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violation of the constitutional right to effective legal representation.’” Accord, Washington v. State , 298 Ga.App. 105, 679 S.E.2d 111 (May 22, 2009); Cuzzort v. State , 307 Ga.App. 52, 703 S.E.2d 713 (November 23, 2010); White v. State , 312 Ga.App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (November 7, 2011); Jackson v. State , 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012); Coleman v. State , 318 Ga.App. 478, 735 S.E.2d 788 (October 29, 2012); Chapman v. State , 318 Ga.App. 514, 733 S.E.2d 848 (November 2, 2012); Bighams v. State , 296 Ga. 267, 765 S.E.2d 917 (November 17, 2014); Edwards v. State , 330 Ga.App. 732, 769 S.E.2d 150 (February 19, 2015); Brooks v. State , 332 Ga.App. 396, 772 S.E.2d 838 (May 21, 2015). Polk v. State, 275 Ga.App. 467, 620 S.E.2d 857 (September 9, 2005). “Polk contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a timely demurrer to the burglary count of the indictment on the grounds that it was fatally defective because it did not specify an underlying felony. We agree. … In Lockhart [ v. State, 24 Ga. 420 (1858)], our Supreme Court held that an indictment which charged solely the offense of burglary without identifying the underlying felony was a nullity. Id. at 422. In Ealey [ v. State, 136 Ga.App. 292 (221 S.E.2d 50) (1975)], citing Lockhart, supra, we reversed a conviction for burglary because the indictment in the case did not specify an underlying felony. Ealey, supra. at 292-293. The state argues that the case sub judice is distinguishable because we may infer that Count 1 of the indictment, which charged Polk with aggravated stalking, supplied the underlying felony for the burglary charge. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55(1) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995), holding that ‘[a]llegations set forth in one count of an indictment cannot be imputed to a separate count, absent specific reference to the allegation sought to be imputed .’ [Cits.] … A fortiori, counsel’s performance was deficient in his failure to challenge timely the validity of the burglary count on this ground. [Cit.] The failure to do so contributed to Polk’s conviction on a void count, thus it harmed Polk and prejudiced his case. [Cit.]” Hughes v. State, 266 Ga.App. 652, 598 S.E.2d 43 (March 24, 2004). “Under Georgia law, a motion to quash ‘is not a proper method for attacking an indictment or accusation for any defect not appearing on its face. Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the offense charged is not in issue on a motion to quash. As reasoned by the Supreme Court, we know of no rule of law that would permit an indictment to be quashed on the ground that the state’s subsequent proof might not authorize a conviction for the offense charged in the indictment. Such a rule would be incapable of application for the reason that at this stage of the proceedings-- post indictment, pre-trial--no one knows what the state’s proof will show.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Pattee, 201 Ga.App. 690, 692 (411 S.E.2d 751) (1991).” Trial counsel thus was not ineffective for failing to file motion to quash based on alleged “erroneous factual allegations.” 38. DENIAL OF COUNSEL Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (April 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Tepanca complains that first appellate counsel abandoned his case and “argues that, pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657) (1984), prejudice must be presumed in his case due to a constructive denial of counsel. However, ‘for the Cronic ‘constructive denial of counsel’ exception to apply, the ‘attorney's failure must be complete and must occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific points.’ Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 699 (606 S.E.2d 244) (2004) (Citation and punctuation omitted.). [Tepanca's] assertion that his [appellate counsel abandoned him at the motion for new trial stage] does not meet this stringent standard.’ Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 682–683(4)(a) (743 S.E.2d 1) (2013).” Carswell v. State , 244 Ga.App. 516, 534 S.E.2d 568 (May 12, 2000). Convictions for kidnapping, child molestation, and related offenses reversed; defendant “was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel by the failure to appoint counsel to represent him until two years after his arrest and after he had requested appointment of Counsel at his initial appearance before a magistrate.” “Uniform Superior Court Rule 30.2 provides that: ‘[b]efore arraignment the court shall inquire whether the accused is represented by counsel and, if not, inquire into the defendant's desires and financial circumstances. If the defendant desires an attorney and is indigent, the court shall authorize the immediate appointment of counsel.’ Despite this requirement, Carswell was arraigned without counsel and, as far as reflected by the record here, without further inquiry concerning his previously expressed desire for counsel.” Rejects State’s argument that the duty to appoint counsel doesn’t arise until completion of an application: “The Guidelines of the Georgia Indigent Defense Council … refute this argument. Section 1.1 provides that ‘[c]ounsel shall be provided to all persons eligible [fn] ... whenever such a person is accused of a felony by indictment, warrant or warrantless arrest....’ (Emphasis supplied.) As of his arrest without a warrant on December 13, 1995, Carswell was entitled to counsel. Section 1.2 provides that ‘[c]ounsel shall be appointed for every eligible person in custody within 72 hours of arrest or detention.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Under the specific facts of this situation and considering the length of time after which Carswell had requested counsel that he was deprived of counsel, we conclude that this is one of those unique cases in which no specific harm need be shown in order to require redress,” citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).