.E.2d 745 (1994) (The defendant could not prevail on an ineffective assistance claim when he testified at trial against his counsel's advice and, in the process, opened the door to his criminal record. This Court held that ‘trial counsel cannot be labeled ineffective where the defendant proceeded against counsel's advice and blundered.’).” Boddie v. State, 327 Ga.App. 667, 760 S.E.2d 668 (June 19, 2014). Convictions for incest, aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed. No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to demur to indictment based on range of dates instead of specific dates charged. “At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Boddie testified that he was away from S.B. at certain times between August and December, but in most instances did not testify as to specific dates or years, or whether he was out of town or just absent for a few hours. … Boddie ‘did not proffer any evidence showing that he had a possible defense’ for the series of offenses that recurred approximately twice weekly between August 9, 2007, and January 19, 2009.” “Further, at the motion for new trial hearing, Boddie's trial counsel testified that alibi was not a viable defense. She stated that because the crimes which Boddie was accused of committing took place as an ongoing pattern of conduct occurring approximately twice a week over a 13–month ‘timeframe, alibi didn't really fit into that. He just denied that it even had happened. So I don't think alibi was the appropriate defense in that ... he said it didn't happen.’” Allen v. State, 318 Ga.App. 531, 734 S.E.2d 260 (November 15, 2012). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty pleas to child molestation; decision not to file special demurrer seeking more specificity in date of offense was strategic. “Here, the indictment alleged that the offenses occurred between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2008. Allen argues that his trial counsel should have filed a special demurrer seeking greater specificity as to the dates of the