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offenses in the indictment so that he could have developed an alibi defense. Nevertheless, at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, his trial counsel testified that he considered filing a demurrer, but decided not to because ‘if the demurrer puts the finger on a[n] issue, then sometimes the State can just, you know, come back and correct the defect.’ And he anticipated that the State would not have chosen a time frame that would have helped an alibi defense, so he determined that demurring ultimately would not be helpful. This testimony demonstrates that trial counsel's failure to seek greater specificity in the indictment was a strategic decision made after consideration of the pros and cons and likelihood of success. Counsel's calculation was not based on a legal error, and such strategic decisions do not amount to deficient performance.” Lewis v. State, 304 Ga.App. 831, 698 S.E.2d 365 (July 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and child cruelty affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to demur to count of accusation alleging erroneous date of offense. “The evidence did not establish that Lewis was unable to present a defense to the child cruelty charge as a result of the obvious date error. ‘Further, as we have previously noted, because a defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,’” quoting Washington v. State, 298 Ga.App. 105, 106, 679 S.E.2d 111 (2009). “See also Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 361(5), 613 S.E.2d 628 (2005). At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that even if a special demurrer had been successfully pursued, the state would have been able to correct the date error and re-indict Lewis for the offense.” Accord, Chalk v. State , 318 Ga.App. 45, 733 S.E.2d 351 (October 16, 2012) (incorrect offense date in indictment was correctable, no an essential element, didn’t prejudice any defense); Moore v. State , 319 Ga.App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (February 14, 2013); Boddie v. State , 327 Ga.App. 667, 760 S.E.2d 668 (June 19, 2014) (No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to demur to indictment based on range of dates instead of specific dates charged.); Young v. State , 327 Ga.App. 852, 761 S.E.2d 801 (July 7, 2014); Conley v. State , 329 Ga.App. 96, 763 S.E.2d 881 (September 22, 2014); Horne v. State , 333 Ga.App. 353, 773 S.E.2d 467 (June 23, 2015). Metts v. State, 297 Ga.App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (April 6, 2009). No ineffective assistance for failing to challenge indictment based on lack of specificity of date of offense. “All three counts of the third indictment averred that the crimes occurred between December 1, 2001, and August 3, 2004. Metts argues that his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a pretrial demurrer to require the state to identify a more specific date for the charged offenses. We do not agree because ‘[Metts] [has] not demonstrate[d] that the length of the period in which the indictment alleged the crimes were committed materially affected his ability to present a defense, which did not rely on an alibi or other time sensitive claim. Thus, even if the indictment was subject to a special demurrer, [Metts] failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that, but for defense counsel's failure to demur to the indictment, the outcome of the trial would have differed.’ (Footnote omitted.) Robbins v. State, 290 Ga.App. 323, 329(4)(a) (659 S.E.2d 628) (2008). Metts thus cannot succeed on the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim.” Accord, Clarke v. State , 317 Ga.App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (August 10, 2012) (no showing that range of dates in theft counts impaired defense; suggestion that new indictment might have been filed outside statute of limitation on some charges was “mere speculation and conjecture.”). Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 633 S.E.2d 537 (July 14, 2006). Indictment charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on a date after the indictment was returned. “This was an obvious clerical error which, after verdict and judgment, would not have vitiated the indictment. Wood v. State, 118 Ga.App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968); Lewis v. State, 55 Ga.App. 743(2), 191 S.E. 278 (1937). However, defendant could have challenged the indictment on the ground that it set forth an impossible date by filing a timely written demurrer. See Lewis v. State, supra (‘[a]fter verdict and judgment the indictment alleging an impossible day, or a day after the bill was found true, is held good. It would be otherwise if it were excepted to in time on special demurrer in writing’). Defendant did not do that. [fn]” Failure to file a special demurrer was deficient, and was harmful here because a prior indictment against defendant for the same charge had been quashed. “If trial counsel had timely challenged [this count] of the second indictment, any future prosecution for that crime would be barred. OCGA § 17-7-53.1; State v. Dorsey, 251 Ga.App. 788, 555 S.E.2d 141 (2001).” Bowden v. State, 279 Ga.App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (May 3, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial based on alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel in failing to file special demurrer to indictment, seeking more specific statement of which drugs defendant was being accused of possessing (those in his pocket or those in the vehicle). “[W]e note that had the special demurrer been granted, the State could have simply re-indicted Bowden. Wallace v. State, 253 Ga.App. 220, 223(3) (558 S.E.2d 773) (2002). In fact, Bowden’s first trial counsel testified that had he filed a special demurrer and won, the State could have re-indicted Bowden on additional charges, worsening Bowden’s position. Because of such considerations, the Georgia Supreme Court in Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 361(5) (613 S.E.2d 628) (2005), has generally concluded that ‘the failure to file a special demurrer ... would not support a finding of the